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Abstract
One recent debate in philosophy of physics has centered on whether quantum particles are
individuals or not. The received view is that particles are not individuals and the standard
methodology is to approach the question via the structure of quantum theory. I challenge
both the received view and the standard methodology. I contend not only that the structure
of quantum theory is not the right place to look for conditions of individuality that
quantum particles may or may not satisfy, but also that there is an important role for
traditional metaphysics to play. Consequently, my work brings together the philosophy of
physics and traditional metaphysics literatures to shed new light on the debate over the
individuality of quantum particles. I defend a set of conditions of individuality and argue
that quantum particles satisfy these conditions thereby defending the view that particles
are individuals in opposition to the received view. I also challenge a second feature of the
standard methodology insofar as I challenge the significance of the Principle of the
Identity of Indiscernibles in terms of which much discussion in the philosophy of physics
literature is framed. My work is significant in a number of additional ways as well. My
work implies that the dominant explanation for quantum statistics in terms of
non-individuality is incorrect, and it also undermines the ontic-structural realists
metaphysical underdetermination challenge to the scientific realist.
Keywords: Individuality; Non-Individuality; Identity; Discernibility; Quantum
mechanics; Quantum particles; Identity of Indiscernibles
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Lay Summary
One recent debate in philosophy of physics has centered on whether quantum particles are
individuals or not. It is commonly thought that particles are not individuals because the
formulas governing their behavior dont care which particle is which when we have
multiple particles of the same kind. The standard way to determine whether particles are
individuals or not is to assume that being an individual requires possessing identity (in
some sense) and looking at the structure of quantum theory to try to determine whether
quantum particles have some form of identity. I challenge the common view by rethinking
what it means for something to be an individual. I also challenge the standard approach of
looking at the structure of quantum theory because quantum theory gives us both reasons
to think that particles have some form of identity as well as reasons to think that particles
dont have any sort of identity. So, the structure of quantum theory underdetermines the
answer to our question of whether particles are individuals or not. By rethinking what it
means to be an individual we can avoid this underdetermination by providing an account
of individuality in which the structure of quantum theory gives us a clear answer. I also
think that there is an important role for traditional metaphysics to play given that we cant
extract a unified account of individuality from quantum theory itself. Consequently, my
work brings together the philosophy of physics and traditional metaphysical literatures to
shed new light on the debate. I defend a set of conditions of individuality independently of
any considerations regarding quantum theory and argue that quantum particles satisfy
those conditions and are, therefore, individuals. My work challenges several additional
positions as well. It challenges the dominant explanation for certain aspects of the
behavior of quantum particles where those aspects are explained by viewing quantum
particles as non-individuals. It also allows the scientific realist (the view that the
theoretical entities posited by science exist) to respond to a challenge from ontic-structural
realists (the view that we should only accept the existence of structural features of our
scientific theories).
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1
Introduction
My goal in this dissertation is to defend the claim that a new view of individuality should
be adopted in discussions of individuality in non-relativistic quantum mechanics
(NRQM); one that is more metaphysically robust than the accounts currently on offer. I
have a number of motivations for this. My primary motivation is that I think the
philosophical questions asked by philosophers of science can often benefit from the work
of metaphysicians. Discussions of individuality in NRQM is just one instance of where
the work of metaphysicians can prove useful. A second motivation is that focusing on the
issue of individuality in NRQM allows this work to provide tools that impact on another
debate of interest; that between scientific realists and ontic-structural realists. It would be
well beyond the scope of this dissertation to focus on both debates, however, a defense of
a conception of individuality that isn’t meant to be grounded in physical theory provides
tools to counter the ontic-structural realists metaphysical underdetermination argument.1
So this dissertation serves to show how the work of metaphysicians can play a useful role
in the debate over the individuality of quantum particles and how that same work has
implications for a second debate.2
1The metaphysical underdetermination argument is essentially that NRQM doesn’t tell us whether
quantum particles are individuals or not and that this sort of underdetermination is problematic for the
scientific realist. We can accept that NRQM doesn’t settle the issue of whether quantum particles are
individuals, that not being able to determine whether quantum particles are individuals or not would be a
problem for the scientific realist, and still counter the argument by arguing that the physical theory isn’t the
right place to look for conditions on individuality that quantum particles may, or may not, satisfy.
2Obviously, those implications are not worked out, but they could be in a future expansion of this
project.
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My goal in chapter two is to show that NRQM does indeed fail to determine whether
quantum particles are individuals or not, paving the way to look elsewhere to settle the
issue. This will be accomplished by looking at the four major arguments in the literature
in favor of or against viewing quantum particles as individuals. Two of these arguments
conclude that quantum particles are not individuals whereas two of them conclude that
quantum particles are individuals. I conclude the chapter with a brief discussion of
metaphysical underdetermination to situate my work with respect to the debate between
scientific realists and ontic-structural realists.
In chapter three I outline four challenges that must be kept in mind in discussions of
individuality in NRQM. The first three of these challenges are for those who want to claim
that quantum particles are non-individuals. The challenges mostly take the form of
pointing to ways in which entertaining the idea of non-individuals requires revisions to
more than just the notion of individuality and how these further revisions point to
problems that may be missed by focusing too narrowly on the concept of an individual.
The challenge to those who think that quantum particles are individuals comes from the
existence of various proofs in the literature that demonstrate ways in which states in
NRQM violate various versions of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. These
violations put restraints on the sorts of accounts of individuality quantum particles could
satisfy.
I begin chapter four by distinguishing between a number of questions one might ask about
individuality that have sometimes been conflated. I then move on to consider different
possible conditions on individuality. In each case I consider whether the condition in
question may be either necessary, sufficient, or both. There are two main results of this
chapter. The first is that I settle on a set of conditions that I take to be individually
necessary and jointly sufficient for something to count as an individual. The second is that
3
I show how one might respond to the first three challenges discussed in chapter
three.
In chapter five I consider the possible metaphysical grounds of individuality. That is,
where chapter four was about what it means for something to be an individual chapter five
is about what metaphysical features of the world could serve to underpin individuality. In
both chapters four and five my evaluations of the positions under consideration are novel
insofar as I adopt a new evaluative criterion. That criterion is whether the position in
question allows for the possible existence of non-individuals.
Finally, in chapter six I wrap up by considering how quantum particles fare with respect to
the conditions of individuality defended in chapter four and the metaphysical grounds of
individuality defended in chapter five. I conclude that quantum particles are
individuals.
4
Individuality in Quantum Mechanics
My broader goal in this dissertation is to defend the claim that a new view of individuality
should be adopted in discussions of individuality in non-relativistic quantum mechanics
(NRQM); one that is more metaphysically robust than the accounts currently on offer.1 As
a first step I will show that there is good reason to think that quantum mechanics itself
cannot provide us with an account of individuality, otherwise that account of individuality
should be the one we adopt. This will be accomplished by a review of the existing
arguments regarding what quantum mechanics tells us, or doesn’t tell us, about
individuality.
I will begin with two arguments that conclude that quantum objects are not individuals.
The first is an argument due to Redhead and Teller according to which the most
ontologically perspicuous formalism of quantum mechanics is the Fock space formalism.
The second will be a much-discussed argument that I shall refer to as “the argument from
quantum statistics.” Next will be two arguments to the effect that quantum objects are
individuals. The first will be a two-part argument that quantum objects are weakly
discernible, and that weak discernibility is sufficient for individuality. The second is due
to Dorato and Morganti who argue that quantum mechanics may endorse a primitive
thisness view of individuality according to which quantum objects are individuals. Finally,
I will conclude with a brief discussion of metaphysical underdetermination. That is, a
1There are a number of reasons why I think it appropriate to limit myself to NRQM. I discuss these
reasons in chapter six.
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discussion of how we should understand the fact that NRQM is compatible with
particles-as-individuals and particles-as-non-individuals interpretations.
2.1 Labels, Individuality, and Fock Space
Redhead and Teller provide an argument to the effect that quantum mechanics tells us that
particles are not individuals (Redhead and Teller 1991, Redhead and Teller 1992, and
Teller 1995).2 They begin by arguing that the standard formalism of quantum mechanics
(which they call the labeled tensor product Hilbert space formalism LTPHSF) combined
with the assumption that distinct rays represent distinct physical situations forces us to
accept label transcendental individuality (described below). They then argue that the need
to symmetrize or antisymmetrize multiparticle wave functions for systems of identical
particles is an artifact of the use of particle labels in the LTPHSF.3 Next, they claim that
the need to (anti)symmetrize creates surplus formal structure. Finally, they argue that the
Fock space formalism does not contain this surplus structure and so is a more appropriate
formalism for answering metaphysical questions. Because the Fock space formalism lacks
particle labels they conclude that particles are not individuals.
Principles of individuation can be divided into two types. Transcendental individuality is
individuality granted by something over-and-above an object’s properties (for example,
individuality granted by haecceities, primitive thisness, or bare particulars).4 Redhead and
Teller further divide transcendental individuality into property transcendental
individuality and label transcendental individuality (LTI). Property transcendental
2I will use the term “particle” to refer to quantum particles except when I am discussing both classical
and quantum particles.
3I will follow the practice of using the phrase “identical particles” to refer to particles that share all the
same state independent properties.
4I will discuss candidates for conferring transcendental individuality in detail in chapter five.
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individuality refers to that in virtue of which an object bears properties (a bare particular
would be a candidate for conferring property transcendental individuality).5 Label
transcendental individuality refers to that in virtue of which an object is an individual
(haecceities or Dorato and Morganti’s primitive thisness would be candidates for
conferring label transcendental individuality). For Redhead and Teller an object is an
individual if it can, in principle, be labeled, distinguished (from other objects of the same
kind), and reidentified over time. So, label transcendental individuality refers to that in
virtue of which an object can be labeled, distinguished, and reidentified over time.
The other type of principle of individuation is that of bundle individuality. Bundle
individuality is individuality conferred by some bundle of individuating properties. These
could be either intrinsic or extrinsic properties. However, since I will only be concerned
with collections of particles that share the same intrinsic properties, I will only be
concerned with the latter. Bundle individuality is an analog of label transcendental
individuality. The bundle of individuating properties is that in virtue of which the object is
an individual. A good example from classical physics is spatiotemporal properties.
Classical objects are taken to be impenetrable and so every classical object will have a
unique spatiotemporal trajectory. Note that I will use the phrase “label individuality”
when I want to refer to label transcendental individuality and bundle individuality
together.
With the above in mind, we can get a better idea of what Redhead and Teller mean when
they say that particles are not individuals. To say that particles are not individuals is to say
they cannot be labeled even in principle. This in turn means that particles cannot, in
general, be distinguished from other particles of the same kind and that particles cannot, in
general, be reidentified over time. However, it is important to note that this is not an
5But note that something that confers property transcendental individuality needn’t also confer label
transcendental individuality as a bare particular would.
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epistemic failure. It’s not merely that we can’t tell which particle is which, but that there is
no fact of the matter as to which is which. Switching the positions of two identical
particles doesn’t create a distinct, but empirically identical, state of affairs, but instead
amounts to doing nothing at all (so it’s questionable whether it’s even coherent to consider
switching the positions of two identical particles if particles are not individuals).
Similarly, there’s no fact of the matter as to whether an electron you detected in the lab on
Tuesday is the same electron you detected last Friday.
It is important to note, to stave off counterexamples, that even if particles are not
individuals it can still be possible to distinguish them from others of the same kind or
reidentify them over time in some cases. This is because even particles of the same kind
can differ in their extrinsic properties (e.g. the property of having been detected by
detector 1) or their state dependent properties (e.g. being spin-up). To take a simple
example, consider sending a single electron through a series of Stern-Gerlach magnets (so
doing a series of spin measurements). Then you know that it was the same electron setting
off each detector. Or consider Priscilla, a positron kept isolated in a Penning trap for three
months by Nobel Laureate Hans Dehmelt. According to Dehmelt “[t]here can be little
doubt about the identity of Priscilla during this period, since in ultrahigh vacuum she
never had a chance to trade places with a passing antimatter twin” (Dehmelt 1990). Or
consider doing a Bell type experiment where you send each member of a pair of entangled
electrons to opposite sides of the lab for spin measurements. After the measurements, it
makes sense to say, “this electron on the left side of the lab is spin-up whereas that
electron on the right side of the lab is spin-down”. Consequently, the ability to distinguish
between particles of the same kind or reidentify particles over time based on state
dependent or extrinsic properties does not constitute a counterexample to Redhead and
Teller’s claim that particles are not individuals.
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2.1.1 The Problem with the Hilbert Space Formalism
The first part of Redhead and Teller’s argument is meant to show how the LTPHSF forces
us to accept LTI beginning with the standard assumption that each distinct ray in a Hilbert
space represents a distinct physical situation. To see how this leads us to LTI consider a
pair of electrons represented in Hilbert spacesH(1) andH(2). The state of the joint
system is represented by a ray in the tensor product spaceH(1) ⊗H(2). The joint state in
which one electron has property a and one electron has property b can be written as the
tensor product |a(1)〉 |b(2)〉. However, |a(1)〉 |b(2)〉 and |b(1)〉 |a(2)〉 are distinct rays in
H(1) ⊗H(2). Consequently, the standard assumption that distinct rays represent distinct
physical situations requires us to treat these states as representing distinct physical
situations. So, we have a state in which electron 1 has property a and electron 2 has
property b as well as a distinct state in which electron 1 has property b and electron 2 has
property a. Combining the LTPHSF with the assumption that distinct rays represent
distinct physical situations requires us to treat the electrons as though they have some
individuating feature over-and-above their properties. A feature in virtue of which it
makes a difference whether it is electron 1 or electron 2 that has property a (or b).
We now have a problem. Our state space seems to include states that it shouldn’t.
Considering again a two-particle system in which the particles can have either property a
or property b. The joint system states in the LTPHSF should be the tensor products of
single system states. The possible joint states should be
|a(1)〉 |a(2)〉 (2.1)
|b(1)〉 |b(2)〉 (2.2)
|a(1)〉 |b(2)〉 (2.3)
|b(1)〉 |a(2)〉 . (2.4)
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But that can’t be right. These four states should be equiprobable in equilibrium which
would give us Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics (MB statistics).6 To get the appropriate
Bose-Einstein (BE) and Fermi-Dirac (FD) statistics, we need to impose a symmetrization
requirement. More specifically, we rule out any states that are neither symmetric nor
antisymmetric with respect to the particle labels. We are left with the symmetric
states
|a(1)〉 |a(2)〉 (2.1)
|b(1)〉 |b(2)〉 (2.2)
1
√
2
(|a(1)〉 |b(2)〉 + |b(1)〉 |a(2)〉), (2.5)
which yield BE, and the antisymmetric state
1
√
2
(|a(1)〉 |b(2)〉 − |b(1)〉 |a(2)〉), (2.6)
which yields FD. States (2.3) and (2.4) must be considered distinct in the LTPHSF
because they are represented by distinct rays. So, we impose symmetrization requirements
to rule that those states are never realized, although they are still mathematically part of
the state space. It is these states that are never realized that constitute the surplus structure
we are left with after imposing the symmetrization requirement.
Redhead and Teller note that we have two interpretive options if we want to keep the
LTPHSF. The first is to say that non-symmetric states (states that are neither symmetric
nor antisymmetric) have a physical interpretation according to which it does matter which
particle is which. But this leaves us to answer the question of why those states never
occur. The second is to say that non-symmetric states have no physical interpretation so
6Here I’m assuming the standard measure which assigns equal probabilities to all of the microstates
compatible with the initial macrostate of the system. The microstate is a specification of the positions and
velocities of the particles whereas the macrostate is given by the temperature, pressure, and volume.
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they do not correspond to unactualized physical possibilities at all. The second option
requires rejecting LTI which, in turn, requires rejecting the standard view that distinct rays
represent distinct physical situations. But rejecting LTI amounts to accepting that particles
are not the kinds of things that can bear labels and so this option leaves us with the
question of how the particle labels in the LTPHSF are to be understood.
While we could choose one of these interpretative options to hold onto the LTPHSF, we
have the option of avoiding the issue altogether by adopting the Fock space formalism.
The Fock space formalism does not use particle labels. Instead it simply tells us how
many particles of a given type are occupying a certain state without concern for keeping
track, either conceptually or ontologically, of which particle is which. The Fock space
formalism is empirically adequate and avoids the surplus structure that the LTPHSF
formalism must remove using a symmetrization requirement. The surplus structure in the
LTPHSF formalism is the set of states that are neither symmetric nor antisymmetric with
respect to particle labels; that is, states where the particle labels make a difference. But it
is not even possible to represent these states in the Fock space formalism due to the
absence of particle labels. As Teller says of the Fock space formalism, “[t]he description
uses no particle labels, and so the issue of which particle has which property never comes
up” (Teller 1995, 28). The need to impose symmetrization in the LTPHSF is merely an
artifact of the use of particle labels. It seems clear that the Fock space formalism is to be
preferred and its lack of particle labels should, per Redhead and Teller, lead us to conclude
that particles are not individuals.
2.1.2 Hilbert and Fock Space Formalisms: Not so Different After All
There are several issues with Redhead and Teller’s argument all stemming from relations
between the LTPHSF and the Fock space formalism. Teller himself notes (Teller 1995,
11
27-28) that the symmetric states in the LTPHSF form a subspace of the larger Hilbert
space. The symmetric subspace contains no surplus elements, so one option for defenders
of the LTPHSF is to take that as the state space for bosons. However, Teller doesn’t see a
difference between (i) leaving the surplus elements uninterpreted or (ii) taking the
symmetric subspace as the state space for bosons (Teller 1995, 28). The symmetric
subspace is still constructed by taking a Hilbert space with surplus structure and then
discarding that structure. Similar comments hold for the antisymmetric states and
fermions.
The problem for Redhead and Teller arises when we note that the Fock space formalism
has a similar issue. The full Fock space (that is, the most general Fock space one can
construct) is the direct sum of all n-particle Hilbert spaces
F =
∞⊕
n = 0
H⊗n = C ⊕H ⊕ (H ⊗H) ⊕ · · · .7 (2.7)
Except for the first two terms (corresponding to states with zero or one particle,
respectively), the terms all contain tensor products of single particle Hilbert spaces.
Consequently, the most general Fock space includes all the surplus structure included in
the LTPHSF. Constructing symmetric or antisymmetric Fock spaces for bosons and
fermions, respectively, also involves constructing a space containing surplus structure
which is then discarded. The symmetric Fock space can be written as
F =
∞⊕
n = 0
Hn = C ⊕H ⊕ (H H) ⊕ · · · , (2.8)
where  represents the symmetric tensor product. Taking the symmetric tensor product is
equivalent to taking the ordinary tensor product then removing all the states that are not
7This result, as well as those that follow, relating the LTPHSF to the Fock space formalism is well
known in NRQM. For an argument that they extend to quantum field theory see (Huggett 1994).
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symmetric. The antisymmetric Fock space can be written the same way with the exterior
(or antisymmetric) product ∧ instead of the symmetric tensor product.
It seems then, by Teller’s own lights, that restricting our attention to the symmetric or
antisymmetric Fock spaces should be just as unappealing as focusing on the symmetric or
antisymmetric subspaces in the LTPHSF. Or, equivalently, that holding onto the LTPHSF
and taking the symmetric (or antisymmetric) subspaces as our state spaces should be just
as acceptable as adopting the Fock space formalism.
Not only that, but the fact that the full Fock space contains the same surplus structure as
the LTPHSF makes it unclear why the other interpretive option for saving the LTPHSF (as
well as LTI) is problematic. Even in the Fock space formalism we must decide whether
the surplus structure has a physical interpretation or not. If not, we can just take the
symmetric (or antisymmetric) subspaces in either the LTPHSF or Fock space formalism as
our state space (bracketing any worries about the role of the surplus structure in their
construction). If so, then we face the issue of why our theory allows for physically
intelligible states that are never realized regardless of which formalism we choose.
Others have also objected that the LTPHSF and Fock space formalisms are more similar
than Redhead and Teller suggest. Huggett, for example, has demonstrated that the
LTPHSF and Fock space formalisms are mostly equivalent even in the relativistic regime
(Huggett 1994). The Fock space of quantum field theory (QFT) contains all the structure
of the LTPHSF, but, unlike the LTPHSF, it also allows us to represent coherent states (that
is, states of indefinite particle number).8 Huggett argues that the ability to represent states
of indefinite particle number is logically posterior to the issue of what metaphysical
significance we should attach to labels. If the lack of labels in the Fock space formalism is
what’s metaphysically salient, then even free field states of definite particle number in
8Note that coherent states are only found in QFT.
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QFT would be incompatible with individuality (due to the lack of labels). However, free
field states of definite particle number have identical state spaces to those found in
NRQM, which are compatible with individuality. The point is, that QFT has a structure
that is compatible with viewing particles as individuals. The fact that the Fock space
formalism can represent coherent states may be a reason to prefer that formalism, but the
formalism itself doesn’t tell us whether particles are individuals or not. Once we’ve settled
the issue of what metaphysical significance labels should have, we can then look at the
consequences for coherent states. Consequently, the Fock space of QFT is equivalent to
the LTPHSF in all the ways that matter for Redhead and Teller.
But, as Huggett also demonstrates, the equivalence is not merely structural. He notes that
“if we map n particle momentum wave functions into field wave functions in n-excitation
subspaces, [that is, Fock subspaces,] the observables and equations of motion agree”
(Huggett 1994, 74). Therefore, Huggett concludes, the formalisms also have the same
physical interpretation. The formalisms are mathematically and physically equivalent
(except for coherent states in QFT). If Fock space is both mathematically and physically
equivalent to the LTPHSF in every respect that matters for discussing metaphysical
questions about the relation between individuality and labels, then it is hard to see how the
fact that one formalism has labels and one doesn’t could be metaphysically salient. So,
considering Huggett’s argument, my demonstration that the LTPHSF and the Fock space
formalism have the same interpretive issues (at least the issues Redhead and Teller
identified with the former) is somewhat unsurprising.
Another similarity, noted in (Baker 2013) and (Krause and Arenhart 2015b), is that the
Fock space formalism is, in a sense, dependent on labels as well as compatible with the
use of labels. Krause and Arenhart note that the construction of Fock spaces begins with
labeled single particle Hilbert spaces (Krause and Arenhart 2015b, 8). The labels are
necessary to distinguish between the non-symmetric states even if those states will be
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discarded. Baker, on the other hand, provides an example of labeling in the Fock space
formalism by asking us to consider the state (Baker 2013, 266)
0
⊕ 1
√
2
|ψ〉
⊕ 1
√
2
(
|ψ〉1 |φ〉2 + |φ〉1 |ψ〉2
) ⊕
0
⊕
· · · . (2.9)
This describes a coherent state. A measurement of particle number would yield either one
or two, each with a 50% chance. The two-particle state is symmetric, but there is no
reason we can’t, as Baker has done, label it the same way we would in the LTPHSF. We
can, if we choose, understand the two-particle term as describing two distinct physical
situations depending on which particle (1 or 2) is in which state (ψ or φ).
Baker goes so far as to say that “[t]he apparent difference between Fock space and the
labeled tensor-product Hilbert spaces of QM is simply an artifact of the occupation
number basis” (Baker 2013, 266). Baker’s accusation here is that Redhead and Teller’s
claim that the Fock space formalism doesn’t use labels is a result of them combining the
Fock space formalism with the occupation number representation. In the occupation
number representation, a state is specified by the occupation numbers of the single particle
states as well as the symmetry of the state. Suppose we have two bosons divided between
two boxes a and b. Equations (2.1) to (2.3) give the states as represented in the LTPHSF.
However, in the occupation number representation, these states could be written as
|a2, b0〉, |a0, b2〉, and |a1, b1〉, where the subscripts represent the number of particles in
each box. Note that these states are not written as tensor products of single particle states.
The occupation number representation cannot be used with the LTPHSF, but it can be used
with the Fock space formalism. However, the converse does not hold. The Fock space
formalism needn’t use the occupation number representation. The Fock space formalism
can easily be represented with direct sums of LTPHSF states with labels present.
Consequently, Redhead and Teller’s identification of the Fock space formalism with the
use of occupation numbers is misleading. It is not the Fock space formalism itself that
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tells us to focus only on how many particles of a given type are occupying a certain state,
but merely one way of representing that formalism.
There is one final issue, that I will merely mention, that does not depend on similarities
between the LTPHSF and the Fock space formalism. The issue is simply that if
paraparticles exist, then Redhead and Teller’s surplus structure isn’t really surplus
structure.9 At least not all of it. That the Fock space formalism, on Redhead and Teller’s
understanding of it, has no non-symmetric states would then be a drawback not a
benefit.
2.2 The Argument from Quantum Statistics
The argument from quantum statistics is the primary argument for the conclusion that
particles are not individuals. Its seemingly wide acceptance has led French and Krause,
for example, to refer to the idea that particles are not individuals as the “Received View”
(French and Krause 2006, 115). The argument has been presented in a variety of ways,
although the core of the argument remains the same.10 The differences are mostly
differences in making the argument precise. Different authors will have slightly different
formulations of the Indistinguishability Postulate or different notions of individuality in
mind. However, it is possible to extract a single unified argument from the various
presentations albeit at the expense of precision.
The argument starts by noting the differences between classical and quantum statistics,
which were noted in section 2.1.1. Suppose we have two objects, 1 and 2, that can be in
9Paraparticles are particles that are neither bosons nor fermions; particles that obey different statistics.
10See, for instance, (Dieks 1990), (van Fraassen 1991), (Reichenbach 1998), (French and Rickles 2003),
(French and Krause 2006), (Ladyman and Ross 2007), and (Morganti 2009) for various presentations.
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one of two boxes a and b. Classically we have four equally probable configurations
corresponding to (2.1) through (2.4). We can have both in box a, both in box b, 1 in a and
2 in b, or 1 in b and 2 in a. But quantum statistics are different. In BE we have three
equally probable configurations corresponding to (2.1), (2.2), and (2.5) (both in box a,
both in box b, or one in each box). In FD we just have one possible configuration
corresponding to (2.6) (one in each box).
Classical statistics treats the situation in which 1 is in a and 2 is in b as distinct from the
situation in which 1 is in b and 2 is in a. Quantum statistics, however, does not treat these
cases as distinct. Permuting particles is treated as making a difference in classical
statistics but not in quantum statistics. It is at this point that different authors will diverge a
little in offering different formulations of the Indistinguishability Postulate (also called
“permutation invariance” or “permutation symmetry”). The Indistinguishability Postulate
is a statement of the fact that permuting particles makes no difference in quantum
statistics. How this statement is made precise is unimportant for my purposes as none of
the criticisms of the argument depend on it.
The argument continues by noting that classical particles of the same kind cannot be
distinguished on the basis of their state-independent, or intrinsic, properties.
Consequently, the fact that classical statistics treats (2.3) and (2.4) as distinct
arrangements must involve something beyond the (classical) particles intrinsic properties.
So, classical particles have some form of label individuality in virtue of which states (2.3)
and (2.4), which only differ in the labels, are considered distinct. The important point isn’t
merely that classical particles are individuals, but that it seems to make an empirical
difference that they are individuals. That classical particles are individuals is meant to
explain why (2.3) and (2.4) are treated as distinct and, consequently, why we have four
possible configurations rather than three.
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The final part of the argument involves looking for the source of the difference between
classical and quantum statistics. In the classical case, we are looking at collections of
classical particles sharing all the same intrinsic properties in addition to having some form
of label individuality. In the quantum case, we are looking at collections of quantum
particles that also share all the same intrinsic properties. The only apparent explanation
for the difference in statistics is then that quantum particles lack the label individuality of
classical particles. Consequently, quantum particles are not individuals. I now turn to
several arguments against inferring that quantum particles are not individuals on the basis
of their statistical behavior.
2.2.1 The Gibbs Paradox: Permutability of Classical Particles
Saunders argues that the Gibbs paradox can be taken to show that classical particles are
permutable (Saunders 2006b). Saying that a particle is permutable amounts to saying that
switching particle labels for particles of the same kind doesn’t change the state. If
Saunders is correct, then the argument from quantum statistics fails because it takes
permutability as a key difference between classical and quantum statistics; a difference
that is to be explained in terms of individuality. Saunders agrees that permutability has
empirical consequences and that it is connected to the difference between classical and
quantum statistics. However, permutability is not the whole story. According to Saunders,
an important part of the explanation for the difference between classical and quantum
statistics is that phase space is continuous whereas Hilbert space is discrete. I will not be
concerned with this last part of Saunders’ argument since the argument from quantum
statistics fails as long as Saunders is correct about the permutability of classical
particles.
18
The Gibbs paradox refers to the fact that MB statistics does not predict the correct entropy
when mixing samples of the same gas. Consider a box divided into two halves each
containing identical samples of the same gas. Each sample has entropy S, so the total
entropy of the system is 2S. The system is in equilibrium and would remain in equilibrium
if the divider were removed. Consequently, mixing the two samples of gas should involve
no change of entropy. However, not only does MB predict an increase in entropy if the
divider is removed, it also predicts that the entropy will drop back down to 2S if the
divider is put back. To get the correct result the entropy predicted by MB must be divided
by N!, where N is the number of particles in the gas. This, however, is exactly what we
would do if classical particles were permutable. It is equivalent to identifying states
related by a permutation to avoid over-counting the number of distinct states.
There are two primary objections to Saunders’ explanation of the corrective factor N!.
The first, an argument Saunders calls the dispensability argument, is that classical
permutability is unnecessary in the sense that alternative explanations exist. This
argument originated in (Ehrenfest and Trkal 1920) and was later defended in (van Kampen
1984). Both provide derivations of the correct result in which classical particles are
explicitly assumed to be permutable. Saunders’ response is that these derivations are only
applicable in certain domains. Ehrenfest and Trkal assume that total particle number
remains constant. However, Saunders points out that this assumption would not hold in a
system subject to nuclear processes. Even though nuclear processes are not covered by
statistical mechanics, Saunders thinks that “[s]o long as initial and final states are
thermodynamically describable, classical thermodynamical principles should apply,
however violent (and non-classical) the transformations that connect them” (Saunders
2006b, 197). In the case of van Kampen, Saunders’ concern is that his derivation is
inapplicable to closed systems.
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The other objection, the incoherence, or unintelligibility, argument, is found in (van
Kampen 1984) and (Bach 1997). Van Kampen offers just a few brief comments rather
than worked out arguments, see (Saunders 2006b, 196-97) for discussion and response.
The more serious incoherence argument comes from Bach who argued that classical
particles cannot be permutable because they would have no spatiotemporal trajectories.
Bach offers a formal argument for this conclusion in addition to pointing out that particles,
of any sort, that have spatiotemporal trajectories can’t be permutable because the
trajectories distinguish them. Saunders takes Bach’s argument to be question-begging.
First, the formal argument takes configuration space to be the appropriate space for
representing the possible configurations of the particles. But a defender of permutable
classical particles would take the reduced configuration space (that obtained by
identifying points in configuration space that only differ by a permutation) as the
appropriate space. Second, the claim that particles with trajectories can’t be permutable
because the trajectories distinguish them is not defended. It is just assumed that the idea of
permutable particles with trajectories is nonsensical. It is nonsensical if we use the full
configuration space because every particle then does have a unique spatiotemporal
trajectory. However, if we use the reduced configuration space the spatiotemporal
trajectories aren’t necessarily unique. The cost of this approach, however, is that it makes
no sense to ask which particle has which spatiotemporal trajectory. Spatiotemporal
trajectories, on Saunders’ view, do not individuate classical particles meaning that
classical particles are not individuals unless they have some sort of LTI.
One important thing to note here is that classical particles, even if they are permutable
under some circumstances, aren’t always permutable. They wouldn’t, for example, obey
MB statistics (outside of the Gibbs paradox) if they were always permutable.11 This
11This is simply the result of the fact that treating classical particles as permutable means that we identify
states (2.3) and (2.4), which gives us something other than MB statistics.
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means that we should qualify the claim that classical particles are permutable in some
way. We could agree with Saunders that the reason we have to identify permutations of
particles to avoid the Gibbs paradox is because there is no fact of the matter as to which
particle has which trajectory. However, we could instead say that we have to identify
permutations of particles because which particle has which trajectory simply isn’t
physically relevant to the entropy of a system when the particles are all of the same kind.
So, classical particles are permutable only if information about which particle has which
trajectory is not physically relevant. Then we can understand the issue with calculating the
entropy of mixing similar gases as one of including irrelevant information in the
calculation that we need to remove. My proposal allows us to understand why identical
classical particles obey MB statistics most of the time, but do not in the case of the Gibbs
paradox. It also allows us to retain the idea that classical particles have unique
spatiotemporal trajectories that serve to individuate them.
Saunders’ position is clearly controversial. However, the idea that classical particles are
permutable has been little discussed and Saunders makes a good case that we have no
particularly compelling reasons to reject it (even if an examination of the issue would find
such reasons). Again, if Saunders is correct then the argument from quantum statistics
fails because permutability is not a feature unique to quantum particles. The argument
from quantum statistics takes a lack of individuality to explain permutability and
permutability to explain quantum statistics. Saunders’ argument challenges the latter
claim. Permutability can’t explain quantum statistics because classical particles are also
permutable and obey different statistics. On the other hand, one can accept Saunders’
position and still accept that a lack of individuality is what explains permutability so that
quantum particles are not individuals (ideally with some account of what’s wrong with
LTI).
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My position, on the other hand, challenges both aspects of the argument from quantum
statistics. Permutable particles can obey MB statistics, in addition to BE or FD statistics,
and can be individuals. Still, my view on the Gibbs paradox is compatible with the view
that quantum particles are not individuals (it merely questions the support for this view
that the argument from quantum statistics is alleged to provide).
2.2.2 The Fundamental Postulate of Statistical Mechanics
While Saunders argues that even classical particles are permutable, Belousek argues that
quantum particles are only permutable if the Fundamental Postulate of Statistical
Mechanics (FPSM) is correct (Belousek 2000). Or, equivalently, Belousek argues that
statistical indistinguishability is not needed to derive quantum statistics. Belousek defines
FPSM as follows: “[e]very distinct equilibrium microstate configuration of identical
particles, or distribution of identical particles over single-particle microstates, is assigned
the same statistical weight” (Belousek 2000, 2). Identical particles are statistically
distinguishable if particle permutations result in distinct states that are assigned their own
statistical weight. In other words, particles are statistically indistinguishable if they are
permutable.
Belousek first demonstrates that assuming FPSM and statistical distinguishability is
sufficient to derive MB. Similarly, assuming FPSM and statistical indistinguishability
allows one to derive BE. FD can be derived in the same way as BE with the additional
assumption of an exclusion principle that forbids particles being in the same state. Clearly,
given FPSM, permutability is sufficient to derive quantum statistics (with the added
exclusion principle for fermions). However, Belousek notes that if we want to conclude
that quantum particles are permutable based on quantum statistics, we want to know if the
assumption of permutability is necessary.
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If we are willing to reject FPSM, then one way we can get BE statistics for a system of
two identical particles with properties a and b is to assign probabilities of 1/3, 1/3, 1/6,
and 1/6 to states (2.1) through (2.4). Similarly, we can get FD statistics by assigning a
probability of 1/2 each to (2.3) and (2.4). We can also get MB statistics by assigning a
probability of 1/4 each to states (2.1) through (2.4). That we can derive quantum statistics
for statistically distinguishable particles in general has been demonstrated in (Tersoff and
Bayer 1983). Instead of using the FPSM, they assign each discrete state i an arbitrary
probability wi and then average over every possible wi.12 The resulting probability
distribution for a given occupancy ni is given by
P{ni} = N!
 M∏
i=1
1
ni!
∫ 1
0
dwiw
ni
i
 δ 1 − M∑
i=1
wi
 , (2.10)
where M is the number of states available to particles (for example, two in the case of
particles divided between two boxes). The equation can be solved recursively to obtain
BE statistics
P{ni} =
N!(M − 1)!
(N + 1 − M)!
. (2.11)
FD statistics can be obtained in the usual way by adding an exclusion principle, which, in
this case, amounts to the restriction that ni = 0 or ni = 1. Tersoff and Bayer provide no
justification for using an exclusion principle to obtain FD statistics. Presumably, it is
either meant to be empirically justified (the occupation number for fermions is either 0 or
1) or justified by the spin statistics theorem. The question now becomes whether there is
any compelling reason to accept one approach over the other. Whether and how FPSM is
justified is an issue on which much has been written. I don’t have the space to get into the
issue in any detail so I will confine myself to just a few brief remarks to the effect that it
would not be unreasonable to accept Tersoff and Bayer’s approach.
12Note that Tersoff and Bayer have no additional justification for this procedure beyond that it gives the
correct statistics.
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Firstly, Tersoff and Bayer claim that the assumptions that go into (2.10) are logically
weaker than the assumption of uniform probabilities (Tersoff and Bayer 1983, 554).
Consequently, the former assumption is to be preferred in the absence of any information
that warrants making the latter assumption. Secondly, FPSM is notoriously hard to justify.
Teller, for example, remarks that the FPSM is “an assumption noted both for its
astonishing power in classical statistical mechanics and for its resistance to justification
other than its empirical success” (Teller 1995, 24). One could take the difficulty in
justifying FPSM as itself reason to be open to alternative principles that can reproduce the
empirical successes attributed to FPSM. The justification here is very weak. It’s simply
that in the absence of any reasons to favor one approach over the other, Tersoff and
Bayer’s approach at least requires less substantive assumptions then assuming the
standard measure.
Since the concern here is with equilibrium statistical mechanics it is clear that any
appropriate probability distribution must be invariant in time. Any probability distribution
is going to assign zero probability to some states (this is unavoidable to ensure the
probabilities sum to 1). Consequently, the standard measure assigns zero probability to
certain states. There are other measures that also assign zero probability to the same
states. However, if we assume that systems in equilibrium are ergodic it can be shown
that, of these measures that agree on which states have probability zero, only the standard
measure is time invariant.1314 The problem with justifying the standard measure in
equilibrium statistical mechanics amounts to the problem of justifying (i) the claim that
equilibrium systems are ergodic, and (ii) the claim that we can ignore states that are
assigned zero probability in the standard measure. However, these claims are very hard to
13Ergodicity refers to the fact that any initial state, with the exception of the initial states assigned
probability zero by the standard measure, will eventually pass through any state that has non-zero
probability. Roughly, given enough time, a system in equilibrium will have spent some time in every
microstate compatible with its macrostate.
14See (Werndl 2013).
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justify.15 It is an open question whether realistic systems in equilibrium are ergodic and an
open question whether states assigned zero probability by the standard measure should be
ignored. In light of these issues, Tersoff and Bayer’s justification isn’t as weak as it first
appears.
At this point it seems reasonable to accept that one cannot claim that quantum particles
are permutable on the basis of quantum statistics. Defenders of the non-individuality of
quantum particles need to combine the argument from quantum statistics with an
independent defense of the permutability of quantum particles. However, there is an
objection van Fraassen has raised against Tersoff and Bayer. Teller and Redhead have
claimed that this objection undermines Belousek’s argument (Teller and Redhead
2000).
Van Fraassen claims that Tersoff and Bayer’s derivation only holds in the special case of
maximal ignorance. He asks to us to suppose that we prepare a pure state of the form
(2.5). When dealing with such states we get deviations from classical probabilities
because we have interference terms. Van Fraassen asserts that “[i]f at this point someone
were to suggest that we could continue to look for a classical model . . . he would run into
the usual obstacle for all hidden-variable interpretations. For we would ask him to let the
interpretation cover various divisions into cells, to correspond to non-commuting
observables. The ‘no hidden variable’ theorems would show that this could not be done,
with any single probability function” (van Fraassen 1991, 418). Teller and Redhead
rephrase van Fraassen’s claim as follows: “to assume that bosonic statistics could be
reproduced for families of non-commuting operators by assuming a distribution of exact
values given by priors, uniform or otherwise, assumes precisely the exact values which set
15See, for example, (Frigg and Werndl 2013), (Emch and Liu 2002), (Earman and Rédei 1996), and
(Sklar 1993) for some back-and-forth on whether realistic statistical mechanical systems are ergodic.
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into motion both the algebraic and Bell inequality no-go theorems” (Teller and Redhead
2000, 954).
I think that Teller and Redhead have misapplied van Fraassen’s reasoning. The abstract of
Tersoff and Bayer’s paper began by stating “[q]uantum statistics can be reconciled with
such classical ideas as distinguishable particles” (Tersoff and Bayer 1983, 553). Van
Fraassen’s objection is that Tersoff and Bayer’s result “does not amount to a reconciliation
of quantum statistics with classical concepts” (van Fraassen 1991, 414). Although Tersoff
and Bayer are only focused on showing that statistical distinguishability is compatible
with quantum statistics, they do appear to be making a grander claim about the (alleged)
similarity between classical and quantum statistics. It seems to be the grander claim van
Fraassen is responding to. Otherwise van Fraassen’s argument would be question begging.
Tersoff and Bayer explicitly note in their paper that their work could provide the
foundation for a statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics in the form of a stochastic
hidden variable theory and state that “[s]ince there is no reason why such a theory should
be factorizable, it need not have the undesirable features of deterministic hidden-variable
theories (such as satisfying the Bell inequalities)” (Tersoff and Bayer 1983, 554). But note
that van Fraassen’s criticism depends on an assumption factorizability (divisions into
cells). But also note that van Fraassen is criticizing the idea of finding a classical model
that yields BE rather than criticizing the more specific claim that BE is compatible with
statistical distinguishability. Furthermore, the section of van Fraassen’s book in which he
discusses Tersoff and Bayer is concerned with the question of whether a classical
reconstruction of quantum statistics is possible. If what van Fraassen is objecting to is the
claim that Tersoff and Bayer have provided a classical reconstruction of quantum statistics,
then van Fraassen’s argument seems to be correct and is not question begging.
The quotation from Teller and Redhead seems to provide an accurate characterization of
van Fraassen’s position. However, Teller and Redhead’s mistake is that they take van
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Fraassen’s comments as undermining Belousek’s argument by undermining the specific
claim that BE is compatible with statistical distinguishability. Recall that what Tersoff and
Bayer are doing is assigning not one probability distribution, but all possible arbitrary
probability distributions before averaging over them to get BE. Assuming an exact
distribution given by priors is exactly what the no-go theorems state that one can’t do with
a single probability function. They do not rule out the possibility of averaging over a
family of probability functions to get correct results, which is exactly what Tersoff and
Bayer are doing (hence their claim that their work could provide the foundation for a
statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics).
2.2.3 Holistic Properties and Individuality
Morganti argues that the only properties that are statistically relevant for many particle
systems are inherent properties, which are insensitive to permutations of particles because
particle identity plays no role in the determination of these properties (Morganti 2009).
Consequently, the explanation of the permutability of particles is to be found in the kind
of properties with which quantum statistics is concerned rather than in a lack of
individuality of particles.
Morganti defines an inherent property as a property possessing three features. An inherent
property is a property (i) of a complex whole (a whole made up of multiple simpler parts),
(ii) that is not reducible to separate intrinsic properties of the parts. Inherent properties are
then holistic properties of complex systems that do not supervene on the intrinsic
properties of the parts. The third feature is that if P is an inherent property of a whole
composed of parts a and b, then (iii) “it is not necessary for P to contain information about
a and b only if it also contains ‘non-trivial’ specific information about a and b separately”
(Morganti 2009, 227). This last feature calls for some explanation.
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To explain the third condition Morganti asks us to consider a situation in which a pair of
fair coins will be tossed, and a powerful demon will make the coins land on the same side,
making a decision as to which side just after the toss. Note that the demon’s decision is
about the pair of coins and not about the individual coins. Morganti says we can attribute
a disposition for the system to evolve in such a way that the coins will land on the same
side. This disposition is an inherent property. The property says something about the
coins, but the only specific information about each coin (that coin 1 will land on the same
side as coin 2 and vice versa) trivially follows from a fact about the whole (that the pair
will be made to land on the same side). Our inherent property contains no specific
information about the individual coins except that implied by facts about the whole. So,
the third feature says that some inherent properties contain no specific information about
the individual parts of the system except for anything implied by facts about the whole.
Morganti says that this is the key to understanding the difference between classical and
quantum statistics. The information “missing” from these kinds of inherent properties is
the sort of information about the specific parts of the system that is always available, at
least in principle, in a classical setting. For example, facts about the coins to be flipped by
means of which one could, in principle, use classical mechanics to calculate how they will
land.
Consider a pair of particles in the state
1
√
2
(|↑↑〉 + |↓↓〉) . (2.12)
This is analogous to the coin example in that a measurement of spin will find both
particles to be spin-up or both particles to be spin-down. On Morganti’s view, the system
has an inherent property in the form of a disposition for the system to evolve in such a way
that the particles are found to have matching spin if a spin measurement is made.
However, there is no specific information about the particles beyond that which follows
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from facts about the overall state of the system. More specifically, the individual particles
do not have spin at all prior to measurement. The permutability of the particles is not a
result of a lack of individuality but because “the particles’ identities do not play any role
in the determination of the states” (Morganti 2009, 228). Which particle has which spin is
irrelevant, not because there is no fact of the matter as to which particle is which but
because there is no fact of the matter as to the spin of the particles until a measurement is
made. There is a fact of the matter as to which particle is which, it simply isn’t physically
salient to the statistical behavior of the particles. This is similar to my proposed
explanation of the Gibbs paradox. We can say that particles are permutable because they
lack individuality (as in the argument from quantum statistics) or we can say that they are
permutable because their individuality isn’t physically relevant to their statistical behavior
(as Morganti does).16
While some may object to Morganti’s characterization of inherent properties preferring,
perhaps, another definition, this is a relatively standard way to think of entangled systems.
Where Morganti’s position is unique, and where it provides a response to the argument of
quantum statistics, is in the fact that Morganti takes the same view of non-entangled
states. States, for example, described by (2.1) and (2.2) are, on Morganti’s view, also
states in which there is an inherent property attached to the whole system and the
individual particles are lacking definitive properties of their own. In state (2.1) the
particles do not both have property a prior to measurement although they are guaranteed
to both have property a post measurement. It is only if all quantum states have inherent
properties that Morganti’s explanation of the permutability of particles can work. Particles
are permutable because the question of which particle has which property is never
physically relevant. Not because the particles aren’t individuals but because the properties
in question aren’t present until a measurement is made. However, Morganti’s only defense
16The difference between these two options is purely theoretical.
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of his extension of holism to non-entangled systems is to say that “once holism has been
acknowledged to hold for some quantum systems, one seems justified in accepting it also
for other quantum systems insofar as doing so solves existing conceptual problems”
(Morganti 2009, 227).
I agree with Morganti here. We have a conceptual problem, how to explain the difference
between classical and quantum statistics, and we have a number of explanations on offer.
In each case the justification for accepting the explanation is just that the explanation
succeeds at its goal. There are negative arguments against some of these explanations, that
is, arguments that purport to demonstrate a problem with the explanation. However, the
positive argument, if we can even call it that, for accepting any of the explanations is
simply that they do the explanatory work they are intended to do. We can, and ought, to
take the explanations as equally good to begin with and then adjust our view by looking at
the strength of negative arguments against each position. Naively following this advice,
however, would lead one to conclude that Morganti’s position is preferable simply due to
its recent appearance in the literature. I don’t intend, or need to, provide an account of
how alternative explanations ought to be assessed in this kind of situation. I only want to
stress that even though Morganti has provided no negative argument against the argument
from quantum statistics, we currently have no compelling reason to favour one view over
the other. It is perfectly reasonable to accept Morganti’s view given the explanations on
offer, and even more so if one finds Saunders’ or Belousek’s arguments that permutability
isn’t a difference between classical and quantum particles compelling (since permutability
is where the argument from quantum statistics locates the difference).
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2.3 Weak Discernibility
The primary case for the weak discernibility of particles is made in a series of four papers
by Saunders, Muller, and Seevinck. Two objects are weakly discernible if they stand in a
symmetric non-reflexive relation to one another.17 For example, in the earliest two papers
(Saunders 2003) and (Saunders 2006a), Saunders claimed that a pair of fermions in the
singlet state are weakly discernible because they have opposite spin. The relation of
having opposite spin is a two-place non-reflexive relation; a particle cannot have opposite
spin to itself, but it can have opposite spin to a second particle. A major criticism of
Saunders claim was that fermions in the singlet state are generally not considered to have
spin values at all and so the relation of having opposite spin cannot be used to claim that
fermions are weakly discernible.18 In response (Muller and Saunders 2008) shows how
fermions can be weakly discerned in any state using only non-probabilistic (or
categorical) properties. The final paper, (Muller and Seevinck 2009) shows how any
particles can be weakly discerned in any state using only categorical properties. I will
limit my discussion to the latter two papers.
Muller and Saunders begin by demonstrating how a pair of fermions is weakly discernible
before extending this result to any number of fermions. First, consider an arbitrary
physically meaningful operator A with eigenbasis |φ1〉 , |φ2〉 , . . . , |φd〉 ∈ H . We can then
define a complete set of one-dimensional projectors Pm that project the state they act on
onto the ray containing |φm〉. Now let Plm ≡ Pl − Pm, P
(1)
lm ≡ Plm ⊗ I, and P
(2)
lm ≡ I ⊗ Plm,
17A relation is non-reflexive if the relation cannot apply to a single object. A relation between two
objects, a and b is symmetric if a′s standing in that relation to b implies that b also stands in that relation to
a. The relation of being opposite spin to is a symmetric non-reflexive relation.
18Examples of this criticism can be found in (Dieks and Versteegh 2008) and (Morganti 2008).
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where I is the identity operator. Finally, we can define the relation
Rt (a, b) iff
d∑
l,m=1
P(a)lm P
(b)
lm |ψ〉 = t |ψ〉 (2.13)
where t ∈ R. The relation Rt (a, b) holds between objects a and b iff the system is in an
eigenstate of the operator
∑d
l,m=1 P
(a)
lm P
(b)
lm with eigenvalue t.
The relation is parameterized by t and may be reflexive or non-reflexive for different
values of t. In order to use this relation to weakly discern fermions it must be the case that
the eigenvalue when a , b is distinct from the eigenvalue when a = b. First, consider the
case where a = b. We have
d∑
l,m=1
P(1)lm P
(1)
lm =
d∑
l,m=1
P(2)lm P
(2)
lm =
d∑
l,m=1
(Plm ⊗ I)2 =
d∑
l,m=1
(Plm)2 ⊗ I
=
d∑
l,m=1
(
P2l − PlPm − PmPl + P
2
m
)
⊗ I =
d∑
l,m=1
(2I − 2Iδlm) ⊗ I (2.14)
= (2dI − 2I) ⊗ I = 2(d − 1)I ⊗ I,
so that
d∑
l,m=1
P(1)lm P
(1)
lm |ψ〉 =
d∑
l,m=1
P(2)lm P
(2)
lm |ψ〉 = 2(d − 1) |ψ〉 , (2.15)
where d is the dimension of the state space. For a , b we have
d∑
l,m=1
P(2)lm P
(1)
lm =
d∑
l,m=1
P(1)lm P
(2)
lm =
d∑
l,m=1
(Plm ⊗ I) (I ⊗ Plm) =
d∑
l,m=1
Plm ⊗ Plm
=
d∑
l,m=1
(Pl − Pm) ⊗ (Pl − Pm) =
d∑
l,m=1
((Pl − Pm) ⊗ Pl − (Pl − Pm) ⊗ Pm)
=
d∑
l,m=1
(Pl ⊗ Pl − Pm ⊗ Pl − Pl ⊗ Pm + Pm ⊗ Pm) (2.16)
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=
d∑
l,m=1
(Pl ⊗ Pl + Pm ⊗ Pm − 2δlmI ⊗ I)
=
d∑
l=1
2Pl ⊗ Pl − 2I ⊗ I = 2
 d∑
l=1
Pl ⊗ Pl − I ⊗ I
 .
For an antisymmetric state we find that
d∑
l,m=1
P(1)lm P
(2)
lm |ψ−〉 = 2
d∑
l=1
Pl ⊗ Pl |ψ−〉 − 2I ⊗ I |ψ−〉 = −2 |ψ−〉 . (2.17)
Since d is a positive number, the eigenvalues in the two cases are distinct. Consequently,
the relation R−2 (a, b) weakly discerns a pair of fermions in any state because the relation
is non-reflexive, symmetric, and applies to any pair of fermions. The result does not,
however, extend to bosons, since 2
∑d
l=1 Pl ⊗ Pl does not act on a symmetric state as a
multiple of the identity. Consequently Rt (a, b), for some t, cannot serve as a weakly
discerning relation for any arbitrary pair of bosons since the eigenvalue in the case where
a , b depends on the particular state. Note that Muller and Saunders’ result for two
particles generalizes to any number of particles with the redefinition
P(n)lm = I ⊗ . . . ⊗ Plm ⊗ . . . ⊗ I, where n indicates the nth place in the n-fold tensor
product.
Muller and Saunders also show that bosons can be weakly discerned by non-categorical
properties. However, Muller and Seevinck have demonstrated that fermions, bosons, and
even paraparticles, can be weakly discerned by categorical properties. Consequently, I
will now turn to their argument. Muller and Seevinck provide two distinct arguments. One
that applies to all particles and one that applies to only particles with non-zero spin. Both
arguments take the same approach as that of Muller and Saunders.
The argument that all particles are weakly discernible only involves position, X, and
momentum, P, operators. They define operators P(1) = P ⊗ I, P(2) = I ⊗ P, Q(1) = Q ⊗ I,
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and Q(2) = I ⊗ Q with which they define the relation
C(a, b) iff
[
P(a), Q(b)
]
|ψ〉 = c |ψ〉 (2.18)
for some non-zero c. The eigenvalues are easy to compute using the standard
commutation relations between position and momentum. When a = b we find that[
P(1), Q(1)
]
|ψ〉 =
[
P(2), Q(2)
]
|ψ〉 = −i~ |ψ〉. When a , b the eigenvalue is zero since the
momentum operator of one particle commutes with the position operator of another;[
P(1), Q(2)
]
|ψ〉 =
[
P(2), Q(1)
]
|ψ〉 = 0. It is clear that C(a, b) is a symmetric reflexive
relation that does not hold between distinct particles in any state. On the other hand, the
negation of C(a, b) is a symmetric non-reflexive relation that applies to any pair of
particles in any state. Consequently, the relation ¬C(a, b) serves to weakly discern any
particles.
The second argument demonstrates that all particles with non-zero spin can be weakly
discerned by a relation constructed out of spin operators. First define operators
S (1) = S ⊗ I and S (2) = I ⊗ S and the relation
T (a, b) iff
∣∣∣S (a) + S (b)∣∣∣2 |ψ〉 = 4s(s + 1)~2 |ψ〉 . (2.19)
When a = b we find that
∣∣∣S (a) + S (a)∣∣∣2 |ψ〉 = 4 |S |2 |ψ〉 = 4s(s + 1)~2 |ψ〉 . (2.20)
Whereas when a , b we find that
∣∣∣S (a) + S (b)∣∣∣2 |ψ〉 = (S (a)2 + S (a)S (b) + S (b)S (a) + S (b)2) |ψ〉
=
(
2s(s + 1)~2 + 2(S ⊗ S )
)
|ψ〉 ≤
(
2s(s + 1)~2 + 2s~2
)
|ψ〉 (2.21)
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= 2s(2s + 1)~2 |ψ〉 < 4s(s + 1)~2 |ψ〉 .
Similarly with C(a, b), T (a, b) is a symmetric reflexive relation that fails to hold between
distinct particles with non-zero spin in any state. Its negation, however, is a symmetric
non-reflexive relation that holds between any pair of particles with non-zero spin in any
state. Consequently, the relation ¬T (a, b) weakly discerns any particles with non-zero
spin.
Before moving on to some alternative proposals for weakly discerning particles there is
one important thing to mention noted by Bigaj (Bigaj 2015, 46). In the case of relations
Rt(a, b), C(a, b), and ¬C(a, b) every state is an eigenstate and the discernment relies
purely on the difference in eigenvalues depending on whether a = b or not. As a result, the
arguments involving these relations only rely on assuming the less controversial part of
the eigenvector-eigenvalue link (that a system in an eigenstate of an operator possesses the
associated eigenvalue). On the other hand, systems that satisfy ¬T (a, b) are systems that
are not in eigenstates of the operator
∣∣∣S (a) + S (b)∣∣∣2. Consequently, an additional assumption
needed in this case in order to claim that the eigenvalues are different is that a system that
is not in the eigenstate of a given operator does not possess the corresponding eigenvalue.
In other words, using ¬T (a, b) to weakly discern particles requires assuming that being in
an eigenstate of an operator is a necessary condition for having the corresponding
eigenvalue rather than merely being a sufficient condition.
2.3.1 Physically Inadmissible Relations
Two alternatives to the Muller-Saunders-Seevinck approach have been proposed; one by
Caulton and the other by Huggett and (Joshua) Norton. The motivation in each case is that
the weakly discerning relations defined by Muller, Saunders, and Seevinck are thought to
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be physically inadmissible. To understand the criticisms, I will first explain some
conditions Muller and Saunders put on physically admissible relations.
The first condition is that of Physical meaning: “All properties and relations should be
transparently defined in terms of physical states and operators that correspond to physical
magnitudes” (Muller and Saunders 2008, 527-528). Muller and Saunders point out that
predicates that express membership or non-membership in a set and predicates that
express names or labels are not physically meaningful. However, they say nothing else
about what might count as a physically meaningful operator. It therefore appears that any
Hermitian operator is acceptable.
The second is Permutation invariance: “Any property of one particle is a property of any
other; relations should be permutation-invariant, so binary relations are symmetric and
either reflexive or irreflexive” (Muller and Saunders 2008, 528). This condition only
requires that any candidate for a weakly discerning relation be permutation invariant.
However, Caulton, Huggett, and Norton think this requirement is too weak. They prefer
the stronger requirement that both the weakly discerning relation and the operators out of
which it is constructed are permutation invariant (Caulton 2013, Huggett and Norton
2014).
The first criticism of the physical admissibility of the weakly discerning relations
proposed by Muller, Saunders and Seevinck is that Rt(a, b) and C(a, b) are not
permutation invariant. I will begin with Huggett and Norton’s criticism of Rt(a, b). The
crux of their criticism is that
∑d
l,m=1 P
(a)
lm P
(b)
lm is not permutation invariant if the number of
particles is greater than two. This makes no difference in the case of fermions since, for n
fermions,
∑d
l,m=1 P
(a)
lm P
(b)
lm |ψ−〉 = −2I
⊗n |ψ−〉 = −2 |ψ−〉 (see (2.17)). The problem is that
space of bosonic states,H+, is not closed under the action of the ‘operator’ (so it’s not an
operator onH+ at all). Huggett and Norton demonstrate this (Huggett and Norton 2014,
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45) by showing that
d∑
l,m=1
P(1)lm ⊗ P
(2)
lm ⊗ I ·
1
√
3
[|↑↑↓〉 + |↑↓↑〉 + |↓↑↑〉]
=
1
√
3
[2(d − 1) |↑↑↓〉 − 2 (|↑↓↑〉 + |↓↑↑〉)] < H+.
(2.22)
Performing a measurement of the physical quantity associated with
∑d
l,m=1 P
(a)
lm P
(b)
lm on a
system of bosons has a non-zero probability of producing non-symmetric bosons.
There are two options for responding to this criticism. One, very implausible, option
would be to say that standard measurement theory doesn’t apply to
∑d
l,m=1 P
(a)
lm P
(b)
lm in order
to avoid finding a non-zero probability of producing non-symmetric bosons (Huggett and
Norton 2014, 45-46). The second option is to reject the standard practice of requiring any
physically meaningful operator to be defined on bothH+ andH−. However, I’m not sure
how to make sense of a physical quantity that’s only defined for fermions. Even spinless
particles are eigenstates of the total spin operator (with eigenvalue zero). Similarly, if there
are any physical quantities that are only possessed by fermions, I would expect bosonic
states to be eigenstates of the relevant operator with eigenvalue zero. If an operator is only
defined onH+ then it implies neither that bosons have nor lack the property in question. It
would imply something else and it’s not clear what that something else might be.
Caulton’s criticism is similar, however, he takes aim at the building blocks of Rt(a, b) and
C(a, b). The criticism is very straightforward. It is simply that the physical admissibility
of
∑d
l,m=1 P
(a)
lm P
(b)
lm and
[
P(a), Q(b)
]
is supposed to be grounded in the physical meaning of
P(a)lm , P
(a), and Q(a) which are themselves not permutation invariant (Caulton 2013, 55-56).
Caulton is perfectly fine with physically admissible operators being constructed out of
components that are not permutation invariant. The problem is that in such cases the
physical admissibility of the operator must be demonstrated directly since it can’t ‘inherit’
physical admissibility from its physically inadmissible components. Consequently,
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Caulton’s criticism is not that Muller and Saunders’ relations are physically inadmissible
but just that they haven’t succeeded in showing them to be physically admissible.
The second criticism, made by Caulton, Huggett, and Norton, is that Rt(a, b) and C(a, b)
are physically inadmissible because they are trivial.
∑d
l,m=1 P
(a)
lm P
(b)
lm reduces to multiples of
the identity when applied to non-symmetric states (see 2.17) whereas
[
P(a), Q(b)
]
reduces
to multiples of the identity regardless of the state to which it is applied (see 2.14).
R−2(a, b) can be restated, based on the equations just referenced, as (Caulton 2013, 56;
Huggett and Norton 2014, 47)
R−2(a, b) iff (a = b and 2(d−1)I |ψ〉 = −2 |ψ〉) or (a , b and −2I |ψ〉 = −2 |ψ〉) (2.23)
which can be further simplified to (Caulton 2013, 56)
R−2(a, b) iff (a = b and − 2 = 2(d − 1)) or (a , b and − 2 = −2). (2.24)
This second form makes it clear that R−2(a, b) is not a physical relation. The rhs contains
no references to physical properties or physical states. Caulton levels the same triviality
charge at C(a,b) which (Bigaj 2015, 47) shows can be rewritten as
C(a, b) iff (a = b and − i~ , 0) or (a , b and 0 , 0). (2.25)
Again, the rhs contains no references to physical properties or physical states.
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2.3.2 Alternative Weakly Discerning Relations
I will begin with Caulton’s proposed alternative as he takes the same approach as Muller,
Saunders, and Seevinck, merely choosing a different operator to define the weakly
discerning relation. Caulton defines the variance of an operator A as
∆2A =
1
4
(A ⊗ I − I ⊗ A)2 (2.26)
and the statistical mean of A as
sA :=
1
2
(A ⊗ I + I ⊗ A). (2.27)
Note that these are both operators and they are both permutation invariant. Finally, the
statistical mean of A2 is
A2 =
1
2
(A2 ⊗ I + I ⊗ A2). (2.28)
Caulton shows that the variance operator can be rewritten as
∆2A =
1
4
(A ⊗ I − I ⊗ A)2 =
1
4
(A2 ⊗ I + I ⊗ A2 − 2A ⊗ A)
=
1
2
(A2 ⊗ I + I ⊗ A2) −
1
4
(A2 ⊗ I − 2A ⊗ A + I ⊗ A2) (2.29)
= A2 − sA2,
justifying the term “variance.” The variance operator can also be rewritten as
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∆2A =
1
4
(A2 ⊗ I + I ⊗ A2 − 2A ⊗ A) =
1
2
(A2 − A ⊗ A), (2.30)
which helps us make physical sense of the variance operator. It measures the
anticorrelation between the particles’ A eigenstates (Caulton 2013, 62).
Caulton, following Muller, Saunders, and Seevinck, defines the operators A(1) = A ⊗ I and
A(2) = I ⊗ A and the relation
R′(A, x, y) iff
1
4
(
A(x) − A(y)
)2
|ψ〉 , 0. (2.31)
It may initially seem like an odd choice of operator for weakly discerning particles since,
for some operator A, bosons may be perfectly correlated. However, Caulton claims the
solution is just to change to a basis in which anticorrelations are present and use “the
quantity associated with this new basis” (Caulton 2013, 61). A basis in which some
variance operator or other (associated with some observable or other) has a non-zero
eigenvalue is only unavailable in the case of a single particle (given Caulton’s definition of
variance). Consequently, some variance operator or other takes different eigenvalues for
single- (zero) or multi-particle states (non-zero) just as those proposed by Muller,
Saunders, and Seevinck. R′(A, x, y) serves to weakly discern particles and the
(permutation invariant) variance operator has clear physical meaning as a measure of
anticorrelations between eigenstates.
While the variance operator has clear physical meaning, it’s not clear that R′(A, x, y) has
physical meaning. Bigaj points out that R′(A, x, y) can be rewritten as (Bigaj 2015,
49)
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R′(A, x, y) iff (x , y and ∆2A |ψ〉 , 0) or (x = y and 0 |ψ〉 = 0). (2.32)
Bigaj’s complaint is that the “physical” conditions 0 |ψ〉 = 0 and ∆2A |ψ〉 , 0 don’t represent
the same physical property of the system. The former condition doesn’t appear to be
associated with a physical property at all let alone the same physical property as that
associated with the latter condition. Furthermore, Bigaj points out that when we want to
measure variance for a single particle, we use the standardly defined variance operator
(∆A)2 = (A − 〈A〉)2. Not only is this not equivalent to the zero operator, but (A − 〈A〉)2 |ψ〉
is not equal to zero for even single particle states if the particle is not in an eigenstate of A.
So while it may make sense to understand ∆2A |ψ〉 , 0 as saying that the variance for A is
not equal to zero, it doesn’t look like 0 |ψ〉 = 0 is a claim about variance at all.
Consequently, it looks like Caulton’s relation R′(A, x, y) doesn’t represent a single
physical relation. Instead, each disjunct is concerned with a different relation. The first is
variance but the second is something else. Ironically, the second disjunct is trivial and this,
by Caulton’s own lights, calls in to question whether it’s about a physical relation at
all.
Bigaj’s final criticism is that Caulton appears to be using two different conceptions of
“variance.” Consider a two boson state |φ〉 |φ〉 that is perfectly correlated. The only reason
it’s possible to find an operator A such that ∆2A |φ〉 |φ〉 , 0 is that (i) |φ〉 |φ〉 is not an
eigenstate of all observables and (ii) any state that is not an eigenstate of A has non-zero
variance for A. Since |φ〉 also will not be an eigenstate of all observables, it should have
non-zero variance for some observables. However, the condition 0 |ψ〉 = 0 means that all
states have zero variance, including those that are not eigenstates of A. We have a
conception of variance in the x , y case according to which states that are not eigenstates
of A have non-zero variance for A. We have a second conception of variance in the x = y
case according to which eigenstates of A have zero variance for A. Applying the second
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conception consistently would mean that all states have zero variance whereas applying
the first conception consistently would mean that R′(A, x, y) is neither reflexive nor
non-reflexive. Either way, R′(A, x, y) doesn’t weakly discern particles. With the first
conception of variance the relation isn’t weakly discerning because it isn’t non-reflexive.
With the second conception of variance the relation isn’t weakly discerning because the
result of applying the operator to any state is zero; so, there’s no distinction between states
in which x = y and states in which x , y.
Huggett and Norton’s proposal is also very similar to that of Muller, Saunders, and
Seevinck, with the major difference being their insistence that the operator in the weakly
discerning relation be permutation invariant. Huggett and Norton use symmetrized
operators that are similar in form to symmetrized versions of P(n)lm = I ⊗ . . . ⊗ Plm ⊗ . . . ⊗ I.
The symmetric operators will not contain any reference to specific particles in which case
we have to consider two cases a = b and a , b separately. When a = b the symmetrized
operator is
1
n
∑
p∈P
(AB ⊗ I ⊗ · · · ⊗ I), (2.33)
where the sum is over all the permutations of the n particles, the division by n is to avoid
over-counting, and A and B are operators representing observables. When a , b we have
instead
1
2 nC2
∑
p∈P
(A ⊗ B ⊗ I ⊗ · · · ⊗ I), (2.34)
where nC2 is the binomial coefficient
(
n
2
)
. They then define the relation
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Rt(a, b) iff
a = b and 1n ∑
p∈P
(AB ⊗ I ⊗ · · · ⊗ I) |ψ〉 = t |ψ〉

or
a , b and 12 nC2
∑
p∈P
(A ⊗ B ⊗ I ⊗ · · · ⊗ I) |ψ〉 = t |ψ〉
 .
(2.35)
Since we want the eigenvalues to be different in the two cases and we want the weakly
discerning relation to be non-reflexive, this relation weakly discerns when t is such that
the first disjunct is false (so non-reflexive) and the second disjunct is true.
Huggett and Norton’s approach has a severe drawback compared to the other approaches.
As Huggett and Norton acknowledge, the scope of their result is very limited. They have
not shown that there is a value t such that Rt(a, b) weakly discerns all fermionic states. In
particular, they have only shown that there exists such a t for fermionic states of the
form
|ψ〉 =
1
√
n!
∑
p∈P
cS |a1〉 |a2〉 · · · |an〉 ( 〈ai|a j〉 = δi j), (2.36)
which does not include, for example, the two fermion state (Huggett and Norton 2014,
53)
|ψ〉 =
1
2
(|a1〉 |a2〉 − |a2〉 |a1〉 + |a3〉 |a4〉 − |a4〉 |a3〉) . (2.37)
Furthermore, there exists no t such that Rt(a, b) weakly discerns all bosonic states.
Huggett and Norton show that Rt(a, b) can’t weakly discern bosons that are all in the
same state, that is, bosonic states of the form |ψ〉 = ⊗n |φ〉.
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2.3.3 Weak Discernibility and Individuality
Discernibility is often taken as a sufficient condition for individuality. However, the sort of
discernibility people tend to have in mind is absolute discernibility. Two objects are
absolutely discernible when they differ in their intrinsic properties. When objects differ in
their intrinsic properties it is always possible to use those properties to individuate them.
When objects are merely weakly discernible, it is not possible to individuate them purely
on the basis of their properties. Weakly discerning relations are symmetric and so objects
that are merely weakly discernible have all the same properties (that is, properties that
make no explicit reference to identity). The idea that a weakly discerning relation could
provide grounds for individuality at all is based on the fact that a weakly discerning
relation can only hold between numerically distinct objects. In other words, numerical
distinctness is a necessary condition for a weakly discerning relation to obtain. So, the
question is whether the existence of a relation between particles that requires numerical
distinctness to obtain implies that the particles are individuals.
There are no positive arguments in the literature for the idea that objects that are weakly
discernible are individuals. Indeed, most of those involved in the debate over the weak
discernibility of particles agree that weak discernibility does not ground individuality.
However, there are two major arguments to the effect that weak discernibility cannot
ground individuality. I will look at these arguments first, before providing my own reasons
in favor of accepting weak discernibility as grounds for individuality.
One complaint is that there is a circularity in claiming that weak discernibility grounds
individuality (Hawley 2006, Hawley 2009, French and Krause 2006). Following (Hawley
2009) the circularity charge is as follows. First, weak discernibility implies that weakly
discerned objects a and b have the distinct non-qualitative properties bears relation R to b
and bears relation R to a, respectively. These properties are non-qualitative because they
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reference identity in virtue of the fact that they include object labels. Possessing these
different relational properties is then what grounds the claim of the numerical distinctness
of a and b. But, in order to say that a has the property bears relation R to b presupposes
that a and b are numerically distinct. The complaint, then, is that the numerical
distinctness required to conclude that a weakly discerning relation obtains in the first place
must be put in by hand. It is important to note that this is an epistemic worry. How are we
to actually demonstrate that a weakly discerning relation obtains without assuming
numerical distinctness?
There are two problems with the circularity criticism that I will address, the latter of which
applies only to the weak discernibility of particles. The first problem, noted in (Muller
2015), is that the circularity objection misunderstands the way in which weakly discerning
relations are meant to discern particles. The reason weakly discerning relations discern is
entirely because the relations are non-reflexive. The reason objects a and b are weakly
discernible isn’t because they have distinct non-qualitative properties but because they
stand in a relation that no object can bear to itself. Allowing non-qualitative properties is
problematic in that it collapses the distinction between different kinds of discernibility.
For instance, if we allow Hawley’s relations bears relation R to a and bears relation R to
b, then weak discernibility collapses to extrinsic absolute discernibility; that is,
discernibility by a specific relation to a specific object that is also extrinsically absolutely
discernible (Muller 2015, 215). This doesn’t strike me as a suitable response. Even if
Hawley has misrepresented how weakly discerning relations actually discern objects, it
still seems to be the case that we need to know whether or not we have numerical
distinctness in order to say whether a weakly discerning relation applies or not.
The second issue with the circularity criticism in the context of the weak discernibility of
particles is that in NRQM there is never any question as to how many particles are in a
given state. Consequently, claims about the weak discernibility of particles in NRQM are
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always claims about whether or not a known number of particles obeys a weakly
discerning relation. So, we can accept Hawley’s claim that we need to know whether we
have numerical distinctness in order to apply a weakly discerning relation and still avoid
the circularity objection because we have a means to determine particle number.
A second circularity criticism comes from (Bigaj 2015). Bigaj claims that the proposals
for weakly discerning relations discussed above depend on assuming numerical
distinctness in order to determine the correct form of the operator. The operators are all
either indexed by particle labels or, in the case of Huggett and Norton, the operators for
when we have either one or more than one particle are explicitly different. Consequently,
we must know whether we have one or more than one particle before applying any of the
proposed weakly discerning relations for particles. However, Bigaj’s concern is that
showing that a weakly discerning relation applies when we already know the objects in
question are numerically distinct doesn’t appear to have any interesting metaphysical
implications.
I find Bigaj’s claim somewhat puzzling. The assumption seems to be that those who want
to connect weak discernibility to individuality want to do it via numerical distinctness by
endorsing the following claims: (i) If objects a and b are weakly discernible then they are
numerically distinct, and (ii) if objects a and b are numerically distinct then they are
individuals. However, for reasons discussed above, we do not need weak discernibility to
determine whether we have one or more than one particle in a state in NRQM. Anyone
that wants to endorse (ii) can start there directly without worrying about whether particles
are weakly discernible.
The second major criticism of a connection between weak discernibility and individuality
is that weak discernibility “is a condition which entails that there is more than one entity
of a given kind, without implying that there are specifiable differences that distinguish
them” (van Fraassen and Peschard 2008, p. 19). Ladyman, Bigaj, and Arenhart all raise
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this criticism as well (Ladyman and Bigaj 2010, Arenhart 2013a). The majority of the
discussion is concerned with what kind of connection, if any, weak discernibility has to
the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII). More specifically, the concern is
whether “weakly discernible” objects count as discernible in the sense relevant for PII. We
can separate the issue from PII by simply asking whether weak discernibility is a
physically interesting kind of discernibility. The above authors all answer this question in
the negative. Ladyman and Bigaj, for example, require that any physically interesting
discernibility relation allow for a physical procedure that would distinguish the objects in
question. But objects that are merely weakly discernible do not differ in their physical
properties (monadic or relational).
At this point I should probably explain why I’m avoiding talking about PII since this
avoidance means I can’t go into detail regarding Ladyman, Bigaj, and Arenhart’s
criticisms of the connection between weak discernibility and individuality. I have avoided
talking about PII up to this point largely because I think the issue of whether some version
of PII holds for particles is a much more complicated issue than whether particles are
individuals or not. If one wants to argue from the truth or falsity of PII to claims about
individuality, there are only two ways to go. If PII is true, then particles are individuals
and if PII is false then particles are not individuals. However, these are not the only
possibilities. If, for example, particles are weakly discernible, weak discernibility grounds
individuality, and weak discernibility is not discernibility in the sense relevant to PII, then
particles are individuals that violate PII. My point is that the issue of whether PII is true
depends on more than objects being individuals or not and so brings inappropriate baggage
into the debate over the individuality (or non-individuality) of particles. The issues
involved in answering the questions of whether particles are individuals and whether
particles violate PII are related, but the answers needn’t be the same. The key to making
sense of the idea of individuals that violate PII is to note that identity and individuality are
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two different things and there are different proposals for how they are connected.19
Framing the arguments without reference to PII avoids obscuring this option. It also
immunizes the arguments from criticisms that cannot be reformulated without reference to
PII (two of which I will discuss later) and, in doing so, strengthens the arguments. Of
course, PII is such an important part of the current debate that I would be negligent were I
not to spend a fair bit of time on its discussion. However, for the reasons given above I
think its discussion is best separated from the arguments for and against the individuality
of particles. Consequently, I will save discussion of PII for chapters three and five.
I have the same response to both Bigaj’s circularity objection and the objection that
appropriate weakly discerning relations should allow for particles to be distinguished (at
least in principle). I think these objections both misunderstand the way in which weak
discernibility is supposed to ground individuality. I’ve already explained why I think this
is the case with regard to the circularity objection. The latter objection can be viewed as
either a criticism of the idea that weak discernibility can ground individuality or a
challenge to provide an explicit explanation of how that grounding is supposed to work.
Viewing the objection as a criticism, it is straight-forwardly question begging since weak
discernibility, by definition, doesn’t provide for a difference of physical properties (either
monadic or relational) by which we could distinguish the particles.
If the objection is viewed as a challenge, the challenge can be answered. Ladyman,
Linnebo, and Pettigrew have proven that weak discernibility is the weakest form of
non-trivial discernibility (Ladyman, Linnebo, and Pettigrew 2012). They also show that
weak discernibility is more discerning than mere numerical distinctness. It is therefore
possible for a collection of numerically distinct objects to not even be weakly discernible.
So, we can ask, what is the metaphysical difference between a collection of numerically
19These proposals will be discussed in chapter four.
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distinct objects that are weakly discernible and a collection that are not? What do weakly
discernible objects have, over-and-above merely numerically discernible objects, in virtue
of which they are weakly discernible? Since weak discernment is discernment in the
absence of qualitative difference, it would be odd if the answer were that weakly discerned
objects have some qualitative property (or set of properties) that merely numerically
discernible objects lack. So, unless we want to take the difference as an unexplained brute
fact the only option seems to be that weakly discerned objects have a non-qualitative
property (identity or individuality of some sort), that merely numerically discernible
objects lack. The connection between weak discernibility and individuality is neither via
the fact that weakly discernible objects are numerically distinct nor by virtue of possessing
qualitative properties that ground a physically detectable (at least in principle) difference.
It is in virtue of the fact that a physically meaningful difference (the holding or not of a
physically meaningful relation) prima facie seems best explained by appeal to a property
that makes explicit reference to identity (that is, a non-qualitative property).
2.4 Primitive Thisness
The second argument to the effect that particles are individuals comes from Dorato and
Morganti. They claim that particles should be taken as individuals because (i) this allows
us to explain why particles are formally countable and (ii) the primitive thisness account
of individuality is the most ontologically parsimonious view (Dorato and Morganti 2013).
Formal countability simply refers to the fact that states in NRQM always have
well-defined particle number. According to Dorato and Morganti, we should understand
the fact that particles are formally countable as having “a direct ontological counterpart,
so that it can be concluded that those particles are n individuals independently of their
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qualities” (Dorato and Morganti 2013, p. 606). Consequently, we should take particles to
be primitively individuated in order to account for their formal countability.
Dorato and Morganti use the phrase “primitive thisness” to refer to primitively
individuated objects. But they are advocating a metaphysically minimal notion of
primitive thisness. They don’t want primitive thisness to “constitute ‘mysterious
metaphysical additions’ to the qualities of things based on full-blown ‘properties”’
(Dorato and Morganti 2013, p.598). On this account, primitive thisness does not refer to
any ontological component of an object. It is simply a brute fact, which cannot be further
analyzed or explained, that particles are individuals. Because the claim that particles are
individuals in this sense doesn’t attribute any additional ontological component to
particles, the view is metaphysically conservative.
Arenhart has raised objections to both points Dorato and Morganti offer in favor of their
view. First, Arenhart claims that numerical diversity is compatible both with
transcendental individuality and non-individuality (Arenhart 2013b). But this objection
misses a key feature of Dorato and Morganti’s position. Their argument claims that
reasons for revising our ontology in terms of non-individuals are inconclusive and so it’s
reasonable to take labels as attaching to individuals. Another line of response to Arenhart
would be to say that primitive individuality is meant to provide an explanation for how we
know how many particles are in a given state not as an explanation for the metaphysical
fact that there are that many particles.
Arenhart’s second objection is very straightforward. Even bracketing worries about
whether metaphysical simplicity should be considered an epistemic virtue, it’s not obvious
that primitive thisness is metaphysically simpler than non-individuality. Prima facie
non-individuality is simpler because the primitive thisness account introduces an
additional brute fact. It’s possible that Dorato and Morganti simply mean that primitive
thisness is the most metaphysically economical way of treating particles as individuals.
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It’s clearly more economical than transcendental accounts of individuality in which case,
accepting metaphysical economy as an epistemic virtue, primitive thisness seems to win
out over transcendental individuality in spite of the previous objection.
2.5 States versus Particles
It is commonly assumed that the labels in NRQM indicate quantum particles. This is why
we have a connection between the Indistinguishability Postulate and the requirement that
states be symmetric or antisymmetric with respect to particle labels. The labels represent
particles and their indistinguishability is captured by the requirement that their states be
symmetric or antisymmetric with respect to those labels.
Redhead and Teller argued that particles are not individuals because they lack labels. But
this was because they thought the Fock space formalism itself didn’t include labels, not
because they didn’t associate labels, when present, with particles. The argument from
quantum statistics depends on the labels indicating particles. Weak discernibility also
depends on labels indicating particles insofar as it’s the entities to which the labels attach
that are merely weakly discernible. Finally, Dorato and Morganti’s primitive thisness
account also depends on labels indicating particles since the particle number operator
returns the value of the number of unique particle labels in an expression. But what if it’s
the case that we shouldn’t be associating labels with particles at all? What if it is
something other than the labels that we should be associating with particles? Dieks and
Lubberdink have offered an such an alternative for understanding particles in NRQM
(Dieks and Lubberdink 2011).
Dieks and Lubberdink are offering a solution to what I’ll refer to as the problem of
indistinguishable classical particles. The issue, as they describe it, is that the
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symmetrisation postulates, which are taken to imply the indistinguishability of quantum
particles, are valid even in the classical limit where we would expect to see classical
particles emerge. Consequently, classical particles that emerge from NRQM are just as
indistinguishable as quantum particles. Their solution is to identity quantum particles with
localized states rather than with labels. So, consider again the state
1
√
2
(|a(1)〉 |b(2)〉 + |b(1)〉 |a(2)〉) (2.38)
where |a〉 and |b〉 are localized states. According to Dieks and Lubberdink, this state
describes two distinguishable quantum particles. One of them is at the position where |a〉
is localized and the other where |b〉 is localized. Consequently, classical particles
emerging in the classical limit will also be distinguishable.
Dieks and Lubberdink solve the problem of indistinguishable classical particles at the cost
of creating the problem of distinguishable quantum particles. If we define classical and
quantum particles in the same way, then the validity of quantum mechanics in both the
classical and quantum domains, ensures that classical and quantum particles are either
both distinguishable or both indistinguishable. Is the problem of distinguishable quantum
particles a genuine problem?
In general, on Dieks and Lubberdink’s definition of ‘particle,’ a quantum state will not
include any particles. If |a〉 and |b〉 overlap in the above state, then there is no unique
decomposition of the position distributions into localized states. But whenever a quantum
state can be uniquely decomposed in terms of localized single-particle states, there are
quantum particles and those particles are distinguishable. So, the ‘indistinguishability of
quantum particles’ is an artifact of the fact that most quantum states don’t describe
particles at all.
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Dieks and Lubberdink can perhaps explain away the indistinguishability postulate on the
basis that the postulate is based on the assumption that labels indicate particles. But how
are they to explain the difference between classical and quantum statistics? Shouldn’t
states that have a unique decomposition in terms of localized single particle states obey
the same statistics? If what the classical limit does is ensure that we have a unique
decomposition in terms of localized single particle states and that those states remain
localized, then this should play some explanatory role in why classical statistics differs
from quantum statistics. But then shouldn’t a state that has a unique decomposition in
terms of localized single particle states outside of the classical limit obey the same
statistics for as long as that decomposition remains applicable? This strikes me as an
empirical consequence of the view. Quantum particles should, even if briefly, sometimes
obey MB statistics. It’s difficult to see how the difference between classical and quantum
statistics could be divorced from indistinguishability, and so any view that proposes that
quantum particles are sometimes distinguishable (in a metaphysical rather than epistemic
sense) needs to explain how it upholds the difference between classical and quantum
statistics.
There are at least two other issues. One is that the physical meaning of the particle number
operator seems to vary depending on the state to which it’s applied. It gives us the number
of quantum particles in states with unique decompositions in terms of localized
single-particle states, but it doesn’t give us the number of quantum particles for other
states (where all other states have zero quantum particles). I think Dieks and Lubberdink
need to provide us with an explanation of how we are to understand the particle number
operator on their view.
The other issue is how to understand states like |a〉 |a〉. If the number of particles is equal
to the number of distinct localized single particle states, then this is a one-particle state.
But there are empirical differences in behavior between the state |a〉 and the state |a〉 |a〉.
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Note that the decomposition into localized single particle states here is unique. The
(alleged) two bosons are each in state |a〉, they aren’t each in state |b〉 or |c〉. And this is
despite having overlapping wave functions. When we have two distinct overlapping wave
functions, then we can’t determine a unique decomposition in terms of localized single
particle states. But if |a〉 , |b〉 then |a〉 |a〉 , |b〉 |b〉. It seems to me that situations we would
normally describe as involving n bosons in the same state would be described by Dieks
and Lubberdink as involving a single particle in that state. But the value of n makes an
empirical difference. Dieks and Lubberdink need to explain how to account for this
difference, but it’s not obvious that they could explain it.
All of this suggests that it would be problematic to associate quantum particles with
localized single particle states rather than with labels. But there is a way to solve the
problem of indistinguishable particles without creating these problems. Classical particles
and quantum particles are very different things and I think it’s misleading to use the term
”particle” to describe the latter (but it is the term generally used). Instead we have
classical particles and quantum wavicles (for lack of a better term) and we should not be
trying to define them in the same way. In light of this perhaps what we should do is accept
Dieks and Lubberdink’s definition for classical particles (and so apply that definition in
the classical limit) but view labels as indicating particles outside of the classical limit.
Then classical particles are distinguishable and quantum particles are indistinguishable;
standard explanations for the difference between classical and quantum statistics still
apply; the particle number operator always gives us the number of particles; and there’s no
mystery about understanding the difference between having 1, or 2, or n bosons in the
same state. Consequently, for the remainder of this dissertation I will assume that labels in
NRQM indicate particles.
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2.6 Conclusion
The forgoing should make it clear that we have a case of metaphysical underdetermination
here. However, it’s not merely that NRQM is compatible with particles-as-individuals and
particles-as-non-individuals metaphysical packages, but that there is no clear winner
between the two. On the side of non-individuality, we have, in the first instance, Redhead
and Teller whose arguments depend on treating the LTPHSF and Fock space formalism as
more different than they actually are. Secondly, we have the argument from quantum
statistics where Saunders and Belousek question whether permutation invariance is
actually a difference between classical and quantum mechanics and Morganti questions
whether permutation invariance is a relevant difference. On the side of individuality, we
first have weak discernibility where it’s not only questionable whether particles are
weakly discernible in a physically meaningful sense but also whether weak discernibility
implies anything about individuality. Finally, we have Dorato and Morganti’s primitive
thisness account where we have little positive argument. What should we do in light of
this metaphysical underdetermination?
Ontic structural realists, such as Ladyman and French, have cited this metaphysical
underdetermination as a cause for adopting ontic structural realism (OSR).20 For example,
Ladyman writes
Even if we are able to decide on a canonical formulation of our theory, there
is a further problem of metaphysical underdetermination [...] In the case of
individuality, it has been shown [...] that electrons may be interpreted either as
individuals or as non-individuals. We need to recognize the failure of our best
20Roughly, ontic structural realism is the view that the only things in our scientific theories that we
should be realist about are structural features.
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theories to determine even the most fundamental ontological characteristic of
the purported entities they feature. It is an ersatz form of realism that
recommends belief in the existence of entities that have such an ambiguous
metaphysical status. What is required is a shift to a different ontological basis
altogether, one for which questions of individuality simply do not arise.21
Ladyman sees scientific realism as incompatible with this sort of metaphysical
underdetermination. I am not going to be concerned with whether there is such an
incompatibility, nor will I be concerned with OSR itself.22 However, for the purposes of
this dissertation I will be assuming that scientific realism, of some sort, is correct.
I have two options here. I can agree with Ladyman that metaphysical underdetermination
is a problem for scientific realism or I can disagree. I will look at both options in turn.
First, suppose I agree with Ladyman. Is there a way to save scientific realism? Since this
is a compatibility issue, there is clearly another potential source of the problem. Perhaps it
is not scientific realism that needs to be revised but our notion of individuality. Quantum
theory has a habit of challenging our classical conception of the world and perhaps in this
instance it’s our concept of individuality that needs revision. So even accepting
Ladyman’s challenge to scientific realism, there is another, as yet unexplored, option
besides accepting OSR. I will be developing this option in chapters four through six.
On the other hand, suppose I disagree with Ladyman and don’t see the metaphysical
underdetermination here as a problem to be resolved. Even in this case I can still ask the
question of whether this a genuine case of metaphysical underdetermination or an artifact
of an inappropriate concept of individuality. I needn’t be concerned with OSR or whether
21(Ladyman 1998, pp. 419-420).
22Though I should note that more recent defenses of OSR don’t rely on underdetermination arguments.
Instead they say that NRQM indicates that quantum objects have relationally determined identity. For more
information on OSR see (Landry and Rickels 2012).
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there is genuine incompatibility between scientific realism and the metaphysical
underdetermination of the individuality, or lack thereof, of particles. My project makes
sense regardless of whether Ladyman is correct.
I do not actually see this metaphysical underdetermination as a serious problem. If the
world is such that we can’t know whether particles are individuals or not, then so be it.
There is no need to remove the underdetermination and the removal of this
underdetermination is not an epistemic virtue that should count in favor of accepting OSR
and against the position I will develop in chapters three through five. However, I do not
think that the world is such that we can’t know whether particles are individuals or not.
We can answer this question, and we can do so in a way that has its own independent
merits.
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Issues with Individuality in NRQM
The second step in my project is to lay out some challenges that must be kept in mind in
discussions of individuality in quantum mechanics. I will begin with three challenges the
defender of non-individuality must address. The first two challenges are tied together by
Jantzen, the originator of these challenges, in the form of a dilemma for anyone who
wants to speak of non-individuals (Jantzen 2011, Jantzen 2014). The challenges can be
separated, indeed the second doesn’t appear in (Jantzen 2011), and I will treat them
separately. The first challenge is the idea that it is nonsensical to claim that particles are
not individuals because (i) collections of particles have cardinality and, (ii) cardinality
presupposes identity. The second challenge is the idea that terms like “electron” function,
semantically, as mass nouns although we treat them, syntactically, as count nouns. Once
we realize that terms like “electron” are, semantically, mass nouns there is no longer any
reason to claim that particle are not individuals. The third challenge is the claim, defended
in (Bueno 2014), that the concept of identity is fundamental in such a way that it makes
the most sense, pragmatically, to treat particles as possessing identity. These challenges all
have the same basic form. The idea is that identity is related to other concepts and so if
identity goes so do these other concepts. The reason I want to present these arguments
merely as challenges rather than as arguments to the effect that particles are individuals is
that the arguments can’t be generalized in a non-question-begging way. I stated in chapter
two that NRQM has a habit of challenging our classical concepts, so one way a defender
of non-individuality can respond is by proposing revised versions of these concepts (such
as cardinality). These proposals will have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
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The rest of this chapter will be a challenge to the defender of individuality in the form of a
discussion of the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals (PII). PII is appealing to
many philosophers of physics because it provides empirical meaning to the claim that
objects are individuals by connecting identity with distinguishability. So, a challenge for
anyone who wants to claim that particles are individuals, and thereby separate
individuality from distinguishability, is to explain the difference between individuals and
non-individuals. If the difference isn’t that the former are distinguishable and the latter are
not, then what is it?
3.1 Classical Cardinality
While a detailed discussion of what it means for something to be an individual or
non-individual will wait until chapter four, understanding Jantzen’s argument requires
noting one particular feature of non-individuals. Everyone agrees that part of what it
means to be an individual is to have identity in some sense. An individual a stands in the
relation a = a to itself. Consequently, one way to deny that an object is an individual is to
say that the identity relation, denoted by “=,” does not apply to the object. This is, in fact,
what all the defenders of the claim that particles aren’t individuals do say. I will look more
at how we should understand the claim that some objects lack identity in chapter four. All
that matters here are some of the consequences of denying the identity relation.
The problem for the defender of non-individuality, according to Jantzen, is that cardinality
presupposes identity. Modern set theory uses the von Neumann cardinal assignment
according to which the cardinal number of a set S is the smallest ordinal number n such
that there is a bijection from n to S . Jantzen points out two ways in which this definition of
cardinality presupposes identity. The first is that one cannot define ordinals without
defining asymmetric relations and, as noted in (French and Krause 2006, p. 284), one
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cannot define asymmetric relations without identity. The other is that a bijection is a
function and “the notion of a function depends upon the primitive identity of elements in a
set” (Jantzen 2011, p. 442). This is easy to see when noting that functions have one, and
only one, output for a given input. If we have a function f : S → T we require that for all
s ∈ S and t, t′ ∈ T that if f (s) = t and f (s) = t′ then t = t′. Finally, Janzten also provides a
nice non-technical way in which we can understand the relation between cardinality and
identity: “we understand the ‘size’ of a finite set A to correspond to what we get by
‘counting’ the elements of A in the normal, intuitive sense of counting. Counting is really
just indexing, affixing to each element of A a unique label as we do when we point to each
element and say “one,” “two,” “three,” etc. But indexing requires that we be able to pick
out individual elements of A without reference to their properties” (Jantzen 2011, p. 442).
The point is that what it means for a collection of objects to have a cardinality, on the
standard ways of thinking about it, “is for the entities to be identical with themselves and
no others in the collection” (Jantzen 2014, p. 3).
The technical details as to why classical set-theoretic cardinality presupposes identity
aren’t actually what’s important here. Defenders of the view that particles are
non-individuals recognize that their view implies that collections of particles can’t be
appropriately described in classical set theory. Hence the development of quasi-set theory.
The issue is whether defenders of non-individuality can adequately explain, in a sensible
way, why collections of particles in NRQM are eigenstates of the particle number
operator. The particle number operator gives us something which it makes sense to refer
to as a cardinality. It does the primary thing that cardinality does, namely indicate how
many objects there are. Consequently, the defender of non-individuality owes us a
definition of cardinality that makes sense as such. That is, the defender of
non-individuality can’t merely attach the word “cardinality” to any definition. The
definition must be such that we can recognize it as a plausible formalization of what we
mean when we say such things as “there are two bosons.”
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Jantzen takes things a little further than this. He claims that, as a result of the success of
classical set theory, very strong motivation is needed to warrant even searching for, let
alone adopting, an alternative. Jantzen sees the fact that an interpretation of NRQM in
which it is compatible with classical set theory (the particles-as-individuals interpretation)
in conjunction with the success of classical set theory undermines any motivation for
developing alternative set theories. We needn’t go as far as Jantzen and I don’t agree that
the project of developing alternative set theories is unmotivated. However, I do agree that
we ought to carefully examine the analogs of classical cardinality these set theories
provide and ensure they are acceptable. I will now proceed to do just that.
3.1.1 Cardinality in Quasi-Set Theory
Quasi-set theory is a conservative extension of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with
urelements (ZFU). To say that theory T2 is a conservative extension of theory T1 is to say
(i) that all the theorems of T1 are theorems of T2 and (ii) that any theorem of T2 that can be
entirely expressed in the language of T1 is a theorem of T1. This essentially means that
quasi-set theory “encompasses a ‘classical’ counterpart which coincides with ZFU”
(French and Krause 2006, p. 284). Urelements are objects that are not themselves sets but
can be elements of sets; an urelement may denote a physical object. The urelements in
quasi-set theory are M-atoms, which denote classical objects, and m-atoms, which denote
the basic entities of quantum theory. Making quasi-set theory a conservative extension of
ZFU ensures that classical objects are treated in the same way in both theories.
The basic differences between quasi-set theory and ZFU are as follows.1 First, the axioms
of quasi-set theory are expressed in a first-order language without identity. Note that
1See (French and Krause 2006) for an extensive account of quasi-set theory.
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French and Krause do not spell out the logic behind quasi-set theory (i.e. the logic of the
metalanguage used to describe quasi-set theory), leaving it open as to whether or not it is
identical to classical first-order predicate logic without identity. Second, quasi-set theory
contains a primitive binary relation of indistinguishability denoted by ‘≡’. Because there
are two types of urelements there are two monadic predicates, m(x) and M(x), to specify,
for some urelement x, its type. Finally, there is a monadic predicate Z(x) indicating that x
is a set in the sense of ZFU. The basic components of quasi-set theory are quasi-sets
(qsets), M-atoms, and m-atoms where (i) anything that isn’t an M-atom or an m-atom is a
qset and (ii) some qsets are sets.
One peculiar feature of quasi-set theory to note is that expressing quasi-set theory in a
first-order language without identity means that the best one can do to represent identity is
to define a relation of extensional identity. French and Krause define extensional identity
as follows:
x =E y =d f
[(
Z(x) ∧ Z(y) ∧ ∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)
)
∨
(
M(x) ∧ M(y) ∧ ∀Qz(x ∈ z↔ y ∈ z)
)]
,
(3.1)
where ∀Q is the universal quantifier restricted to qsets (French and Krause 2006, p. 277).
This says that x and y are extensionally identical if they (i) are sets with all the same
members or (ii) are M-atoms that are elements of all the same qsets.
Extensional identity and numerical identity are logically distinct, and one might be
concerned that quasi-set theory only has the former. To see that they’re logically distinct
consider the standard example that every species that has a heart also has kidneys. The
phrase “has a heart,” understood in the sense we mean when we say things like “members
of the human species have hearts,” and the phrase “has a kidney,” understood in the same
sense, are extensionally equivalent.2 However, they clearly aren’t equivalent in the sense
2Note that people temporarily lacking a kidney during a transplant, for example, is not a counterexample
to the claim that every species that has a heart has kidneys when that claim is understood as intended.
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of having a heart being the very same thing as having a kidney. It’s a theorem of quasi-set
theory that extensional identity has the properties of first-order (Hilbert-Bernays) identity
(French and Krause 2006, p. 279). What this claim amounts to is that for any claim in
ZFU that involves numerical identity the corresponding claim using extensional identity is
also true. So, French and Krause aren’t disputing that extensional identity and numerical
identity are logically distinct, but they think the difference doesn’t matter because it makes
no practical difference in the context of quasi-set theory. In the context of quasi-set theory,
it’s perfectly safe to use a relation of extensional identity without fear that it will identify
distinct things. Still, one might be concerned by the fact that quasi-set theory lacks the
ability to say that the sets {1} and {2} have numerically the same cardinality. To put it more
strikingly, quasi-set theory can’t articulate the claim that 1 is numerically identical to
itself. Instead, it can only articulate the claim that 1 is extensionally identical to
itself.
The few features of quasi-set theory I have described above are sufficient to understand its
claims about cardinality. So, I’ll leave my misgivings about extensional identity behind
and turn, first, to what French and Krause say about cardinality. French and Krause define
the quasi-cardinal of a qset as “The quasi-cardinal of a qset is a cardinal (defined in the
‘classical part’ of the theory) and coincides with its cardinal itself when this qset is a set”
(French and Krause 2006, p. 286). What this means is that a quasi-cardinal is a von
Neumann cardinal and that in the case of a qset that is also a set in ZFU the quasi-cardinal
assignment from quasi-set theory and the cardinal assignment from ZFU agree. They state
that this definition doesn’t commit them to the claim that a qset consisting only of
non-individuals (a pure qset) can be ordered because “the associated ordinal of a quasi-set
of indistinguishable m-atoms cannot be something that belongs to the ‘classical’ part of
the theory” (French and Krause 2006, p. 286). The idea is that we can use either a
different definition of ‘ordinal’ for m-atoms or, instead of defining ordinals for m-atoms,
we could simply assign ordinals to them. The latter option would mean that “the
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cardinality of pure qsets is always an ad hoc addendum” (Jantzen 2011, p. 447). French
and Krause say little more about the cardinality of pure qsets saying only that it should be
further investigated.
The only attempt, so far, to provide a satisfactory account of cardinality for pure qsets can
be found in (Domenech and Holik 2007) and further developed in (Arenhart 2011) and
(Arenhart 2012). Jantzen gives a very nice brief summary of Domenech and Holik’s
approach: “If we call the qset in question X then—informally speaking—their approach is
to construct qsets from X which resemble classical singletons, argue that these
‘quasi-singletons’ should be assigned a cardinality of 1, and then to count how many such
quasi-singletons can be extracted from X” (Jantzen 2011, p. 445). Let X be a non-empty
qset and let x ∈ X. We can construct the quasi-singleton in two steps. The first is to
construct the following qset
Ax =E [a ∈ P(X) : x ∈ a], (3.2)
where P(X) is the power qset of X. The power set of a set S is the set of all subsets of S .
Similarly, the power qset of a qset X is the qset of all sub-qsets of X. Ax, then, is the qset
of all sub-qsets of X that contain x. The quasi-singleton 〈x〉 can then be written as
〈x〉 =E
⋂
a∈Ax
a. (3.3)
〈x〉 is the intersection of Ax; that is, the elements of 〈x〉 are all and only those elements that
are members of every sub-qset of X that contains x. If X is a set then 〈x〉 =E {x} and the
cardinality of 〈x〉 is uncontroversially 1.
To show that we should take the cardinality of 〈x〉 to be 1 for any qset X, including qsets
whose members are all m-atoms, Domenech and Holik show that if Qα and α ⊆ 〈x〉, then
α =E ∅ or α =E 〈x〉, where Qα means that α is a qset (Domenech and Holik 2007, p. 865).
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In other words, they show that the only sub-qsets of 〈x〉 are itself and the empty set. There
is no smaller non-empty subset of 〈x〉. This result, which they call “Proposition 4.4”,
seems like a good reason to call 〈x〉 a quasi-singleton.
However, Jantzen shows that Proposition 4.4, in conjunction with the definitions of a
quasi-singleton and a power qset, provides the resources to construct a first-order identity
relation for m-atoms. Specifically, Jantzen defines the relation x ∼ y =E y ∈ 〈x〉 and shows
that ‘∼’ has the properties of first-order identity just as ‘=E’ does (Jantzen 2011, p. 446).
The proof begins with the assumption that y ∈ 〈x〉 where X is a pure qset. The proof can
then be divided into four steps. Showing that ∀z∈P(X)(x ∈ z→ y ∈ z) is the first step. This
follows straightforwardly from y ∈ 〈x〉 and the definition of 〈x〉.
The second step is to establish that ∀z∈P(X)(y ∈ z→ x ∈ z). Jantzen provides a proof by
contradiction and so begins by asking us to suppose that there exists a qset z ∈ P(X) such
that y ∈ z and x < z. Then, by the definition of 〈y〉, it follows that x < 〈y〉. Since x ∈ 〈x〉 it
must be the case that ¬(〈x〉 =E 〈y〉). Now, y ∈ 〈x〉 implies that 〈x〉 ∈ Ay. This is because Ay
is the qset of all sub-qsets of X that contain y and 〈x〉 is such a sub-qset. Next note that it
follows from 〈x〉 ∈ Ay that 〈y〉 ⊆ 〈x〉. To see this, note first that if all the elements of 〈x〉 are
in the intersection of Ay then 〈y〉 =E 〈x〉 and if only some of the elements of 〈x〉 are in the
intersection of Ay then 〈y〉 ⊂ 〈x〉. However, from Proposition 4.4 if 〈y〉 is a non-empty
subset of 〈x〉, then 〈y〉 =E 〈x〉. The assumption ¬∀z∈P(X)(y ∈ z→ x ∈ z) has led to a
contradiction and so it is the case that ∀z∈P(X)(y ∈ z→ x ∈ z).
The third step begins by noting that y ∈ 〈x〉 implies ∀z∈P(X)(y ∈ z↔ x ∈ z). Since m-atoms
are indistinguishable from one another we can change this to y ∈ 〈x〉 implies
∀z∈P(X)
(
(y ∈ z↔ x ∈ z) ∧ (x ≡ y)
)
. Consequently, ‘∼’ functions as a first-order
indistinguishablity relation on P(X). The final step comes from (Ketland 2006, p. 307)
who shows that for a language with finitely many predicates first-order identity and
first-order indistinguishability have all the same properties. So, “if we restrict the range of
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our quantifiers to the qsets in P(X) then ‘∼’ is a first-order identity relation for m-atoms
just as ‘=E’ is an identity relation for everything else” (Jantzen 2011, p. 446). The relation
‘∼’ is an identity relation in exactly the same way as extensional identity (that is, it has the
properties of first-order Hilbert-Bernays identity). Consequently, defenders of
non-individuality require a different definition of cardinality for m-atoms. However, the
very fact that it’s possible to define an identity relation for m-atoms that is compatible with
the axioms of quasi-set theory is itself cause for concern. If particles are not individuals in
the sense of lacking self-identity, then an appropriate theory presumably wouldn’t be
compatible with defining an identity relation for them.
Arenhart endorses and builds on Domenech and Holik’s results. Consequently, if
Jantzen’s criticisms are correct, they apply equally well to Arenhart. Arenhart does,
however, have a reply to Jantzen. Arenhart challenges the claim that ’∼’ has been shown
to be an indistinguishability formula. He points out that the relation only shows that
“m-atoms x and y, under the conditions of the definition, belong to the same q-sets, which
is not the same as an indistinguishability formula” (Arenhart 2012). The reason, according
to Arenhart, is that an indistinguishability formula must apply to all predicates of the
language. But Jantzen’s proposed indistinguishability relation isn’t defined on the full
domain of non-individuals. Jantzen has responded that the fact that ‘∼’ has a restricted
domain is irrelevant because “[w]e wouldn’t worry whether electrons in a collection are in
some global sense really non-individuals if it were the case that in any given collection of
electrons, there is a property that distinguishes them from each other” (Jantzen 2014, p.
4). I agree with Jantzen; if we can define an identity relation for any collection of particles
of the same type why isn’t that enough to say that the particles have identity? Granted it
isn’t enough to conclude that particles have identity in the sense of possessing some sort
of metaphysical label (e.g. haecceity). However, it’s not clear why that would be a
drawback and Arenhart certainly wouldn’t view it as such.
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Arenhart’s second criticism is that even granting that Jantzen has defined some sort of
individuality for m-atoms it seems to be contextual individuality. Contextual individuality
is a kind of individuality that we might attribute Priscilla or electrons in a Bell type
experiment. We might capture the fact that we can individuate the particles in those
contexts by asserting that the particles have contextual individuality. However, there is a
big difference between Jantzen’s definition and contextual individuality. Namely that we
can define an identity relation in Jantzen’s sense for any collection of particles of the same
type whatsoever. The importance of this was seen in my discussion of weak discernibility.
Perhaps the claim that Jantzen’s individuality is contextual individuality could be
defended, especially since unlike the case of weak discernibility the individuality granting
relation depends on the collection of particles under consideration. However, it cannot be
defended merely by pointing to the case of Priscilla or Bell type experiments as Arenhart
does.
If we accept Jantzen’s indistinguishability relation ‘∼’, then we can pose the following
dilemma for defenders of non-individuality. Either distinguishability is sufficient for
identity or it isn’t. If it is, then the ability to define a distinguishability relation for any
collection of quantum particles implies that they satisfy an identity relation.3 If it isn’t
then the normal reason for taking classical particles to be self-identical (distinguishability
in virtue of having distinct spatiotemporal trajectories) is no longer available. In that case,
defenders of non-individuality for quantum particles must explain what grounds their
differential treatment of classical and quantum particles. But if identity isn’t just a matter
of distinguishability, then the identity that classical particles have in virtue of which
quasi-set theory defines an identity relation for them, must be a form of transcendental
identity. So this route requires defenders of non-individuality of quantum particles to
3Even if this is a case of contextual identity, that doesn’t appear to be problematic if identity reduces to
distinguishability, as I’m supposing here, and when some relation of contextual identity or other is always
available.
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either (i) defend the claim that identity doesn’t reduce to distinguishability and drop
identity for classical particles or (ii) defend the claim that identity doesn’t reduce to
distinguishability and the claim that classical particles have transcendental identity
whereas quantum particles do not. The former route requires either (iii) accepting that
identity reduces to distinguishability and accepting that all particles are individuals or (iv)
accepting that identity reduces to distinguishability and finding a way to undermine
Jantzen’s relation ’∼‘. Most defenders of non-individuality of quantum particles would
only find (iv) appealing. But the prospects for (iv) do not appear particularly good. The
formal results, including that the relation functions as an identity relation in the same
sense as extensional identity, makes it difficult to argue that identity should apply to, and
only to, classical particles without adopting option (ii).
3.2 Mass Nouns
The next challenge also comes from Jantzen who suggests that particle terms, such as
‘electron,’ are actually mass nouns although we treat them, syntactically, as count nouns
(Jantzen 2014). In general, the only kinds of things we can say about quantum systems do
not make reference to any specific particle. The only exceptions are cases such as that of
Priscilla or Bell type experiments where the context allows us to individuate the particles.
Jantzen notes that any sentence that doesn’t make reference to specific particles is a
sentence in which particle terms can be understood as mass nouns. For example: “(S1)
One electron in the system is spin-up, the other is spin-down” (Jantzen 2014, p. 7) is
similar to “(S5) Half of the liquid is vinegar, the other half is water” (Jantzen 2014, p. 8).
We could rephrase (S1) as “Half of the electron-stuff is spin-up and half is spin-down”
(Jantzen 2014, p. 8). Or “(S4) Lithium atoms have 3 electrons” (Jantzen 2014, p. 7) is
similar to “(S8) A shot of whiskey has 0.6 oz. of alcohol” (Jantzen 2014, p. 8). We might
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rephrase (S4) as “A standard unit of lithium atom has 3 units of electron” (Jantzen 2014,
p. 8).
If Jantzen is correct that we can always replace ‘electron(s)’ with either ‘electron-stuff’ or
‘unit of electron’ in a sensible way, then there would seem to be no question that
‘electron’ functions as a mass noun. Consequently, an explanation of why ‘electron’ is not
a mass noun despite functioning as such would be required from anyone who wants to
treat ‘electron’ as a count noun or sortal. Note that the feature Jantzen points out as
ensuring that we can always sensibly replace ‘electron(s)’ with ‘electron-stuff’ or ‘unit of
electron’ is exactly the feature that is supposed to lead us to the view that particles are
non-individuals. It is permutation symmetry that, except in some special cases, prevents
us from making reference to specific particles in our assertions about quantum systems.
But this is a general feature of mass nouns such as ‘water.’ If we want to refer to specific
molecules of water in making assertions about some body of water, then we have to tag
those molecules; there is no way to identify them otherwise. That just amounts to
attaching something else to those molecules and we can easily do that for electrons as
well. For example, we can attach alpha particles to some electrons to form helium
atoms.
The idea that particle terms are mass nouns makes a lot of sense when considering the
wave nature of particles. We could view the wave function of, say, an electron as
representing a spatial distribution of a single unit of electron-stuff. This is, in fact,
essentially what the GRW interpretation with mass density ontology says.4 But the
question of whether particles terms are mass nouns can, presumably, be answered without
reference to any particular interpretation. If we have a bunch of units of electron-stuff,
then it would be difficult to distinguish them just as it’s difficult to distinguish molecules
4GRW refers to the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber wave function collapse interpretation of quantum
mechanics. On the mass density view of this interpretation, wave functions represent mass density waves.
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of water in a body of water. Is the inability to distinguish the units of electron-stuff due to
their being metaphysically indistinguishable or is it just an epistemic matter? That
quantum particles are not impenetrable complicates the issue. Water molecules are always
distinguishable because they won’t overlap, so let’s say that water molecules are
individuals. Now suppose that water molecules could overlap. Would that make a
difference to their individuality? That depends on whether distinguishability is necessary
for individuality, something I will discuss in chapters four and five. But for now, I will just
say that I think the fact that quantum particles are not impenetrable raises a question as to
whether it makes sense to connect distinguishability with individuality. Adding the
possibility that particle terms are mass nouns makes the issue even murkier.
Jantzen views this as a problem for the defender of non-individuality as he takes mass
nouns to refer to individuals. However, there is room for debate. Even if ‘electron’ is a
mass noun, that doesn’t settle the issue of individuality. It’s not obvious that mass nouns
must refer to individuals. ‘Furniture’ seems to refer to individuals (at least when used in
the singular rather than the plural) whereas it’s not obvious that ‘water’ does. If some
mass nouns refer to individuals and others do not, then even if ‘electron’ is a mass noun
we haven’t determined whether electrons are individuals. The defender of
non-individuality could say that ‘water’ doesn’t refer to individuals. In chapter four when
looking at various potential components of an account of individuality we will see that
some accounts of individuality would say that ‘water’ doesn’t refer to individuals. So, I
see the challenge for defenders of non-individuality as not coming from Jantzen’s claim
that ‘electron’ is a mass noun alone. Rather, it will be Jantzen’s claim in conjunction with
considerations relevant to defining ‘individuality.’ And, depending on the particular
considerations, we could have a challenge for defenders of individuality as well.
Consequently, I will return to this issue in chapter four.
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I will finish this section with two brief comments on reasons why one might reject the
claim that ‘electron’ is a mass noun. The first is that, since mass nouns are contrasted with
count nouns, one might take the ability to count electrons (at least in the sense of assigning
a cardinality to a collection of them in NRQM) as a relevant difference. However,
ordinary mass nouns like ‘water’ have minimal parts that we could count. Responding to
Jantzen’s proposal by saying that we can count electrons would be like saying ‘water’ isn’t
a mass noun because we can count water molecules. If we use the term ‘electron-stuff’ for
a collection of electrons and ‘electron’ for a single electron, the response would amount of
the claim that ‘electron-stuff’ isn’t a mass noun because we can count electrons.
The second reason is similar, if not identical, to the first. It is that French and Krause
claim that terms like ‘proton’ can’t be understood as mass nouns because they don’t divide
their reference (French and Krause 2006, p. 347). That is to say, that protons can’t be
divided into smaller parts that are also protons. However, Jantzen notes that ‘electron’ in
the phrase ‘electron system’ does divide its reference. You can split electron systems into
other electron systems, up to a point. Jantzen takes French and Krause’s mistake to be of
the same sort as that mentioned in the previous paragraph. ‘Proton’ doesn’t divide its
reference when referring to a single proton just as ‘water’ wouldn’t divide its reference if
we used the term ‘water’ to refer to a single water molecule. “That [electron systems]
have minimal parts—that some parts of an electron system are not themselves electron
systems—is not a worry; the same is true of many ordinary mass-nouns” (Jantzen 2014, p.
8).
3.3 Identity as Fundamental
The final challenge to the idea that particles are not individuals comes from Bueno. He
argues that we have good pragmatic reasons to treat particles as possessing identity
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regardless of whether they have some form of metaphysical identity or not. He provides
four reasons why this is the case. These reasons are:
(a) Identity is presupposed in every conceptual system: without identity, it is
unclear that any conceptual system can be formulated. (b) Identity is required
to characterize an individual: nothing can be an individual unless it has
well-specified identity conditions. (c) Identity cannot be defined: even in
systems that allegedly have the resources to define identity. (d) Identity is
required for quantification: the intelligibility of quantification presupposes the
identity of the objects that are quantified over.5
I will look at each of these in turn. However, I will save discussion of (b) for chapter
four.
3.3.1 Identity is Presupposed in Every Conceptual System
Bueno’s first argument is an indispensability argument. Concepts are needed to do
metaphysics. Concepts presuppose, and therefore require, numerical identity. Therefore,
metaphysics requires numerical identity. The reason concepts require numerical identity is
in order to serve their classificatory purpose. Objects falling under the same concept are
grouped together, which presupposes numerical identity of the concept in question.
Objects falling under different (numerically distinct) concepts are differentiated in virtue
of not being qualitatively identical in the relevant respect.
Bueno doesn’t clearly distinguish between the identity of concepts and the identity of the
objects falling under the concepts. Krause and Arenhart seize on this to argue that a weak
5(Bueno 2014, p. 325).
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notion of distinguishability would serve to differentiate objects that fall under different
concepts (Krause and Arenhart 2015a). I agree with Krause and Arenhart, and I suspect
that Bueno does as well.
The more problematic part of Krause and Arenhart’s criticism is their discussion of
objects falling under the same concept. They describe the following dilemma. If concepts
are extensional then the identity of a concept would be defined in terms of the identity of
the objects falling under it. In that case, the identity of the concept wouldn’t be
fundamental. On the other hand, “[o]n an intensional understanding of concepts ... it is
notoriously difficult to account for the identity of concepts” (Krause and Arenhart 2015a,
p. 7). The latter part of the dilemma is surprising. If identity is fundamental, and
undefinable as Bueno claims, one would not expect to find an account of identity. Being
charitable to Bueno I expect he was thinking of concepts in intensional terms and the lack
of an account of identity is because there can, on his view, be no such thing.
Finally, Krause and Arenhart note that because the same linguistic entity applies to
multiple objects it doesn’t follow that there is any ontological counterpart that applies to
both objects. That is, the identity of concepts doesn’t imply the existence of, say,
universals bearing a metaphysical identity relation. One could, they point out, be a trope
theorist where two objects that have property P have it in virtue of having numerically
distinct tropes of the same type. I have one problem with the objection. Bueno makes it
clear that he’s offering pragmatic arguments that could be turned into metaphysical
arguments with some additional steps. So it isn’t really a criticism when Krause and
Arenhart point out that additional steps are needed to reach a metaphysical
conclusion.
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3.3.2 Identity Cannot be Defined
The next argument, (c), is that numerical identity is fundamental because it cannot be
defined. We already saw that French and Krause accept this and have therefore opted for
extensional identity instead. But, as Bueno points out, it has been claimed that numerical
identity can be defined. For example, there is the well-known Whitehead-Russell
definition of identity in terms of Leibniz’s Law: x = y if, and only if, ∀P(Px↔ Py).
However, McGinn has noted that the variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ must be the same on either side
of the bi-conditional (McGinn 2000). For it cannot be the case that ‘x’ and ‘y’ denote the
same object if some other objects ‘w’ and ‘z’ share all the same properties. Consequently,
the Whitehead-Russell definition presupposes, rather than defines, identity.
Krause and Arenhart respond that “this is not a problem of questioning identity. The two
exes in the Leibniz Law are instances of the same abstract object (a variable)” (Krause and
Arenhart 2015a, p. 16). I’m not sure what the objection is supposed to be. What do
Krause and Arenhart mean by ‘same’ and why does having two instances of the same
abstract object in the definition of identity not amount to presupposing identity? Krause
and Arenhart don’t elaborate. Instead they immediately follow the above statement with a
discussion of how we build up conceptual schemes in a constructive way, noting that we
can assume identity initially and still end up with a system that lacks identity. I’m also not
sure what that has to do with whether or not identity can be defined. It should be clear that
Bueno is only claiming that numerical identity cannot be defined and, as far as I can tell,
Krause and Arenhart agree. But if that is the case, I’m not sure what Krause and Arenhart
are objecting to with the above quoted statement and the subsequent discussion.
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3.3.3 Identity is Required for Quantification
The final reason offered for the fundamentality of identity is that identity is required for
quantification in classical logic. For example, consider universal quantifier introduction. If
we know that Fa for arbitrary a we can infer that ∀xFx. That is, “if each object in the
domain of quantification is F, then every object in the domain is F. However, this holds
only if each [numerically] distinct object in the domain is in the range of the universal
quantifier” (Bueno 2014, p. 329). Since we are saying that all the objects in the domain
have property F the possibility of differentiating the objects qualitatively isn’t even on the
table. Universal quantifier introduction doesn’t require that I appeal to some
distinguishing feature of the objects in question as a means to ensure that all the objects
that should be in the domain are in the domain. Asserting that all electrons have electric
charge −e, for example, on Bueno’s view, requires that the electrons have some form of
numerical identity. If we were repeatedly quantifying over the (numerically) same
electron, “then there would be no support for the conclusion that every [electron has
electric charge −e]” (Bueno 2014, p. 329).
Krause and Arenhart object that alternative interpretations of the universal quantifier are
possible. For example, we can “call |F| the class of objects of the domain that have F, and
let D be the domain of interpretation. The interpretation for ∀xFx can now be stated
simply as saying that D is a subset of |F|. For instance, we may say that |F| is the class of
all ... Oxygen atoms in a molecule of O2 without need of identifying them” (Krause and
Arenhart 2015a, p .19). As far as I can tell, Bueno’s comments apply just as well to |F|.
How are we to make sure that all of the objects that are F are in |F|. We can’t qualitatively
distinguish them, and we also can’t quantitatively distinguish them if they don’t have
identity. We still appear to need a non-qualitative way of distinguishing between objects,
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at least in principle, to make sense of the idea that all and only the objects that should be
within the domain of the universal quantifier are in fact in the domain.
I take the first two of these arguments as arguments in favor of the idea that identity is
primitive. That, by itself, does not tell us that we should take particles to be individuals.
However, it does suggest that we take numerical identity as primitive, and so, for example,
should make Dorato and Morganti’s primitive thisness view more appealing. Bueno’s
argument also provides us reason to question any argument for the non-individuality of
particles that is based on the idea that numerical identity must be grounded in qualitative
facts. Consequently, I see these arguments as providing a challenge to defenders of
non-individuality. In particular, they need to better explain why primitive identity isn’t
acceptable for particles.
On the other hand, the final argument provides reason to question the coherence of various
statements about particles if those particles are taken to lack identity. Still, this can be
treated as a challenge; defenders of non-individuality must explain why quantification
over non-individuals makes sense. Bueno notes that if collections of particles have
cardinality, even without an ordinal, a coherent explanation of quantification over
non-individuals may be possible. However, he agrees with Jantzen that Domenech and
Holik’s attempt to define cardinality for particles presupposes identity. Still, if the
defenders of non-individuality can provide a satisfactory account of cardinality for
non-individuals that may also deal with Bueno’s quantification objection.
There are two ways we can read Bueno’s arguments. Bueno himself treats them as
pragmatic arguments. We should treat particles as individuals because it is convenient and
useful to do so. Even reading them this way we can still understand them as establishing
that identity, if it is some metaphysical component of objects, is primitive. We could also
treat the arguments as metaphysical arguments. In this case, the first two arguments would
have to be supplemented with reasons to draw a connection between fundamentality or
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primitiveness and metaphysical reality. However, the last argument can stand on its own
as a metaphysical argument as long as substantive worries about defining cardinality for
collections of non-individuals remain.
3.4 The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles
The final challenge I want to discuss is a challenge for those who claim that particles are
individuals. If NRQM violates PII, as many claim, then on what grounds can particles be
said to be individuals? I will divide my examination of this issue into three parts. In the
first part I will provide a historical overview of the debate surrounding PII and NRQM in
order to get a sense of why it is thought that discussion of PII is important. The latter two
parts will wait until chapter five after I’ve discussed the relation between identity,
individuality, and distinguishability as well as the distinction between metaphysical and
conceptual kinds of identity.
In second-order logic with identity PII can be expressed as
∀F(Fx↔ Fy)→ x = y. (3.4)
This says that if ‘two’ objects share all the properties over which F ranges, then ‘they’ are
one and the same object. We can recognize three different versions of PII depending on
the kinds of properties we allow F to range over. The logically weakest form of PII,
PII(1), is obtained if F ranges over all qualitative properties and relations. So PII(1) says
that ‘two’ objects that share all of their qualitative properties and relations in common are
one and the same object. The next strongest form, PII(2), excludes spatiotemporal
properties and relations from the range of F. So PII(2) says that ‘two’ objects that share
all of their non-spatiotemporal, qualitative properties and relations in common are one and
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the same object. Finally, the strongest form, PII(3), excludes all relational properties. So
PII(3) says that ‘two’ objects that share all or their qualitative monadic properties in
properties in common are one and the same object. Most authors leave out the word
’qualitative’ although most clearly have only qualitative properties in mind. So, for
example, two particles that only differ in that they have different metaphysical labels (like
primitive thisness) violate even PII(1). PII, understood in terms of qualitative properties,
links identity with distinguishability in principle. Metaphysical properties that aren’t
discernible under any circumstances are excluded.
Since particles seem to possess all their monadic properties in common, NRQM violates
PII(3). This is unimportant for our purposes since PII(3) isn’t a suitable criterion for
identity anyway as it identifies even classical particles that possess unique spatiotemporal
trajectories. Whether NRQM violates PII(2) depends on whether particles obey weakly
discerning relations. Whether NRQM violates PII(1) depends on whether particles either
obey weakly discerning relations or can be individuated by spatiotemporal properties. I
will not be concerned with spatiotemporal trajectories since whether these can serve as
individuators for particles depends on the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics.
For example, each particle has a unique spatiotemporal trajectory in the de Broglie-Bohm
pilot wave theory since ”[i]n effect the impenetrability of the particles is built into the
guidance equations” (French and Rickles 2003, p. 224).6 Consequently, for my purposes
the question of whether NRQM violates PII collapses to the question of whether particles
are weakly discernible.
It should be clear why I included PII as a challenge for those who claim that particles are
individuals rather than as an argument in favor of non-individuality. If NRQM does
violate PII it doesn’t follow that particles are not individuals because this is compatible
6See (Pylkkänen, Hiley, and Pättiniemi 2016) for an extended discussion of individuality and the de
Broglie-Bohm pilot wave theory.
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with individuality on metaphysical grounds (e.g. on the basis of primitive thisness).
Additionally, it is not clear that NRQM does violate PII due to the possibility of weakly
discerning relations. I have already discussed weakly discerning relations in chapter two
and will not discuss them further here.
I have three concerns about appealing to PII in this context. The first is that most authors
engaged in the debate do not discuss the relationship between distinguishability and
identity and so take a close relationship between the two for granted. The second is that
the relationship between identity and individuality is generally not discussed and, again, it
is assumed that there is a close relationship between the two. The third issue is that I have
a concern that discussions involving PII sometimes conflate metaphysical and conceptual
notions of identity. I will discuss these further in chapter five.
There are a number of points where I will claim that a conflation has been made. I want to
say something about this because it’s not always clear that a conflation is being made.
When I accuse someone of a conflation it is because they are writing as if A implies B for
conceptually distinct concepts A and B (i) without demonstrating any recognition that
there is a conceptual distinction and (ii) without explicitly mentioning or defending the
connection between A and B (where failing to do the latter involves failing to do the
former). In some cases, A and B are used interchangeably and in some cases instances of
A are replaced by B. But it is often difficult to tell whether A and B are being used
interchangeably or if instances of A are being replaced by B. But even in the latter case, if
(i) and (ii) are true we can’t tell whether it’s only coincidental that instances of A are
replaced by B without the opposite also occurring.
In such cases there is either (iii) a conflation or (iv) the author is begging the question
against those that dont accept the connection. But why would the author not say
something about the connection between A and B if they recognize that A and B are
conceptually distinct? They are either making a conflation or begging the question and the
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former charge seems to be the more charitable one in these instances (where nothing at all
is said about a connection between A and B). But the important point is that nothing turns
on whether a given instance is a case of conflation or a case of begging the question. At
least not as far as anything I will say goes. In each either case the author has failed to
establish a connection between A and B and it’s that failure that will be important.
3.4.1 Historical Overview
The earliest philosophical discussion of PII in relation to NRQM seems to be that in
(Margenau 1944). Margenau argues that the Exclusion Principle (EP) implies that PII is
false. He defines EP qualitatively as “no two [fermions] (of the same kind) can be in the
same state of motion” (Margenau 1944, p. 188) and more rigorously as “state functions
representing several similar [fermions] must be antisymmetrical” (Margenau 1944, p.
195). Margenau asks us to consider two fermions in the antisymmetric state
a(1)b(2) − b(1)a(2), (3.5)
where I have dropped the ket notation for sake of convenience as well as to match
Margenau’s notation. The probability of finding particle 1 at position (1) is found by
squaring this equation and integrating over the space of particle 2. So, the probability of
finding particle 1 at position (1) is given by
a2(1)
∫
b2(y)dy − 2a(1)b(1)
∫
a(y)b(y)dy + b2(1)
∫
a2(y)dy = a2(1) − b2(1), (3.6)
where I have invoked the normalization condition and that the inner product of orthogonal
functions is zero. Similarly, the probability of finding particle 2 at (2) is a2(2) − b2(2). So,
the probability of finding one particle at a particular location is the same as the probability
for finding the other particle at the same location. Additionally, “[w]hat has here been
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proved for the observable position holds for all other observable properties of the two
particles, and in general for all constituents of an n-particle system” (Margenau 1944, pp.
201-202). It follows that electrons are indiscernible and therefore that PII is
violated.
PII can be read as stating that qualitative identity, with respect to the relevant properties
and relations, implies numerical identity. So if all electrons, for example, have all of the
relevant properties and relations in common it follows that they violate the corresponding
version of PII because there are numerous electrons.
PII has often been defended as a principle of logic and, in light of that, claims that PII is
false are sometimes met with the question ‘’how can entities that are indiscernible be
different with respect to number?” Margenau’s answer is that number is an observable
property. The number of particles in a quantum mechanical system is the number needed
to correctly describe the system in NRQM (under the assumption that what we usually
refer to as an n-particle wave function actually describes a system of n particles). Number
of particles does make an empirical difference, however, since number is a property of
systems rather than particles, it is still the case that particles themselves are indiscernible.
Margenau’s response is ultimately a holistic one that grants that there is something strange
about the idea of indiscernible objects that differ in number. There’s nothing about the
‘individual’ particles that tells us how many there are but there is something about the
behavior of collections of particles in virtue of which we can determine the number.
If we accept that number of particles is an observable, then we might try to argue that this
implies that PII isn’t violated. The proposal is similar to that of individuation on the basis
of weak discernibility and so faces the same sorts of issues. Why should we accept that
number counts as an observable in the relevant sense when it cannot serve as a basis for
distinguishing between the particles? Weak discernibility seems to fare better since we
can appeal to individuality as an explanation of the difference between particles that obey
81
physically meaningful weakly discerning relations and those that are merely numerically
diverse.
Next comes van Fraassen who claims that PII is often incorrectly understood (van
Fraassen 1972). Van Fraassen claims that even two objects that share all properties and
relations in common at a time satisfy PII if they have different histories. This is an
important point that is often, though not always, left aside in more recent discussions of
PII. There is at least one good reason to leave it aside, namely that whether particles can
be individuated by history is tied to one’s interpretation of quantum mechanics. History
could serve to individuate particles on the de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave interpretation and
may work on some versions of other interpretations. However, particles wouldn’t even
have histories in anything like the ordinary sense of the term if GRW with the flash
ontology is the correct interpretation.7 On that interpretation we would need something
other than history in order to even determine which flashes constitute the historical
progression of a single particle. And that’s assuming it even makes sense to connect
separate flashes as historical progressions in the first place.
After van Fraassen comes Cortes who criticizes the claim that PII is a theorem of
second-order logic with identity (Cortes 1976). Cortes presents two ‘proofs’ of PII. The
first is a very simple informal proof of PII. We assume that objects a and b share all
properties in common so that ∀F(Fa↔ Fb). Then since a has the property of being
identical to a, it follows from our assumption that b also has the property of being
identical to a. So it follows from ∀F(Fa↔ Fb) that a = b.
The other is a formal proof beginning with the assumption ∀F(Fx↔ Fy), where x and y
are arbitrary. Next, we instantiate a particular property; namely, the property (λz)[z = x].
7On the flash ontology view of GRW there are no actual waves. Instead, the ontology consists only of
brief “flashes” when wave function collapse occurs.
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This expression can be read as ‘the property of those z such that z = x and it indicates the
property of being identical to x.8 Instantiating this property, ∀F(Fx↔ Fy) becomes
(λz)[z = x]x↔ (λz)[z = x]y, which reduces to x = x↔ y = x. Since x = x is a theorem of
classical logic we can invoke it to conclude that y = x and further use it to establish that
x = y. Consequently ∀F(Fx↔ Fy) implies that x = y.
Cortes says that these proofs are question-begging because they both involve naming the
objects in question and then using those names to say something about the objects. This
amounts, according to Cortes, to assuming the objects are individuals. We conceptually
treat the objects as individuals when we suppose that we can name the objects and use
those names to talk about the objects separately. Cortes explains the problem as
follows:
[I]f I talk about a and then about b, and then again about a, I must suppose
that conceptually I will not confuse a with b. That is, it would have to be
logically possible to identify and reidentify a and b in order for me validly to
make the assumption that a and b are conceptually distinguishable. But if it is
logically possible to identify and reidentify a and b, then it must be the case
that a and b differ in some respect which means that they do not share all
properties in common. In other words if I know nothing whatsoever about two
objects, then if the mere fact that I can name one ‘a’ and other ‘b’ allows me
to infer that they are indeed distinguishable from each other, then it must be
the case that the assumption that I can name one ‘a’ and the other ‘b’ implies
that they are distinguishable. Thus, I have shown that to suppose that the
8The λ operator allows us to abstract over a variable. The expression (λx)[ f (x)] is understood as an
expression waiting for a value to input for x. The λ operator binds the variable. We can then apply the
expression (λx)[ f (x)] to an argument a to get a value. So (λx)[ f (x)]a = f (a).
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object(s) under consideration are nameable is equivalent to assuming that
they are INDIVIDUALS.9
There is an important lesson here that has been noted by many authors since. In labeling
objects for our convenience, we must be careful not to inadvertently draw metaphysical
conclusions from the mere labeling itself.
Cortes also considers van Fraassen’s proposal that particles with different histories would
thereby be individuated. Cortes claims that if history individuates objects then it should be
logically possible to determine the history of the objects. For example, consider bosons
that come from distinct spacetime points A and B, completely overlap for a time, and then
go off to distinct spacetime points C and D. Cortes claims that it is not logically possible
to determine whether the boson at C originally came from A or B. Cortes does not
elaborate and it is therefore unclear why this is not logically possible. Barnette
understands Cortes as confusing epistemological with metaphysical issues (Barnette
1978), which would make it clear why Cortes thinks there is a problem. Although it is a
metaphysical fact that the bosons in the example have different histories, once they
overlap we are no longer in an epistemic position to identify the boson that arrives at C as
the one that came from A (or B). We can describe one of the bosons as “the object which
is identical with the object having history A” (Barnette 1978, p. 469). Whether the boson
at C or D satisfies this description is a metaphysical issue. If Barnette is right, then Cortes’
criticism fails. If not, then Cortes needs to clearly spell out why the temporary overlap
creates a problem viewing bosons as individuals in a metaphysical sense. We can
understand Barnette as claiming that all that matters is that nature is able to keep track of
the bosons. We can then understand Cortes as claiming that there must be some
9(Cortes 1976, p. 498).
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distinguishing feature during the period of overlap in order to make sense of the idea that
nature is able to keep track of the bosons.10
From 1984 to 1991 there are three discussions of Margenau’s arguments that draw
attention to an important feature missed in the original discussion. Van Fraassen pointed
out in 1984 that the separate states assigned to the fermions in Margenau’s argument are
mixed states (van Fraassen 1984, see also van Fraassen 1991). It was then noticed by
French and Redhead that the mixed states are improper rather than proper mixtures
(French and Redhead 1988). Noting that the states assigned to the fermions are mixed
states allowed van Fraassen to characterize Margenau’s argument as a dilemma: either PII
is violated or quantum mechanics is incomplete. PII is violated if the mixtures are
interpreted ontologically. However, PII is saved if we take the fermions to have distinct
states and understand the fact that NRQM assigns them the same mixed state as a matter
of ignorance/incompleteness. If we assume scientific realism, as I am, and also take
quantum mechanics to be complete, then Margenau’s argument does appear to establish
that fermions violate PII.11
Margenau’s argument can be viewed as a first attempt to provide a formal proof that
NRQM violates PII. The proof was extended in (French and Redhead 1988), (Butterfield
1993), and reached its maximum level of generality in (Huggett 2003). Margenau’s
argument only applies to fermions and he only demonstrated that two fermions in an
antisymmetric state have the same expectation values for monadic properties. So
Margenau has, at best, only shown that fermions violate PII(3). French and Redhead
extended the proof to show the same result is obtained for all observables and for both
10See (Ginsberg 1981) for a criticism of Barnette on the basis of QFT. Also see (Teller 1983) for a
suggestion that the issue is more complicated than Cortes, Barnette, and Ginsberg realize.
11(Massimi 2001) raises an interesting challenge to Margenau’s argument. Massimi argues that PII(3)
isn’t applicable to fermions in the first place and so cannot be considered to be violated. This is unimportant
for my purposes as (i) PII(3) isn’t a suitable candidate for individuating particles anyway and (ii) if Massimi
is correct PII(3) still couldn’t be used as an individuating principle even if it were suitable.
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symmetric and antisymmetric states. Their proof that fermions are indiscernible with
respect to their monadic properties is the same as that provided by Margenau.
Extending the proof to relational properties is straightforward. The probabilities we want
to compare here are conditional properties. Consider an observable Q. I will write
P(a(Q = x)|b(Q = y)) to mean the probability that a has value x for property Q conditional
on b having value y for property Q. If we can show that
P(a(Q = x)|b(Q = y)) = P(b(Q = x)|a(Q = y)) (3.7)
for fermions, then we have shown that fermions cannot be distinguished on the basis of
relations. This is because it amounts to demonstrating that any relations the fermions can
have with respect to measurable observables are symmetric. Conditional probability is
defined as
P(A|B) = P(A ∩ B)/P(B). (3.8)
We can rewrite this as
P(A ∩ B) = P(A|B)P(B). (3.9)
Noting that P(A ∩ B) = P(B ∩ A) we can write
P(B ∩ A) = P(A|B)P(B). (3.10)
We can therefore write
P(B|A) = P(B ∩ A)/P(A) = P(A|B)P(B)/P(A). (3.11)
Writing this in the same notation as above we have
P(b(Q = x)|a(Q = y)) = P(a(Q = x)|b(Q = y))P(b(Q = y))/P(a(Q = y)). (3.12)
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Now P(b(Q = y)) = P(a(Q = y)) by Margenau’s original proof since these are the
probabilities that b and a have value y for the monadic property Q. So, we find that
P(b(Q = x)|a(Q = y)) = P(a(Q = x)|b(Q = y)). (3.13)
Therefore, fermions cannot be discerned on the basis of either monadic or relational
properties.
As might be expected, the calculation for bosons is even simpler. We just consider a pair
of bosons that are both in the same state a(1)a(2). The numbers ‘1’ and ‘2’ are just to
distinguish the arguments for the two functions and have no physical import. With no
difference between the states obtaining different values for the expectation values of
observables isn’t even a possibility. French and Redhead also demonstrate that there are
even paraparticle states that violate PII.
French and Redhead’s results were then extended by Butterfield in 1993. Butterfield
considers the possibility of relations that are based on two observables. That is, instead of
looking at probabilities of the form P(a(Q = x)|b(Q = y)) for some observable Q, he
considers probabilities of the form P(a(Q = x)|b(Q′ = y′)) for observables Q and Q′. He
then shows that P(a(Q = x)|b(Q′ = y′)) = P(b(Q = x)|a(Q′ = y′)) and
P(a(Q′ = x′)|b(Q = y)) = P(b(Q′ = x′)|a(Q = y)) for both bosons and fermions.
Additionally, Butterfield also proved the same result while supposing the presence of a
third particle of different type. That is, Butterfield considered the possibility that two
particles of the same type might be distinguished by their relation to a third particle of a
different type. He demonstrated that this is not possible for either bosons or fermions in
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certain states.12 Finally, Huggett extends the proof to cover systems of n ‘identical’
particles.
I will not go into detail on any of these other calculations as the important point to note is
that the conclusion that relations do not distinguish particles in the states in question is
because the particles are only related by symmetric relations (at least as far as observables
are concerned). Looking at the nature of proofs it is clear why they do not rule out the
options discussed in chapter two for taking particles to be individuals. The proposal of
weak discernibility is that even symmetric relations can serve to individuate as long as
those relations are irreflexive. On the other hand, proposals involving primitive thisness
are not ruled out because the proofs only consider discernment on the basis of observable
properties. The challenge, then, from PII is simply that accounts of individuality not run
afoul of the various proofs discussed above.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen that there are a number of issues to keep in mind when
considering whether particles are individuals or not. The first three issues present
challenges for the view that particles are not individuals. The first issue is that
non-individuals, defined in terms of lacking self-identity, don’t line up with our classical
notion of cardinality. That in itself doesn’t imply that particles must be individuals since
we can understand this as just another case where quantum mechanics requires we revise
our classical concepts. But defenders of non-individuality owe us an account of this
revised concept of cardinality. The second issue is that there is a connection between the
12Recall that I mentioned in chapter two that no one is claiming that particles are never discernible. They
only seek to establish that particles sometimes violate PII in which case PII cannot be appealed to as a
general individuating principle for particles.
88
features of particles that are taken to suggest non-individuality and the features of mass
nouns. This raises the possibility that the features of particles that are taken to suggest
non-individuality aren’t even in need of explanation in the first place given that such
features are expected for mass nouns. Finally, the third issue is that identity is so tied up
with how we think that talk of non-individuals requires a large overhaul of our conceptual
scheme. Consequently, we have pragmatic reason not to bother with talk of
non-individuals even if there are such things. Pragmatic considerations aside this can also
be viewed as spelling out some of the things defenders of non-individuality must do. They
must provide a sensible conceptual scheme for thinking about non-individuals. One that
explains why identity is ordinarily presupposed, why identity appears to be undefinable,
and how to make sense of quantification in the absence of identity.
The challenges are primarily for the defender of non-individuality. But that is to be
expected. Talk of non-individuals does require a substantial change to the way we tend to
conceptualize things. Although this doesn’t mean that the language of particle physics is
in need of any change. As we saw in chapter two quantum theory appears to be neutral on
whether particles are individuals or not. The conceptual revisions are only needed at the
level of interpretation of the theory. It will take some time to identify all of the concepts
that need revision to talk about non-individuals as well as time to provide suitable
revisions. In the next chapter, when I start looking at what metaphysicians have had to say
about individuality, it is likely that more challenges will arise. At the same time, looking
at the work of metaphysicians will also likely provide some resources for the defenders of
non-individuality to respond to those challenges as well as those discussed in the present
chapter.
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What does it mean to be an Individual?
We’ve seen that NRQM doesn’t tell us whether particles are individuals or not let alone
provide us with an account of what it means to be an individual. Redhead and Teller argue
that the (allegedly metaphysically appropriate) Fock space formalism provides us no
reason to think that particles are individuals due to the lack of labels. This isn’t a positive
argument for viewing particles as non-individuals unless combined with an argument to
the effect that NRQM would tell us if particles were individuals. The argument from
quantum statistics, on the other hand, can be understood as a positive argument in favor of
non-individuals. A lack of individuality is taken to explain quantum statistics. However,
this argument still cannot be understood as NRQM telling us that particles aren’t
individuals because there are other explanations of quantum statistics on the table
compatible with the view that particles are individuals. Whether particles are individuals
or not cannot simply be read off the theory.
How then are we to determine whether particles are individuals or not? The only option
seems to be to find a way to define what it means for something to be an individual and
see if the definition applies. However, since we are concerned with whether particles are
individuals in a metaphysical sense, we cannot merely stipulate a definition. Instead we
must look at clear cases of individuals and non-individuals and attempt to determine what
it is that accounts for their individuality or lack thereof. That will be the focus of this
chapter. But first I should spell out more precisely what the metaphysical issue is. One
thing to note first though is that there is no guarantee that there is a universal concept of an
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individual. However, in that case there would be no way to develop a definition of
‘individual’ that applies to all and only clear cases of individuals. In short, if there is no
universal notion of individual then any attempt to find such a notion would be faced with
unavoidable counterexamples. My focus on clear cases is, of course, because unclear
cases are cases that can be contested. If something that isn’t clearly an individual is
claimed to be a counterexample to my definition of ‘individuality’ it would be reasonable
for me to deny that it is a counterexample (although it may also be reasonable for me to
accept it as a counterexample).
Gracia distinguishes between six philosophical issues involving individuality (Gracia
1988). Most of them won’t be important for my purposes but I want to at least briefly
mention each one. The reason for this is that much work on individuality, particularly
prior to Gracia’s work but also in subsequent works, conflates some of the issues Gracia
identifies. It will be easier to point out such conflations if I at least outline each of the six
issues. It will also help my readers avoid making such conflations themselves as well as
arm my readers to identify any such conflations I may have made.
The first issue involves determining what it means to be an individual, that is, determining
the intension of ‘individuality’. As Gracia points out, it’s unorthodox to use the terms
‘intension’ and ‘extension’ with respect to ‘individuality,’ but their use fits well enough
and I will follow Gracia’s terminology.1 Gracia characterizes this first issue as a logical
issue of conceptual clarification. However, I see it as a partially metaphysical issue.
‘Individual’ is defined ostensively. To determine what it means for something to be an
individual we look at the things we refer to as individuals and attempt to figure out what
they all possess that non-individuals lack. What are the necessary and sufficient conditions
for us to refer to something as an individual? This certainly sounds like it’s just a
1The intension of a term is essentially just its definition where the extension of a term is the set of things
to which the term applies.
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conceptual issue. However, whether that’s the case depends in part on whether our use of
the term individual picks out, roughly, a metaphysical category of objects. It also depends
on whether the project of conceptual clarification is revisionary or merely
descriptive.
If our use of the term ‘individual’ were to exactly pick out a metaphysical category of
objects then even a purely descriptive approach to conceptual clarification will tell us
something about what it means, metaphysically, for something to be an individual. This is
because we are finding necessary and sufficient conditions for objects to be a member of a
metaphysical group. If, more realistically, our use of the term ‘individual’ only roughly
maps onto a metaphysical group of objects then our project of conceptual clarification
ought to be revisionary to some extent. At least if what we are really interested in is the
conditions for an object’s membership in that metaphysical group rather than our
linguistic practices.
Does our use of the term ‘individual’ map on to a metaphysical category of objects? The
best way to answer this question is to actually undertake the project of conceptual
clarification and see if the necessary and sufficient conditions we come up with do pick
out a metaphysical category of objects.
The philosophers of physics engaged in the debate take ‘identity’ as a necessary condition
for ‘individuality’ in a metaphysical sense. Consequently, they accept that there is a
metaphysical class of objects that is at least partially defined by possessing ‘identity’ (and
another partially defined by a lack of ‘identity’). Occasionally, philosophers of physics
involved in the debate do offer a definition of individuality. For example, Krause and
Arenhart define an individual as “something that is considered as one, distinct from any
other individual, and which at least in principle can be reidentified in a different situation
(within the same context) as being that same item” (Krause and Arenhart 2016, p. 62).
Identity, unity, and the possibility of reidentification over time are all commonly proposed
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as necessary components of individuality. The focus on identity, the fact that it is very rare
to see a definition of individuality appear in the debate, and the fact that the definitions
that do appear match the sorts of definitions offered by metaphysicians via ‘conceptual
analysis’ indicate that the debate is about whether particles are individuals in the ordinary
sense of the term. Given also that the debate is explicitly metaphysical, that is the debate
is proceeding under the assumption that ‘individual’ does pick out, at least roughly, a
metaphysical class of objects. Consequently, it is clearly worth paying attention to the
metaphysical literature and examining possible definitions of ‘individual’. That, as I
already mentioned, will be the task of this chapter.
The next three issues that Gracia describes are more clearly metaphysical. First is the
extension of ‘individuality’. This involves determining if there are any individuals and
distinguishing them from any non-individuals. How we would go about this depends on
the relation between intension and extension. Does intension determine extension or vice
versa? Or is the relation between the two more complicated than one simply fixing the
other? I don’t think we need to answer these questions to proceed. Regardless of the
specific details of the relation between intension and extension, we can still learn a lot
about the extension of ‘individuality’ from a study of the intension of ‘individuality’.
Gracia also agrees, noting the obvious point that anything that doesn’t meet the necessary
conditions for individuality can’t be in the extension of ‘individual’. Similarly, anything
that meets the sufficient conditions for individuality must be in the extension. However, if
something that we have good reason to consider an individual fails to be in the extension
of ‘individuality’ then we have reason to reconsider our set of necessary conditions.
Similarly for an apparent non-individual that appears to satisfy our sufficient conditions
for individuality.
The next issue is the ontological status of individuality. This involves determining whether
individuality is a property, a relation, a mental construct, or maybe something else. For
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my purposes, this issue can be set aside. My main concern is with whether particles are in
the extension of ‘individuality’ and with the intension of ‘individuality’ insofar as it helps
us answer that question. However, the intension of ‘individuality’ may shed some light on
this issue as well.
The last of the metaphysical issues is concerned with principles of individuation. This is
concerned with what it is that makes something an individual (for example, this could be
having a unique spatiotemporal trajectory or possessing primitive thisness). The main
question here is “in virtue of what do individuals satisfy the necessary and sufficient
conditions of ‘individuality’?” I portrayed Gracia’s first issue as a partially metaphysical
one because the issue isn’t merely one of picking a definition of ‘individuality’ that we
like. That definition will be informed by features of the class of objects we call
‘individuals’. However, finding the necessary and sufficient conditions for individuality
doesn’t tell us how individuals actually satisfy those conditions. That is what principles of
individuation are for.
Finally, the last two issues Gracia identifies are discernibility of individuals (an epistemic
issue), and reference to individuals (a semantic issue). I will not be concerned with either
of these. Note that here when I say ‘discernibility of individuals’ the issue is specifically
how knowers are able to distinguish between individuals. There are principles of
individuation that are couched in terms of discernibility understood in a metaphysical
sense. Discernibility in this case refers to objects possessing different properties or
standing in different relations than other objects regardless of whether anyone could
actually distinguish the objects on the basis of those properties or relations. Discernibility
in this metaphysical sense will be discussed extensively.
The focus of this chapter will be on the intension of individuality. What does it mean to be
an individual? What are the logical constraints on the notion of an individual? By asking
these questions I am expecting to find a minimal notion of individuality that is universal.
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But note that this is not incompatible with there being a variety of meanings of
‘individual’ in different fields. The reason for this has to do with ambiguity surrounding
the word ‘meaning’. I am not asking two questions here but only one worded in two
different ways. What it means for something to be an individual can involve more than
just logical constraints. For example, what it means for something to be an individual can
involve metaphysical details about why the logical constraints are satisfied. I am assuming
that the logical constraints on individuality are universal, but I am not assuming that that a
complete answer to the question ‘what does it mean to be an individual?’ is universal. The
definition of ‘individuality’ that I will be defending will be compatible with different fields
of inquiry providing different answers to the question of what it means for something to be
an individual in that field. The distinction is between logical and non-logical conditions.
What I aim to provide is a set of logically necessary and sufficient conditions for
individuality that specific scientific disciplines may augment with non-logical conditions.
For example, what it means for something to be an individual in biology will be to satisfy
the logical constraints on individuality that I will be defending and satisfying some,
presumably, biological conditions.
My main result in this chapter is to conclude that relative indivisibility, formal
immiscibility, and ontological autonomy are each necessary, and jointly sufficient, for
individuality. However, in examining different possible requirements for individuality
responses to the first three challenges raised in chapter three arise. First, since I conclude
that identity isn’t a necessary or sufficient condition for individuality, there is no reason
why a definition of cardinality that presupposes identity would be unsuitable for
individuals.2 Second, if identity isn’t a necessary or sufficient condition for individuality
then Bueno’s arguments based on the fundamentality of identity lose some of their force.
2However, note that the presupposition of identity is still a problem for French and Krause’s particular
view since, for them, a non-individual is something that lacks identity.
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Third, since I conclude that things referred to by mass nouns cannot be individuals it is no
challenge to defenders of non-individuality that particle terms may be mass nouns rather
than count nouns.
Before beginning to look at proposed candidates for necessary conditions of individuality,
I want to quickly note two distinctions. First is the distinction between the problem of
individuation and the problem of accounting for numerical difference. These are often
taken to be the same problem. However, there is reason to think they are different issues.
It seems logically possible for there to be a universe containing exactly one object and for
that object to be an individual. It makes sense to ask in virtue of what is this object an
individual despite the lack of need to account for numerical difference.3 It is possible for a
solution to the problem of individuation to provide an account of numerical difference.
Indeed, in most cases where an author conflates individuation with numerical difference
their proposal serves to account for both. Still, some of what is said for or against various
accounts of individuality depends on conflating individuation and numerical difference.
Consequently, it will be important to keep the distinction in mind. What’s ultimately
important here is that numerical distinctness is sometimes taken to explain individuality
when instead it could be the case that either (i) individuality explains numerical
distinctness or (ii) something else explains both individuality and numerical
distinctness.
The second distinction is that between individuality and distinguishability. In our one
object universe, there is nothing to distinguish our individual from. That something is an
individual does not imply that it is distinguishable, even in a metaphysical sense, from
other things. That isn’t to say that there isn’t a relation between individuality and
distinguishability or that an account of individuality can’t imply that individuals are
3This point has been made by others, see, for example, (Castañeda 1975).
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distinguishable under most circumstances. Even French and Krause state that “To say
what an entity’s individuality consists in ... is first to say that it consists in something
having to do—metaphysically speaking—with that entity and no other and secondly to say
what precisely that something is” (French and Krause 2006, p. 7). This is, in part, why
they claim that particles lack self-identity rather than merely claiming that permutation
invariance, and the associated indistinguishability, directly imply a lack of individuality.
Still, in light of the distinction between individuality and distinguishability we can
question the inference from indistinguishability to lack of self-identity.
4.1 Identity
The first candidate for a necessary component of individuality I will look at is identity.
Since we’re interested in metaphysical questions, we want a criterion of identity that tells
us what the identity of objects consists in. As Lowe puts it,“[an identity criterion] purports
to state ... the truth-conditions of canonical identity statements concerning individual
Ks—statements such as ‘This K is identical with that K’. Such statements may concern
identity over time—diachronic identity—or identity at a time—synchronic identity”
(Lowe 2005, p. 90). Our interest is in the metaphysical question of what makes identity
statements true rather than the epistemological question of how we have access to that
information.
There are, at least, two questions we have to address here before getting started. One is
whether to adopt the metalinguistic view that the identity relation holds between labels (or
names) or the metaphysical view that the identity relation holds between objects. On the
former view, the identity relation is only a relation between labels, and it holds between
two labels when the labels refer to the same object. On the latter view, the identity relation
holds between ‘two’ objects when they are the same object. On the metalinguistic view,
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then, when you learn that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ refer to the same object you’ve
learned that there is a relation between the labels ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’. But you
haven’t learned that Hesperus and Phosphorus are the same object. This is because a
consequence of requiring that the identity relation only hold between labels, i.e. only
holds at the level of language, is that we cannot engage in semantic descent to assert
anything about the objects the labels represent. The metalinguistic view doesn’t license
any metaphysical conclusions including the obvious one that if two labels co-refer the
labeled object is just one object. It was such bizarre features of the metalinguistic view
that led to the metaphysical view.4 Besides the issues with the metalinguistic view, the
metaphysical view seems to be assumed by everyone involved in the debate. Indeed, the
metaphysical view is required if one is going to conclude that particles lack individuality
on the basis of their lacking identity. So I will set the metalinguistic view aside.
The second question is what kinds of identity there are that we might use to formulate
conditions on individuality. On the one hand, we have the distinction between numerical,
qualitative, and extensional identity. On the other hand, we have the distinction between
synchronic, diachronic, and self-identity. Of the former distinctions, clearly numerical
identity is the kind of identity at issue. Whether qualitative identity is important as well
depends on the status of PII. With respect to the latter distinctions, it’s unclear how many
kinds of identity we actually have here. Is there an important metaphysical difference
between synchronic identity and self-identity or are they the same kind of identity? While
there is a clear epistemological difference between synchronic identity and diachronic
identity it isn’t obvious that there is an important metaphysical difference. If there is no
difference between synchronic identity and self-identity and if synchronic identity
accounts for diachronic identity, then there may be no interesting metaphysical distinction
4This is most easily seen in (Frege 1948) where Frege discusses his reasons for abandoning the
metalinguistic view in favor of the metaphysical view.
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here. I will treat self-identity first since there are reasons to think it importantly different
from synchronic or diachronic identity. Then I will treat synchronic and diachronic
identity together.
4.1.1 Self-Identity
The reasons to think of self-identity as different from synchronic and diachronic identity
primarily have to do with a distinction between merely logical relations of identity and
metaphysical relations of identity. Lowe is one of the defenders of this distinction and he
states that “[t]he [logical] relation of identity may be exhaustively characterized ... by two
logical properties of that relation: its reflexivity and its governance by Leibniz’s law”
(Lowe 2016, p. 52). So, the logical identity relation is such that for any object x, x = x.
And for any two objects x and y, if x = y then x and y have all of their properties in
common (in other words, numerical identity implies qualitative identity). Clearly it is
numerical identity that is being characterized.
It seems to me that if we understand ‘=’ as indicating numerical identity, then the claim
that for any x, x = x is the claim that for any object x (of kind K) it is one object (of kind
K).5 Reflexivity and Leibniz’s law together imply that any object has the properties it in
fact has. None of these claims are particularly interesting as they are logical truths. Hence
why this is a merely logical relation.
Now, everyone agrees that claims of self-identity can appropriately be represented in the
form x = x. In which case, everyone has to either accept that claims of self-identity are, at
least in part, claims that the object in question is one object (of a particular kind) or they
need to understand ‘=’ as indicting something other than numerical identity. The other
5Obviously, any composite object isn’t one object in an unqualified sense, hence the restriction on kind.
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options are, as noted before, qualitative identity or extensional identity. Anyone who
wants to deny that particles have self-identity, like French and Krause, given that
single-particle states have one particle (as in the particle number operator returns the value
1 when acting on these states), is going to have to go with one of the other options. It
would undermine their position to accept that particles have self-identity in single-particle
states, even if they maintain that they lack self-identity in multi-particle states. In that
case, particles could oscillate back and forth between being individuals or non-individuals
depending on whether they satisfy whatever other conditions on individuality one might
want to pair with self-identity, if any.
Understanding ‘=’ in terms of qualitative identity won’t help French and Krause because
then the claim that x = x is the claim that x has all the properties it in fact has. It appears
that x = x, for any x, understood in terms of qualitative identity is still a logical truth. In
terms of extensional identity, x = x is the claim that x has the very extension that it has.
Again, there seems to be no reasonable prospect for denying that except in the case where
x is something that doesn’t have an extension. Since x will be denoting a particle in the
cases of interest it is the case that x = x is not true when ‘=’ denotes extensional identity.
But this is because the claim, and its denial, don’t make sense for x’s for which the
concept of extension simply doesn’t apply. Kind terms, like ‘boson,’ have extension but a
particular particle doesn’t have an extension.
If there is a way to understand self-identity such that its denial makes sense, French and
Krause (and probably most of the other defenders of the non-individuality of particles)
need to explain it. As it stands, French and Krause do take ‘=’ to represent numerical
identity in self-identity claims and so are committed to denying that the particle in a
single-particle state is one particle (of whatever type it is); at least if they want to claim
that single quantum particles are non-individuals (which they do). They could instead
claim that particles are only non-individuals when in multi-particle states. Arguably, that’s
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the conclusion the argument from quantum statistics should reach anyway because it only
concerns multi-particle states. But if single particles are individuals why conclude that
they are not individuals in multi-particle states rather than claiming that their individuality
isn’t physically relevant to quantum statistics?
It is entirely unclear how to turn self-identity claims into metaphysical claims rather than
trivial logical claims. Without showing how that can be done, there is no prospect for
including a requirement of self-identity in a metaphysical account of individuality. While
most defenders of non-individuality characterize it in terms of objects lacking
self-identity, they have said virtually nothing about what it means to have (or lack)
self-identity. The most that has been said is that French and Krause have claimed that it is
a relation and that “the existence of the individual and the establishment of self-identity
are conceptually on a par in that we cannot envision the possibility of one without the
other” (French and Krause 2006, p. 14).This latter claim is made in the context of
discussing whether individuals must exist before ‘entering into’ relations, including
relations of self-identity. In that case, the claim means that the relata (the individual) isn’t
ontologically prior to the relation of self-identity (otherwise self-identity would be a
consequence of, rather than a condition for, individuality). None of what French and
Krause say here provides reason to think that self-identity makes sense understood as a
metaphysical relation. This is especially problematic given that paying attention to the
possible meanings of ‘=’ in attempting to understand the possible meanings of claims of
the form ‘a = a’ results in tautologies.
One possible way to make sense of the idea that self-identity might not apply to particles
is to say that it is indeterminate whether a = b or a , b. There are at least two ways in
which we could understand what such a claim means. One is to take it as meaning that the
concept of self-identity is inapplicable here such that particles neither have nor lack
self-identity. The other option is to say that it is metaphysically indeterminate whether the
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particles have or lack self-identity. But neither of these approaches will save the Received
View. If self-identity is a necessary condition for individuality, then the former approach
implies that particles are neither individuals nor non-individuals whereas the latter
approach implies that it is indeterminate whether particles are individuals or
non-individuals. The former approach seems to favor a version of OSR in which there are
no individuals or non-individuals whereas the latter would give ammunition to
underdetermination arguments in favor of OSR.
A second issue with a metaphysical understanding of self-identity arises when we
consider what we’re looking for in giving a metaphysical account of identity. Identity, in
the metaphysical sense, is what makes a particular object the very object that it is. It is
something that we could reasonably call an ‘individual essence,’ and note that we needn’t
understand this in the metaphysically robust way normally associated with this
terminology. An individual essence, in the sense of being that which an objects identity
consists in, could easily just be a set of properties (I’ll talk about bundle theories of
individuality in the next chapter). How would we understand an individual essence as
relational? In the logical sense, identity is a relation between labels. But in the
metaphysical sense it seems strange to think of that in virtue of which an object is the very
object it is in relational terms. The problem here is the same as that which motivates the
distinctions between individuality, distinguishability, and numerical difference. A universe
with a single individual is logically possible, so how could its identity (and its
individuality) be grounded in something relational?
I don’t mean to suggest that relational accounts of individuality are non-starters. But the
relation in question must be able to obtain in a single object universe. This issue is likely
part of the reason why the only relational accounts of individuality, prior to the debate
about particles, are spatiotemporal accounts. In a single object universe, the object has a
unique spatiotemporal trajectory. Since spacetime and the object are the only ‘things’ in
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these single object universes it’s unclear how we could have a relational
non-spatiotemporal condition on identity (or individuality). The only option seems to be
to say that the object bears some sort of relation to itself, but that just seems to be an
inaccurate way of talking about monadic properties or some other sort of non-relational
feature. Of course, composite objects can have relations among their parts, but we can
imagine a universe with just a single classical point particle.
Note that because what we are concerned with here is logical constraints on a notion of
individuality any suitable conditions must be compatible with any logically possible
individuals. Hence why the mere logical possibility of a universe containing only a single
classical point particle presents a problem for the possibility of a relational
non-spatiotemporal account of individuality.
4.1.2 Synchronic and Diachronic Identity
From the preceding section one might already guess how synchronic identity (could)
differs from self-identity. If one thinks that objects possess metaphysical identity (that is,
identity conferred by some ontological component of an object) of some sort at a time,
then that will be a form of synchronic identity but not self-identity. So, the question of this
section is whether possessing some form of metaphysical identity (either at a time or over
time) is a necessary and/or sufficient condition for individuality.
The claim that identity is a necessary and/or sufficient condition for individuality is
sometimes made but it seems to have never been explicitly defended.6 In the absence of
such a defense I will confine myself to a brief discussion of some reasons to think that
identity is neither necessary nor sufficient for individuality. Of course, one can conceive of
6Gracia noted the same thing in 1988.
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identity in a metaphysical sense in terms of bare particulars or haecceities. Certainly,
views in which bare particulars or haecceities provide necessary (or necessary and
sufficient) conditions for individuality have been defended. But I will discuss those views
in the next chapter. Here my focus is on the view that metaphysical identity is required for
individuality independently of any particular details about the nature of that metaphysical
identity.
The first objection to the view that metaphysical identity is necessary for individuality that
I want to look at comes from Woods (Woods 1968). Woods is one of the few to consider
synchronic identity rather than just diachronic identity. Woods distinguishes between two
types of questions. Type 1 questions are of the form ‘How many Xs are there?’ and type 2
questions are of the form ‘Is this X the same X as the X which...?’ These kinds of
questions are related. To avoid double-counting in answering type 1 questions information
relevant to answering some type 2 questions is needed. On the other hand, answering type
2 questions requires information relevant to answering type 1 questions since you want to
know if there are one or two objects.
Type 2 questions can be reformulated as type 1 questions, and the most natural way to do
so involves making use of what Woods calls a ‘frame of enumeration’. For example, if
one is looking at a church that is on the same site as a church their great-grandfather
attended in the early 1940s, they might ask ‘is this church the same church as the church
which my great-grandfather attended?’ This could, in this instance, be reformulated as
‘How many churches have stood on this site since 1940?’ This reformulation uses, in
Woods terminology, spatial and temporal frames of enumeration.
Woods also distinguishes principles of individuation (P.I.) from criteria of individuation
(C.I.). He claims that “[t]o possess a C.I. for a kind of object is to have a rule for
answering Type 1 questions within a temporal frame of enumeration; to possess a P.I. is to
have a rule for answering Type 1 questions within a spatial frame of enumeration” (Woods
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1968, p. 127). On the face of it, type 1 questions are about individuation and type 2
questions are about identity. So, as Woods points out, it may seem counterintuitive to
understand a criterion of identity in terms of answering type 1 questions. But the intuition
is explained by the fact that we don’t generally recognize that we can reformulate type 2
questions as type 1 questions.
Woods doesn’t explain why he associates temporal frames of enumeration with criteria of
identity and spatial frames of enumeration with principles of individuation. However, type
1 questions with only a temporal frame of enumeration are about diachronic identity. On
the other hand, type 1 questions with only a spatial frame of enumeration are not about
identity but about whether it is possible to individuate the objects in question in order to
enumerate them. This has nothing to do with whether a given object has some sort of
metaphysical identity. No one, for example, is arguing that particles must have
metaphysical identity because we can enumerate them (ordinal counting, rather than mere
enumeration, would, of course, be a different story).
With all of this in place we can ask whether a criterion of identity is either a necessary or
sufficient condition for a principle of individuation. The answer is straightforward. A
temporal frame of enumeration isn’t needed to answer the question “[h]ow many animals
are there in this cage now?” (Woods 1968, p. 128), consequently, a criterion of identity
isn’t necessary for a principle of individuation. We may dispute whether this question
lacks a temporal frame of enumeration given the presence of the word ‘now’, but I don’t
think it matters. The question is about individuation (how many individuals are there are
in the cage) not synchronic identity (do these individuals possess some form of
metaphysical identity at a time).
A criterion of identity is, however, a sufficient condition for a principle of individuation.
This is because in order to determine whether a is identical with b requires that we be able
to individuate a and b. If we can’t individuate a and b then we wouldn’t be able to tell that
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there are two objects even if there were. Suppose that clouds are individuals in a
metaphysical sense such that when two clouds merge there are still two clouds. In order
for someone who didn’t see two clouds merge to determine that there are two clouds, they
must be able to individuate the two clouds. They must be able to determine that this part
(or these parts) belong to one cloud and this other part (or these other parts) belong to a
distinct cloud. I don’t mean to suggest that clouds are individuals, but it helps to illustrate
that the ability to individuate is necessary to answer identity questions. But what is
important here is the possibility of individuating the clouds in principle, not whether the
epistemic issue of whether someone could actually do so.
Since Woods is concerned with the ability to individuate or make identifications, one
might wonder what all this has to do with whether identity in a metaphysical sense is
necessary for individuality. This has to do with the fact that Woods is concerned with what
is logically required in order for individuation or identification rather than with how we
might actually individuate or identify things. If a criterion of identity isn’t needed for
individuation, then we have reason to doubt that there is a metaphysical role for identity to
play in grounding an objects individuality. In particular, if a criterion of identity isn’t
needed to correctly individuate objects, then it’s possible to correctly individuate things
that lack metaphysical identity. But if that’s possible, then it’s contingent whether all
actual individuals possess metaphysical identity. Metaphysical identity can’t be necessary
for individuality (even if it happens that all actual individuals have metaphysical
identity).
Because the claim that identity is a logically necessary and/or sufficient condition for
individuality has been taken as obvious (hence the lack of explicit defense of this claim in
the literature) there is also very little critical discussion. Other than Woods, the only other
detailed criticism seems to be found in (Gracia 1988). But there is at least one more
reason for the lack of critical discussion in the literature. The vast majority of discussion
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in the literature is about metaphysically necessary and/or sufficient conditions tied to
specific proposals for the metaphysical grounds of individuality. Those discussions are
about principles of individuation rather than the intension of ‘individuality’ and so belong
in the next chapter. It is also possible that it was assumed that logical conditions relating
to identity were irrelevant to the question of whether something is an individual in a
metaphysical sense. Lowe, for example, argues that self-identity is not the right sort of
identity for such discussions precisely because he takes it to be a logical relation (Lowe
2016). Regardless of the reasons, however, there is virtually no discussion of the claim
that identity is a logically (as opposed to metaphysically) necessary and/or sufficient
condition for individuality.
Gracia is completely focused on diachronic identity because, prior to the idea that
self-identity is important for individuality, the focus was always on diachronic identity. In
particular, the ability for individuals to persist through various kinds of change. Gracia
offers two reasons to think that diachronic identity isn’t necessary for individuality and
another two reasons as to why it isn’t sufficient for individuality.
The first reason that diachronic identity isn’t necessary for individuality is that the concept
of an instantaneous individual doesn’t appear contradictory (Gracia 1988, p. 40). An
instantaneous individual can be understood either as a being that comes and goes out of
existence in an instant or a non-temporal being. The Abrahamic God would, presumably,
be a non-temporal individual (barring a way to make sense of God’s eternal and
unchanging nature in such a way that He could exist in time).
The other reason to think that diachronic identity isn’t necessary for individuality is
finding principles of individuation and finding criteria of identity are different issues.
Gracia demonstrates this by noting that having a unique spatiotemporal trajectory can
function as a principle of individuation, but it doesn’t seem suitable as a criterion of
(diachronic) identity (Gracia 1988, p. 40). An object isn’t identical over time because it
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has a unique spatiotemporal trajectory. It seems to be more the other way around. An
object having a unique spatiotemporal trajectory is partly explained by its diachronic
identity. If diachronic identity were a requirement for individuality, then it shouldn’t be
possible to formulate an acceptable (and, in this case, popular) principle of individuation
that doesn’t also serve as, or include as a component something that serves as, a criterion
of identity.
Diachronic identity is also not sufficient for individuality because some putative
non-individuals are identical over time, such as universals. Gracia’s arguments in this
section are all extremely brief, presumably because he has no particular defense of
identity as a condition of individuality to critique. I’m not sure there’s a non-controversial
example of something that has diachronic identity but would generally be agreed to be a
non-individual. Some other (potential) examples would be clouds or puddles, but some
people, perhaps Jantzen, would see these as individuals. Universals might be the best
example since all that is needed is that it be possible that universals exist and acceptance
that universals aren’t, or wouldn’t be, individuals. Gracia seems to take it for granted that
universals are not individuals (but note that he doesn’t dismiss claims to the contrary as
contradictory and so recognizes that there is a distinction between particularity and
individuality). But anyone that accepts that there could be non-instantaneous
non-individuals will have to accept that diachronic identity is not sufficient for
individuality.
The final reason that diachronic identity isn’t sufficient for individuality is also extremely
brief. Gracia just notes that “[i]t is altogether possible to answer the question, “What
makes S to be the same S through time?” by saying that S has not changed or has not
changed much. But certainly that answer is not sufficient or even appropriate to answer
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the question, “What makes S to be the individual it is?”” (Gracia 1988, pp. 40-41).7 The
first question isn’t about why S is the very S it is, but just why it at a later time is the same
S as at an earlier time. An explanation of an instance of diachronic identity isn’t
necessarily an explanation of individuality (even if it sometimes could be).
With a number of considerations against, and no considerations for, taking either
synchronic or diachronic identity as necessary and/or sufficient conditions for
individuality, it seems appropriate to conclude that identity, despite the undefended claims
to the contrary, isn’t important for individuality.
This is why I cautioned against reading Jantzen’s cardinality argument and Bueno’s
fundamentality arguments as objections to the general view that particles are not
individuals. If identity isn’t a sufficient condition for individuality, then a definition of
cardinality that presupposes identity isn’t a problem for defenders of non-individuality.
However, it is still an issue for French and Krause’s view, which is shared by many others
in the debate. French and Krause must explain how to understand self-identity as a
metaphysical relation and, even if they do, they still have to address Jantzen’s argument.
Additionally, if identity isn’t a sufficient condition for individuality then Bueno’s
fundamentality arguments don’t imply that particles are individuals. However, Bueno’s
arguments do still challenge French and Krause’s view.
In light of problems taking self-identity as a metaphysical relation necessary for
individuality, the lack of positive reasons to take either synchronic or diachronic identity
as either necessary or sufficient for individuality, the issues formulating a definition of
cardinality that doesn’t presuppose identity, and Bueno’s arguments which draw attention
to the fact that even concepts unrelated to the debate over individuality (e.g. logical
quantifiers) need to be revised to support a view in which some objects aren’t
7This point is also made in (Lowe 2005, pp. 91-92)
109
self-identical, it seems that defenders of non-individuality should be looking for another
way to understand non-individuality. Certainly, there seems to be nothing about
permutation invariance that suggests that understanding it in terms of non-individuality
requires understanding non-individuality in terms of a lack of self-identity.
4.2 Unity
The proposals for conditions of individuality that I will discuss in this section all have in
common that they can be understood as claiming that individuals must be unified in some
way. Either they must be indivisible in some sense or they must be distinct from
everything else, I will look at each proposal in turn.
The view that individuals must be distinct from everything else is sometimes expressed in
terms of individuals each counting as one object (in the sense that individuals are
countable). This version of the distinctness view is never explicitly defended, the closest
thing to a defense is provided by Lowe when he argues that number is a property of
objects (Lowe 2009, pp. 42-51). While it does need to be the case that number be a
metaphysical component of objects, or a consequence of metaphysical aspects of an
object, in order for a criterion of countability to provide a metaphysical grounding for
individuality, we are provided no reason to think this feature of objects has anything to do
with individuality. Additionally, the primary objections (discussed in section 4.2.2) to
viewing distinctness as a necessary condition for individuality applies equally well in its
countability guise. Consequently, I will not explicitly discuss the countability version of
the distinctness requirement.
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4.2.1 Indivisibility
First, we should distinguish between two kinds of indivisibility. Gracia refers to them as
‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ indivisibility (Gracia 1988, 30). Something is absolutely
indivisible if it cannot be divided. For physical objects this means that they can’t be
physically divided. For things like universals or tropes it’s not clear how it should be
understood. But a universal or trope is absolutely indivisible if it cannot be metaphysically
divided, however we come to understand ‘metaphysically divided’ here. This isn’t
important for my purposes. It’s clear that some individuals (e.g. people) aren’t absolutely
indivisible, so absolute indivisibility isn’t a necessary condition for individuality.
On the other hand, if absolute indivisibility were a sufficient condition for individuality
then, presumably, universals would be individuals. Restricting our attention to physical
objects, if absolute indivisibility were a sufficient condition for individuality then particles
would (likely) be individuals. It’s not clear why this kind of indivisibility would be
important for individuality, and it would be question begging to merely assert it as a
sufficient condition. I mention it merely for a contrast with relative indivisibility.
Something is relatively, or formally, indivisible if it cannot be divided into other entities of
the same kind. So, if an entity of type X can’t be divided into two, or more, other entities
of type X then it is relatively indivisible. Living creatures are, generally, relatively
indivisible (exceptions would be creatures that satisfied the myth that splitting an
earthworm in two results in two earthworms). Examples of entities that are relatively
divisible includes bodies of water, clouds, and piles of rice.
Gracia considers two objections to the view that relative indivisibility is a necessary
condition for individuality. The first objection is that we might consider a pile of stones to
be an individual (Gracia 1988, p. 31). No reasons are offered for why we might think this,
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and I have no linguistic intuitions one way or the other about whether a collection of
individuals is itself an individual. A pile of stones is relatively divisible in that we can
divide it into two piles of stones, so this would be a counterexample to the view that
relative indivisibility is a necessary condition for individuality.
Gracia also considers a response to the objection. It could be that it is the particular
quantity of stones that is an individual rather than the pile itself. That is, maybe the
relevant type is, for example, ‘pile of ten stones’ rather than ‘pile of stones’. A pile of ten
stones can’t be divided into two piles of ten stones, so this view allows piles of stones to
be individuals and to be relatively indivisible. That there are ten stones is part of what
makes a pile of ten stones the very pile of stones that it is. When considering whether an
object is an individual one must be careful not to illegitimately abstract away from
particularizing details. If something were merely an individual pile of stones, and not an
individual pile of n stones, then the individual pile of stones would remain the same
individual pile of stones if we removed a stone. But sets, collections, piles, etc... are
defined in terms of their members. Removing a member results in a different set. There
seems to be nothing else about the pile of stones we could point to as making it the very
pile of stones that it is. The only other option is to characterize the individuality of the pile
of stones in terms of its spatiotemporal trajectory in which case an individual pile of
stones could remain the same individual pile of stones after losing (or gaining) a member.
I will discuss such views of individuality in the next chapter. But, without moving to
another view of individuality, there appears to be no alternative to the usual view of
collections being defined by their members. Consequently, even if I accept that piles of (n)
stones are individuals, it doesn’t pose a problem for the view that relative indivisibility is
necessary for individuality. The issue here has to do with whether the relevant kind is ‘pile
of stones’ or ‘pile of n stones’. If we take piles of stones to be individuals and take their
individuality to involve which stones are in the pile, then the relevant kind with respect to
concerns of individuality is ‘pile of n stones’.
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The other objection, which Gracia accepts, is that an infinite collection of things is both an
individual and is divisible into other infinite collections (Gracia 1988, p. 31). A
counterexample to the idea that relative indivisibility is necessary for individuality needn’t
be something that actually exists, but it must be something that could exist. So, to accept
this objection we would need (i) reasons to think that an infinite collection could exist and
(ii) reasons to think that an infinite collection of things would be an individual. As I stated
previously, I think we need to have a worked-out account of individuality before we can
answer questions of the latter sort. The former issue is controversial, and I can’t devote the
space to discuss it properly. But I will point out that to say that there are an infinite
number of objects is, in part, to say that it is indeterminate how many objects there are.
Infinity isn’t a number and if there were a definite number of objects then there couldn’t
also be an infinite number of them. It is unclear whether it even makes sense for there to
be an indefinite number of objects. And while an infinite number of objects implies an
indeterminate number of objects, it’s not clear that an indeterminate number of objects
implies an infinite number of objects. So if we, for example, understood quantum states
that aren’t eigenstates of the particle number operator as states of indeterminate particle
number, it’s not obvious that Gracia could use this to claim that infinite collections could,
and in fact do, exist.
Chauvier defends the view that relative indivisibility is a necessary condition for
individuality (Chauvier 2016). However, he combines it with the requirement of formal
immiscibility. An entity is formally immiscible if mixing two entities of the same kind
together does not yield a larger entity of the same kind. Piles of rice are formally miscible
since mixing them together yields a larger pile of rice. Rabbits are not formally miscible
since ‘mixing’, or aggregating, them just yields an aggregation of rabbits rather than a
larger rabbit.
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The reason we need both conditions, according to Chauvier, is that being an individual has
to do with ‘the fact that [an individual] has its own or proper boundaries that separate it
both from beings with which it coexists and from beings of lower levels (of which it can
be composed) as well as from beings of higher levels (of which it may be a physical part)’
(Chauvier 2016, p. 35). Chauvier disagrees with Gracia that piles of stones are individuals
because piles of stones are relatively divisible. Note that my response to Gracia’s first
objection was premised on the assumption that piles of stones are individuals. It was
because a pile of stones was being considered an individual that it was important to focus
on particularizing details like the number of stones and which particular stones are part of
the pile. If we don’t think that piles of stones are individuals, then we have no reason to
think that the description ‘pile of stones’ is in some way unsuitable.
Thinking of individuality in terms of individuals possessing boundaries that separate them
from other entities gives us reason to be suspicious of the idea of relatively divisible
individuals. If I divide a pile of rice into two piles of rice, then recombine them, how
many piles of rice are there? Is there just one large pile of rice or does the large pile of rice
have two smaller piles of rice as parts? If piles of rice are individuals, then presumably the
answer is that we have three piles of rice after the recombination. The individuality of an
entity shouldn’t depend on where it is or how it is spatially related to other objects. I
shouldn’t be able to destroy an individual pile or rice by combining it with another one.
I’m inclined to agree with Chauvier that a pile of rice isn’t an individual and that the
reason why is piles of rice don’t have suitable boundary conditions for individuating them
from other piles of rice. So I’m inclined to agree that an individual can’t be both relatively
divisible and formally miscible. So then piles of stones are also not individuals.
At this point it’s open whether an individual could be relatively divisible but not formally
miscible or the other way around. It is necessary that at least one of the conditions of
relative indivisibility and formal immiscibility be satisfied in order for something to be an
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individual, I think, but are both conditions necessary? Could there be an individual that is
relatively divisible but not formally miscible or vice versa. Any mere collection of objects
will be both relatively divisible and formally miscible. So finding a counterexample
requires finding an entity that is not a mere collection, but that can be divided into two
entities of the same kind without recombination being possible. Or finding an entity that is
not a mere collection, but that can be combined into one larger entity of the same kind
without redivision being possible.
If a given entity of type X is not a mere collection of Xs, how could it be divided into Xs?
If an entity of type X doesn’t have entities of type X as parts, then dividing it into parts
would only yield entities of type X if the parts transformed into Xs after being separated.
But then that involves more than mere division. That is, it’s not the mere act of dividing it
that creates Xs but an additional transformation event that occurs after the division.
Consequently, this type of scenario doesn’t seem to be a counterexample.
Is there an entity of type X that is not a mere collection but is made up of X’s? A stone
seems to be an example. A stone can be broken into two stones which cannot be
recombined in a single stone (at least not without adding an adhesive). Stone can be either
a count noun and a mass noun, and the reason a stone can be broken into other stones is
because of the connection between the two. Being a stone amounts to having a collection
of stone that is held together by the appropriate chemical bonds. It’s not a mere collection
of stone because of this additional requirement. So, a stone is an example of something
that is relatively divisible without being formally miscible. Is a stone an individual? If so,
it’s a counterexample to my (and Chauvier’s) position.
Suppose I glue a bunch of rice together. Once the glue has dried the resulting object is
relatively divisible without being formally miscible (additional adhesive is needed for
recombination). It seems to me that this object only has contextual individuality. It’s a
mere collection that has been turned into something that behaves as an individual by
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sticking the individual grains of rice together. It would become a non-individual again if
the glue was removed. And note that the bonds in this case are chemical bonds as well. In
order for the stone to have more than the contextual individuality of the glued pile or rice,
there has to be a relevant different between the two cases. Since they both involve
chemical bonds, the only difference one could appeal to is that a stone is naturally
occurring where a glued together pile of rice is not. We normally think that artifact kinds,
such as laptops, can be individuals. So, at minimum, artifact kinds that are not mere
collections (or mere collections that have been glued together) can be individuals. So it’s
not clear why a stone being naturally occurring would be a relevant difference here. So
either the stone and the glued together pile of rice are both individuals or are both
non-individuals. I would say that they are both non-individuals but that they both possess
a form of contextual individuality that explains why we would intuitively view the stone
as an individual (and perhaps why one might view the glued together pile of rice as an
individual as well).
What about an entity of type X, that isn’t a mere collection, that could be combined with
other entities of type X to create a larger X? Since X isn’t a mere collection, combining
two of them just results in two Xs side-by-side. They would have to merge in a more
intimate and transforming way than merely pushing two piles of rice together. Again, just
putting the Xs together doesn’t create a larger X. It appears that there can be no such thing
as an entity that is formally miscible but relatively indivisible since there can be no entity
that is formally miscible that is not a mere collection.
It seems the only possible counterexample to Chauvier’s position would be an individual
collection (accepting my claims that things like stones only have contextual
individuality).8 I’ve already provided reasons above why an individual collection would
8Of course this doesn’t mean the Chauvier’s position is immune to criticism. Criticisms needn’t rely on
counterexamples. One could, for example, argue that Chauvier’s position gets the order of explanation
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be relatively indivisible; they would be formally immiscible, on my view, for the same
reasons. If one views it as necessary that individual collections are, or would be if mere
collections were individuals, relatively indivisible and formally immiscible, then it doesn’t
even seem possible to object to Chauvier’s dual requirement of relative indivisibility and
formal immiscibility by providing an example of an individual that fails to meet it. That
is, if one views my argument that individual collections would be relatively indivisible and
formally immiscible as a purely logical argument (for example, by holding the view that
abstracting away from particularizing details like the number of stones amounts to moving
away from talking about the individuality of that pile of stones), then it looks like it may
be impossible to formulate a coherent counterexample to Chauvier’s position.
The apparent impossibility of finding a counterexample to Chauvier’s requirements
suggests that they are purely logical constraints that provide no metaphysical insight into
individuality. In other words, the requirements of relative indivisibility and formal
immiscibility seem to be constraints on the meaning of ‘individual’ such that it is
incoherent to suppose that the term ‘individual’ could apply to anything that fails to
satisfy these requirements. But note that it is not merely a failure to find a counterexample
but the apparent impossibility of doing so that suggests that Chauvier’s requirements are
logical requirements.9 It’s unclear whether Chauvier views them this way. Although he
does also require that individuals be ontologically autonomous (I will discuss this criterion
in the next section), which could serve as the metaphysical grounds of individuality.
I myself am inclined to view the requirements of relative indivisibility and formal
immiscibility as merely logical constraints. Whether one agrees with such a strong
wrong. I.e. they could claim that individuality explains relative indivisibility and formal immiscibility rather
than the other way around.
9It may be more appropriate for me to speak of conceptual requirements rather than logical
requirements. But the point remains that the force of the argument is that one would be asserting something
contradictory to suppose that there are individuals that are relatively divisible or formally miscible.
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reading of the requirements, they do provide strong reasons to think that a mere collection
of Xs isn’t an individual. Consequently, any entity we’d correctly refer to with mass nouns
also wouldn’t be an individual, contrary to Jantzen’s claims. The members of a collection
may still be individuals and collections that have additional individuating features may
still be individuals. Any composite material object is an example of a collection that isn’t
merely a collection. Persons, laptops, and stones, for example, aren’t merely collections of
particles. Jantzen’s argument would still cause some trouble for French and Krause’s view
as they do explicitly reject the idea that particle terms are mass nouns. Since fundamental
particles aren’t collections at all and composite particles aren’t necessarily mere
collections of their components, Chauvier’s requirements are compatible with a
particles-as-individuals view.
I should note that the requirements of relative indivisibility and formal immiscibility cut
across the distinction between count nouns and mass nouns. While mass nouns will
always refer to things that are relatively divisible and formally miscible (e.g. you can
divide a body of water into two smaller bodies of water or combine two bodies of water in
to one larger body of water), whether something is referred to by a count nouns won’t tell
us whether it’s relatively indivisible or formally immiscible. For example, ‘cloud’ is a
count noun, but clouds are relatively divisible and formally miscible. However, ‘laptop’ is
also a count noun and laptops are not relatively divisible or formally miscible.
Finally, there is an ambiguity regarding the conditions of relative indivisibility and formal
immiscibility. Take the condition of relative indivisibility. What is required to satisfy this
condition? On the one hand we have the consequences of ‘division’ and on the other hand
we have what the process of division involves. Another way to ask the question is to ask
whether what is important for this condition as a condition of individuality is the
consequences (one entity of a given kind becoming two entities of that same kind) or if
what is important is something about the nature of the process of division.
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The conditions of relative indivisibility and formal immiscibility are both kind relative.
Chauvier prefers the phrase ‘formal indivisibility’ because both conditions are about
whether the ‘form’ of a given kind is indivisible or immiscible. Consequently, it’s not the
nature of the process of division that’s important. Since the conditions are kind relative
‘division’ can mean different things for different kinds. And while the word ‘division’
makes sense for the sorts of objects I’ve been using for examples the word ‘division’ may
not be appropriate for other kinds of objects. However, that’s not important. The
conditions are about capturing the idea that individuals have clear boundaries that separate
them from objects of the same kind rather than fuzzy boundaries that get blurred when
‘division’ or ‘mixing’ happens. So it’s the consequences these conditions associate with
‘division’ and ‘mixing’ that matter.
For the condition of relative indivisibility, then, the issue is whether there is a way for an
object to become two objects of the same kind in a way that blurs the boundaries that
metaphysically separate the objects. For particles the issue is whether there is any physical
process that starts with one particle of a given kind and ends with two particles of the
same kind. To determine whether the process blurs boundaries in a problematic way we
can consider whether the question ‘which particle is identical to the original particle’
makes sense or if that question is confused in the same way that asking that question about
a cloud that’s been divided is confused. Similarly, for the condition of formal
immiscibility, the issue is whether there is any physical process that starts with two
particles of a given kind and ends with one particle of the same kind. Again, we can
determine whether the process blurs boundaries in a problematic way by considering
whether it makes sense to ask which of the original particles is identical to the final
particle. Whether these questions make sense will depend on the nature of the physical
processes, if any, that take us from one particle to two or two particles to one. What isn’t
important is whether the words ‘division’ or ‘mixing’ are appropriate ways of describing
the process. But, more importantly, the nature of the physical process isn’t important for
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determining whether the conditions of relative indivisibility or formal immiscibility are
applicable (even though the nature of the physical process is relevant for determining
whether the conditions are satisfied or not).
4.2.2 Distinctness
Another condition that has sometimes been proposed as a necessary, or necessary and
sufficient, condition for individuality is distinctness. Views according to which particular
properties, sets of properties, or distinguishing relations ground individuality will be
discussed later. Here the claim is that mere distinction, aside from the details of any
particular distinguishing features, is necessary, or necessary and sufficient, for
individuality.
Gracia considers three reasons why one might think that distinctness is not a necessary
condition for individuality. The first is simply that there appears to be no logical
connection between individuality and distinctness (Gracia 1988, p. 34). Gracia provides
no reason to think this. However, it seems clear insofar as the individuality of an object is
something that pertains to that particular object whereas its distinctness is not.
The second reason Gracia offers, which I would take as explaining the first, is that the
same considerations I provided at the beginning of the chapter in favor of distinctions
between individuality, numerical difference, and distinguishability (Gracia 1988, p. 35).
Distinctness is what is meant when people speak of metaphysical distinguishability. In our
single object universe, that object can be an individual even though it cannot be
distinguished (epistemically) from any other object and even though it is not distinct from
any other object. For increased clarity in future sections, I will reserve ‘distinguishability’
for epistemic issues and ‘distinctness’ for metaphysical issues.
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There are some objections to the use of this thought experiment, which, if correct, would
also undermine the reasons I offered in favor of differentiating between individuality,
numerical difference, and distinguishability. The first objection is that “arguments based
on imaginary examples do not prove anything because we tacitly introduce in them the
features they set out to prove” (Gracia 1988, p. 35). I agree with Gracia’s response, which
is simply that such examples are meant to show logical possibility rather than to prove
anything.
The second objection is that “although the answer is supposed to operate under a
condition that prescribes the non-existence of other entities in the universe, it functions
under the tacit assumption of the possible existence of other entities” (Gracia 1988, p. 35).
Gracia accuses these objectors of conflating psychological necessity with logical
necessity. The idea seems to be that we can legitimately consider a universe that
necessarily only has one object in it, but the objector is suggesting that we can’t
psychologically imagine such a universe. That is, we always imagine the universe could
have more objects in it, even if we don’t intend to. Gracia’s point is that since we’re trying
to show that it’s logically possible to have an individual that isn’t distinct from anything
else, all that matters is the logical possibility of a universe that necessarily contains one
object. It doesn’t seem to matter if we are psychologically capable of imaging such a
universe unless logical necessity is, or reduces to, psychological necessity.
However, we could understand this objection in a different way. The idea could be that the
object in our single object universe could be an individual in virtue of the fact that it
would be numerically distinct from other objects were there any other objects. So the
conclusion of the thought experiment is reached by ignoring the possibility of a modal
understanding of the proposed distinctness requirement. This certainly weakens the
argument. However, what matters here is whether it’s reasonable to separate individuality
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from distinctness. We have some admittedly weak considerations in favor of separating
the two. However, we also have little but intuitions in favor of connecting the two.
The final objection is that the conditions of the example are violated when we introduce an
observer to note that the solitary object isn’t distinct from anything else (Gracia 1988, p.
36). Again, I agree with Gracia’s response which is simply that this objection confuses
“being in a universe” for “thinking about a universe”.
The final reason for thinking that distinctness isn’t a necessary condition of individuality
is that distinctness seems to presuppose individuality. The alleged reason for this is that if
X and Y are distinct then this is because X is not Y and if X is not Y then they are
individuals. Gracia takes the argument to be question begging since defenders of the view
that distinctness is necessary for individuality would presumably say that the distinctness
of X and Y explains why X is not Y (Gracia 1988, p. 36). I agree but think there is another
issue as well. Why think that if X is not Y then they are individuals? This would follow if
distinctness were a sufficient condition for individuality, but what we’re assuming is that
distinctness is a necessary condition. The objection seems better understood as an
objection to the view that distinctness is necessary and sufficient for individuality,
although Gracia’s charge that the objection is question begging still stands.
Gracia also offers one reason to think that distinctness isn’t sufficient for individuality.
This is simply that universals are, presumably, not individuals and yet they are distinct
from one another. This isn’t particularly compelling without reason to think that
universals wouldn’t be individuals. One could still claim that distinctness is a sufficient
condition for the individuality of material objects, however, it would be question begging
to do so here without some positive reasons in favor of doing so. If distinctness were a
sufficient condition for individuality, then particles would be individuals at least some of
the time since electrons, say, are sometimes both distinct and distinguishable from each
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other. I think Gracia is right that distinctness has to do with different issues than
individuality and that any view that intimately connects them would be confused.
4.3 Ontological Autonomy
As I mentioned above, Chauvier adds a requirement of ontological autonomy in addition
to relative indivisibility and formal immiscibility. An object is ontologically autonomous
when it has its own being. The standard example is that Socrates’ nose, unlike Socrates, is
not ontologically autonomous. The example already gives us one reason to think that
Chauvier’s other requirements are not sufficient for individuality since they imply that
Socrates’ nose would be an individual. Noses are relatively indivisible and formally
immiscible and yet they don’t seem to be individuals, at least not when part of
someone.
Ontological autonomy is important because individuals should be “ontologically separated
from the rest of the things, in contrast with simply being cognitively separated from the
rest of the world by an act of demonstrative focusing” (Chauvier 2016, p. 32). The logical
requirements of relative indivisibility and formal immiscibility, in addition to not being
jointly sufficient for individuality, don’t provide us the resources to find a metaphysical
ground for individuality. However, given Chauvier’s characterization of individuality in
terms of things having their own proper boundaries, ontological autonomy makes sense as
the metaphysical counterpart to his logical requirements. Consequently, the claim that
ontological autonomy is a condition for individuality receives some support from the
defense of the logical requirements.
Chauvier’s claim that ontological autonomy is a necessary condition for individuality
inherits the main problem any sort of claims about ontological autonomy must deal with.
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The primary issue is explaining what ontological autonomy amounts to. When is an object
ontologically autonomous? Chauvier distinguishes ontological autonomy from existential
independence. The latter applies to objects whose existence is not connected in any way
whatsoever to other objects. But individuals are connected in a number of ways to other
objects including existentially. Paradigm examples of individuals, such as a given person,
depend on their parents for their existence. Any requirement of ontological autonomy
can’t, therefore, mean being causally or physically isolated. Chauvier defines ontological
autonomy as “not needing to be a proper part of something in order to exist” (Chauvier
2016, p. 33).
If we now distinguish between attached and detached noses, the requirement of
ontological autonomy implies that an attached nose can’t be an individual whereas an
unattached nose could be as long as it meets the other requirements of relative
indivisibility and formal immiscibility (which it does). The requirement of ontological
autonomy, then, prevents us from counting arbitrary undetached parts as individuals,
while allowing us to count detached parts as individuals.
Chauvier’s view then, is that relative indivisibility, formal immiscibility, and ontological
autonomy are each necessary for individuality. They are also jointly sufficient for
individuality. This is my view as well. Although, in the case of ontological autonomy,
unlike the other requirements, I have little to add to Chauvier’s discussion. I think that
defending the requirements of relative indivisibility and formal immiscibility provides
some support for ontological autonomy, so my additional defense of the other
requirements, then, adds additional support for this aspect of Chauvier’s view.
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4.4 Non-instantiability
The final candidate for a condition on individuality is the one that Gracia defends. There
have been two other proposals that have not been defended by any contemporary writers,
but I’m not going to discuss them in detail. The first of these is that it’s a necessary and/or
sufficient condition for individuality to belong to a species consisting of multiple
individuals. It’s not clear why somethings being the very individual it is would require that
there be other individuals of the same kind. It’s also unclear why we should think that any
member of a kind that has multiple instances would thereby be an individual. Gracia notes
that this view had been defended in the medieval period, but there seem to be no defenders
since and the view seems to confuse individuality with numerical difference.10
The latter of the two proposals is the view that impredicability is a necessary and/or
sufficient condition for individuality. If impredicability is a feature of language, then it
can’t provide a condition for individuality if individuality is understood as a metaphysical
feature of the world. If impredicability is instead a metaphysical relation between
properties and objects, then this condition on individuality implies that objects are bare
particulars in which properties inhere (mirroring the linguistic subject-predicate
distinction). I will consider the bare particular view in the next chapter, but for now I will
just say that proposing a criterion of individuality that implies a very specific metaphysical
view is suspicious. Rather than providing a logical condition on what it means for
something to be an individual the position smuggles in metaphysical assumptions.11
The view that Gracia holds is that non-instantiability is a necessary and sufficient
condition for individuality. Instantiability is a feature of properties. If an object possesses
10See (Gracia 1988, pp. 37-38) for additional discussion.
11See (Gracia 1988, pp. 41-43) for further discussion.
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property X then that object is said to instantiate property X. The ability of X to be
instantiated can be called ‘instantiability’. Most properties can be instantiated multiple
times (e.g. there are multiple red objects). However, some properties can only be
instantiated once, such as ordinal properties (e.g. the property of being the first person on
the moon). Objects or substances cannot be instantiated since the relationship, say, a book
has with its redness is not the kind of relationship a book could have with another
object.
On Gracia’s view, the fundamental feature of individuals is non-instantiability whereas
individuals themselves are non-instantiable instances (of instantiables). Universals, on the
other hand, are instantiables. Gracia characterizes individuals as non-instantiable
instances rather than merely instances because ‘instance’ is sometimes used to refer to
instantiables. For example, “human being” is instantiable but might also be considered an
instance of “animal.” (Gracia 1988, p. 47). This view, according to Gracia, overcomes the
problems we saw with the other proposals. Gracia’s view allows for both instantaneous
and atemporal individuals, unlike views that take diachronic identity to be a necessary
condition for individuality. Gracia’s view allows for the possibility of individual infinite
collections that can be further divided into individual infinite collections, unlike the
indivisibility view. Gracia’s view allows for universes containing only a single individual
unlike the distinctness and species views. Finally, Gracia’s view doesn’t imply that objects
are bare particulars unlike the impredicability view. Gracia doesn’t offer any reasons in
favor of his view beyond his claim that his view avoids the problems discussed above.
Non-instantiability is a feature of everything other than properties and so Gracia’s view
implies that everything that isn’t a property is an individual. Gracia also doesn’t appear to
offer any reason as to why non-instantiability explains individuality as opposed to
individuality explaining non-instantiability. His argument for why we should accept his
proposal seems to be (i) all individuals are non-instantiable, (ii) viewing
non-instantiability as a necessary and sufficient condition for individuality avoids the
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problems faced by alternative proposals, therefore (iii) we should accept that
non-instantiability is a necessary and sufficient condition for individuality.
I would like to point out that Chauvier’s view also avoids all of the issues that Gracia’s
proposal avoids with the exception of the possibility of individual infinite collections.
However, I have provided reasons to think that mere collections are not individuals. If a
given infinite collection of Xs forms an individual it is not merely because it is a collection
of Xs. Rather it would be because the infinite collection falls under a kind whose
individuation conditions render objects of that kind relatively indivisible and formally
immiscible.
Gracia considers two objections to the view that non-instantiability is a necessary and
sufficient condition for individuality. The first is that contradictory properties such as
“round-squareness” are non-instantiable and yet not individuals (Gracia 1988, p. 46).
Gracia’s response is that a theory can’t be considered a failure merely because it fails to
apply to contradictions. He points out that the property of “round-squareness’ can’t be an
individual because it is composed of two universals and that it cannot be a universal
because it’s non-instantiable. If it’s not an individual (particular) or universal, then what is
it? Gracia says that the puzzle arises due to the illegitimate attempt to “apply to
contradictions categories that do not apply to them” (Gracia 1988, p. 47). While Gracia
views this objection as making a category mistake insofar as it attempts to treat
contradictions as being either individuals or universals, we can go further and say that the
problem, ultimately, is trying to treat contradictions as components of our ontology. At
any rate, I agree with Gracia that this isn’t a problem for his view.
The second objection is that non-instantiability can’t be a necessary condition for
individuality because cloned organisms are both instantiable and individual. Gracia’s
response is that “[c]loning is not a case of instantiation but rather a case of reproduction”
(Gracia 1988, p. 47). It seems pretty clear that this is the case; the objection seems to have
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been raised for the purposes of clarification rather than as an objection someone might
actually raise. For a discussion of particular ways in which cloning and instantiation differ
see (Gracia 1988, p. 47).
Gracia distinguishes non-instantiability from multiple non-instantiability. The latter
allows for something to be instantiated once and only once. For example, if the
Abrahamic religions are correct, then divinity would be multiply non-instantiable, but not
simply non-instantiable, if it only applies to God (Gracia 1988, p. 48). If multiple
non-instantiability were the necessary and sufficient condition for individuality, then
divinity, in this case, would be an individual rather than a universal. However, since
divinity is instantiable (though limited to one instance), divinity in this scenario still
counts as a universal on Gracia’s view. Similarly, one shouldn’t view the negation of
multiple instantiability as the necessary and sufficient condition for individuality because,
for example, “the last Dodo bird” is not multiply instantiable and is a universal rather than
an individual. Problematically, Gracia’s arguments regarding the distinction between
non-instantiability and multiple non-instantiability rely entirely on his undefended claim
that universals are not individuals.
Gracia’s proposal does seem to face one of the issues already mentioned. I claimed that
one reason to reject the impredicability view is because it smuggled in a metaphysical
viewpoint. Gracia doesn’t actually view that as a problem. His issue is rather that the
impredicability view is unacceptable because the bare particular view is unacceptable (as
an account of individuality). I however, think that a discussion of the meaning of
individuality should be at least somewhat limited in its metaphysical commitments since
it’s supposed to be a logical exercise. Gracia’s proposal seems to depend on the view that
properties can only be understood as instances of universals. As long as it is possible to
understand properties as tropes, then it is possible to have instantiable individuals. Tropes
are particulars and, as such, are candidates for individuality. Not only that, proposals for
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necessary and sufficient conditions of individuality shouldn’t simply commit us to a
particular metaphysical position. I’m not claiming that we couldn’t have necessary and
sufficient criteria of individuality that do settle the metaphysics. But they shouldn’t settle
it so straightforwardly and simply. We need to assess whether tropes are individuals
independently and only accept Gracia’s view if it turns out that tropes aren’t (or wouldn’t
be) individuals.
So, ruling out Gracia’s view in light of its unsupported metaphysical commitments, we are
left with only Chauvier’s conditions of relative indivisibility, formal immiscibility, and
ontological autonomy.
4.5 Conclusion
We might think that conditions of individuality might vary by kind of object or might
depend on features of the universe in which the object exists. For example, Gracia claims
that “[d]istinction is a necessary condition of individuals in a universe where there are
more individuals than one. Division is a necessary condition of individuals that belong to
a species where more than one individual is possible. Identity is a necessary condition of
individuals that endure in a world of time and change... Finally, relative indivisibility is a
necessary condition of material individuals” (Gracia 1988, p. 50). I think this gets things
backwards. Rather than these being necessary conditions for individuality under certain
circumstances, we should view them as features of individuals under those circumstances.
That is, instead of viewing diachronic identity as a necessary condition of individuals in a
world like ours, we should view diachronic identity as a necessary consequence of the fact
that material individuals in our world exist in spacetime. We could say the same thing
regarding numerical distinctness.
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Division also seems better understood as a necessary consequence of the existence of
individuals that are part of a species. It is because there are multiple individuals that form
a given species that the species is divisible into multiple individuals. It is not because a
species is divisible into multiple members that those members are individuals.
Diachronic identity is also not a necessary condition of individuality for material objects
in a world like ours. First, nothing about our world seems to preclude the existence of
instantaneous individuals. Second, it is because a given material object is an individual
that exists in spacetime that it has diachronic identity rather than the other way around. It
is because a given material object is relatively indivisible and formally immiscible that we
can distinguish it from other objects of the same type and assign them unique
spatiotemporal trajectories. If material objects weren’t relatively indivisible and formally
immiscible, then we couldn’t assign them unique spatiotemporal trajectories under all
circumstances any more than we could do so with clouds.
My view, then, is that the logically necessary and sufficient conditions for individuality
don’t vary by context or by kind of object. What does vary, however, is the kinds of
inferences one can make on the basis of combining these conditions with other
information. For example, if one knows that a given object is both an individual and has a
unique spatiotemporal trajectory, then one can conclude that the object has diachronic
identity. As a result, different fields of inquiry could reach different conclusions about
what features individuals in those fields have beyond satisfying the logical constraints. For
example, it could be the case that certain biological facts imply that everything in biology
that satisfies the constraints on individuality also has certain additional features in
common. However, it would not be the case that biological individuals have these features
in common because they are constraints on individuality but rather because being an
individual partly explains (in conjunction with certain biological facts) why they have
those features. Consider a group of objects that are (i) all individuals and (ii) are all
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non-instantiable. They could all be individuals because they are all non-instantiable, or
they could all be non-instantiable because they are all individuals, or it could be a
coincidence. My point is, if all members of a group have two things in common there are
two ways the order of explanation could go (assuming one feature does explain the other).
Something that all biological individuals have in common could be interpreted as a
condition on what it means for something to be a biological individual or it could be taken
to be something that follows from being an individual with certain biological features. I
will say more about this point in chapter five, but my view allows individuals in different
fields to have different features. It only denies that those features are, strictly speaking,
defining features of individuality.
Individuals in biology, for example, may all have certain features that individuals in other
fields do not. Strictly speaking, those features wouldn’t have anything to do with why the
individuals in question are individuals. In other words, the differences in the features of
individuals in different fields would be differences in what follows from individuality in
that field. Additionally, the logical constraints can be supplemented with metaphysical
constraints. So while something may be an individual because it is relatively indivisible,
formally immiscible, and ontologically autonomous it being an individual of a specific,
say, biological kind could involve additional metaphysical conditions. Regardless of the
kind of object or the sort of universe in which it exists, the necessary and jointly sufficient
conditions for individuality are relative indivisibility, formal immiscibility, and
ontological autonomy.
One final thing before moving on to the next chapter. I spent a lot of time here discussing
other people’s objections to the various positions I examined here. In some cases, I had
additional points of my own to make or responses to those objections. But in a number of
cases I had nothing to add. As a result, it may be unclear precisely what my contributions
are. Consequently, I will briefly list them.
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The discussion of self-identity is almost entirely original. In particular the examination of
the possible ways to understand what it means for something to be self-identical and why
none of those ways seem to support the view articulated by French and Krause (and
accepted by many others) that a lack of self-identity is a sufficient condition for
non-individuality (and a necessary condition for individuality).
The responses I outlined to the three challenges to non-individuality discussed in chapter
three are my own. These are, again, that discounting identity as a necessary or sufficient
condition for individuality implies that non-individuals could possess identity in which
case a definition of ‘cardinality’ that assumes identity isn’t thereby unsuitable for
non-individuals. Additionally, the lack of role for identity in defining individuality takes
some of the force out of Bueno’s arguments. Finally, the conclusion that relative
indivisibility and formal immiscibility are requirements of individuality implies that mass
nouns do not refer to individuals undermining Jantzen’s argument that quantum particles
may be individuals in virtue of particle terms functioning as mass nouns.
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The Metaphysical Grounds of
Individuality
Having looked at what it means for something to be an individual there is still one final
thing to do before I can examine whether particles are individuals. I must consider the
question “in virtue of what do individuals satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions of
‘individuality’?” One possibility is that it’s merely a brute fact that anything that satisfies
the necessary and sufficient conditions for being an individual is an individual. In that
case, I could simply argue that particles do satisfy these conditions and are, therefore,
individuals. However, the problem with that approach is that we can give metaphysical
accounts of why various kinds of individuals do satisfy the conditions of ‘individuality.’
For example, it is commonly argued that classical particles are individuals whose
individuality is grounded in their unique spatiotemporal trajectories. If I can provide a
metaphysical explanation of why some objects count as individuals and some other
objects are not individuals, then it appears ad hoc to claim some objects are or are not
individuals without also providing an explanation of why that is the case. If it were a brute
fact whether an object was an individual or not, we would not expect to be able to provide
explanations as to why some objects are individuals.
A second reason why the ‘brute fact’ approach might be undesirable is that what makes
something an individual may depend on the kind of thing it is. What makes a biological
organism an individual may not be the same as what makes a particle an individual. For
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example, the most common principles of individuation appealed to regarding biological
organisms involve physiology or natural selection rather than uniqueness of
spatiotemporal trajectories (Guay and Pradeu 2016). Providing a general account of the
necessary and sufficient conditions of ‘individuality’ is compatible with a variety of
metaphysical explanations as to why objects of a given kind do or do not satisfy those
conditions.
I will look at three general sorts of principles of individuation in this chapter. First, I will
consider principles that appeal to relations as individuators. My primary focus here will be
on certain kinds of spatiotemporal accounts as these are the only well-developed
(non-structuralist) relational accounts of the metaphysical grounds of individuality. Next, I
will look at accounts that take qualitative monadic properties as individuators. These will
be bundle theory accounts (objects are individuated by some set, or bundle, of monadic
properties). Finally, I will examine the possibility that some objects are individuated by
non-qualitative properties. Unlike the first two sorts of principles of individuation, there is
more internal variety in this last category. In particular, there are accounts in terms of bare
particulars, haecceities, matter, form, and existence. Finally, I should note that this chapter
isn’t meant to be exhaustive. One could write an entire dissertation, and more, on the
metaphysical grounds of individuation. My goal here is to highlight problems with the
sorts of metaphysical grounds empiricists are most likely to favor and defend the sorts of
grounds they are likely to dismiss. The purpose is to highlight the need to pay attention to
sections of the metaphysical literature that have been largely ignored in the debate over
the individuality of particles.
As stated at the beginning of chapter four in my discussion of the various sorts of
questions one can ask about individuality, questions about principles of individuation are
questions about the metaphysical grounds of individuality. These questions are meant to
answer what it is about the world that confers individuality on an individual. In evaluating
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the various proposals for metaphysical grounds of individuality I will, of course, be
considering traditional sorts of objections. Additionally, I will be considering whether
they are compatible with the conditions I defended in the previous chapter.
But there is also a third criterion of evaluation I will be using that has not been considered
in previous debates. That is whether a given account of the metaphysical grounds of
individuality is compatible with the existence of non-individuals (including composite
non-individuals). The recent literature is almost devoid of any discussion of the possibility
of non-individuals prior to the idea that quantum particles may be non-individuals. Many
accounts of the possible metaphysical grounds of individuality simply assume that
everything is an individual or, at least, that every composite, physical object is an
individual. As a result, many of the proposals do not even allow for the possibility of
composite, physical objects that are not individuals. In the context of the question of
whether quantum particles are individuals or non-individuals these accounts are
question-begging. To avoid this charge these accounts would need to be paired with an
argument to the effect that the existence of physical non-individuals is impossible. With
serious and sensible proposals for the possibility of composite, physical non-individuals
on the table we must consider whether the accounts of the possible metaphysical grounds
of individuality in the literature treat these proposals fairly or dismiss them out of
hand.1
With all of this in mind I now turn to the first category of proposals: individuation on the
basis of spatiotemporal relations.
1I realize this is a somewhat anachronistic way of putting of the point. It would be unfair of me to
characterize the authors who have defended the various positions I’ll be looking at as treating proposals for
the existence of physical non-individuals unfairly when there were either no such proposals at the time of
their writing or, at least, no such proposals that they could reasonably have been expected to be aware of.
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5.1 Are Objects Individuated by Spatiotemporal Relations?
I mentioned in the preceding chapter that the possibility of a universe with a single,
non-composite individual seems to limit relational accounts of individuation to
spatiotemporal accounts. There is nothing other than the individual and the background
spacetime (or space and time) to be related. Consequently, the focus of this section will be
on spatiotemporal relations.2
The idea that spatiotemporal relations individuate quantum particles is definitely
compatible with Bohmian mechanics. However, it is unclear if spatiotemporal relations
could serve to individuate quantum particles on other interpretations. At the very least,
existing accounts of spatiotemporal relations would need some modification to apply them
to quantum particles. Since it is beyond the scope of this work to concern myself with the
various interpretations of quantum mechanics, I will not be considering the possibility that
particles are individuated by spatiotemporal relations. However, it is still worthwhile
considering how spatiotemporal relations individuate. If spatiotemporal relations aren’t
good candidates for metaphysical individuators then we might conclude that whether
particles have well-defined spatiotemporal trajectories isn’t relevant to determining
whether they are individuals or not. On the other hand, if spatiotemporal relations are
good candidates for metaphysical individuators then we might conclude either (i) that
particles cannot be individuals unless Bohmian mechanics is the correct interpretation or
(ii) that something else serves to individuate particles. If it turns out that a sensible
spatiotemporal account could be developed for non-Bohmian interpretations, then a third
2If spacetime is relational, then a universe with a single, non-composite individual seems to rule out
spatiotemporal accounts as well. At least if such a world wouldn’t have a spacetime. But if spacetime is
relational there is a circularity concern about appealing to spacetime relations to individuate objects.
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option would be that particles are individuals individuated by spatiotemporal relations
independently of the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics.
There isn’t much to say directly in favor of spatiotemporal relations as individuators. It
seems intuitively obvious that unique spatiotemporal trajectories, at least, can serve to
individuate objects. Such accounts are defended primarily, or, as far as I can tell, entirely,
by responding to criticism. As a result, this section will proceed by looking at a series of
criticisms of spatiotemporal accounts of individuation and possible responses. But first,
for reference, I will briefly describe two spatiotemporal accounts of individuation.
The first account is from Karl Popper who states that “[i]f the body A lies within region P,
and the body B lies with region Q, and if P and Q are separated by a gap, then A , B”
(Popper 1953, p. 110). Popper defines being “separated by a gap,” or being
“disconnected,” and being ‘connected’ as follows: “The regions P and Q are called
‘connected’ or ‘overlapping’ if and only if they have at least one sub region (consisting of
one point at least) in common; otherwise they are called “disconnected” or “separated by a
gap” (Popper 1953, p. 110). A and B are individuated if they occupy disconnected spatial
regions and, in virtue of being individuated, are also non-identical. Popper views this as a
sufficient condition for individuality. Poppers terminology is a bit misleading as it
suggests a connection between distinguishability and individuality that Popper doesn’t
endorse. In particular, he isn’t suggesting that spatial separation is a sufficient condition
for distinguishing between individuals, but only that it is a sufficient condition for
something being an individual.
Before arriving at his final criterion of individuation Popper begins with a simpler
criterion that he modifies in order to respond to a criticism. The criticism is that in
attempting to formulate a criterion of spatiotemporal individuation one may end up simply
replacing “the problem of the difference of bits of matter by that of the difference of
spatial regions” (Popper 1953, p. 106). The criterion provided above does not require that
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spatial regions be individuated as we can sensibly talk about whether spatial regions are
connected or disconnected regardless of whether it even makes sense to talk about spatial
regions in terms of individuation.
Understanding Popper’s criterion as a metaphysical criterion of individuality implies that
any objects that occupy disconnected spatial regions at a given time are individuals. This
implies that clouds, for example, are sometimes individuals and sometimes not. It implies
the same for quantum particles on non-Bohmian interpretations of quantum mechanics.
Although Popper’s proposal can be viewed as properly metaphysical in the sense that he
isn’t conflating epistemology and metaphysics, it does imply that anything we can
distinguish on the basis of spatial location is an individual. It leaves little room for the
possibility that there are things that we can individuate (at least some of the time) that are
not individuals. In particular, this spatiotemporal account isn’t a threat to the idea that
quantum particles are individuals (at least some of the time) even if it is correct.
Although this view was first defended almost 70 years ago, it was defended as recently as
1989 by Legenhausen (Legenhausen 1989). Legenhausen defines a property F as “Fx =d f .
There is a location l and an object y such that x occupies l and y does not occupy l”
(Legenhausen 1989, p. 632). Legenhausen does not explicitly define separation or
disconnectedness. He does, however, note that his definition also avoids the criticism
Popper considered, saying “[u]nlike other accounts which explain non-identity in terms of
difference in location, there is no appeal in this proposal to antecedently defined thisnesses
or individual locations” (Legenhausen 1989, p. 632). I should point out that both Popper
and Legenhausen accept that this criticism is a good one. In fact, it is their acceptance that
accounts in terms of objects possessing unique spatiotemporal trajectories presuppose the
individuality of spacetime points that motivates them to develop their spatiotemporal
separation accounts. It’s not entirely clear that Legenhausen’s version of the view does
avoid the criticism. What individuates objects is supposed to be their spatial separation
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hence the important part of property F is that x and y are spatially separated. However,
Legenhausen is significantly less careful than Popper who explicitly defines spatial
separation in such a way as to avoid reference to locations.
The second account states that “A at t1 at p1 is identical with B at t2 at p2 provided that
there is a continuous spatial path between p1 and p2 on every pair of neighboring points of
which there are closely qualitatively similar things at neighboring moments of the interval
from t1 to t2 [and provided that all of the objects on that path are of the same kind]”
(Quinton 1973, p. 67). The requirement that the objects at ‘adjacent’ points on the
trajectory be qualitatively similar is meant to allow for the possibility of gradual change
over time while disallowing significant instantaneous changes. The restriction on kind is
there because the criterion would otherwise imply that, for example, a log that’s been
burned is identical to the pile of ashes that it becomes. Quinton is offering a criterion of
diachronic identity and defining individuals in terms of objects that satisfy that criterion.
Quinton’s view implies that quantum particles are not individuals.
The first sort of spatiotemporal account of individuation in terms of separation implies
that quantum particles are individuals at least some of the time (or all of the time on the
Bohmian interpretation). Whereas the second sort of account in terms of the possession of
a unique spatiotemporal trajectory may imply that quantum particles are not individuals
unless Bohmian mechanics is the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics. So while it
may seem intuitively obvious that spatiotemporal accounts of individuation would imply
that quantum particles are not individuals this is not the case.
There are other spatiotemporal accounts, but they are similar enough to the ones described
above. They either provide an identity condition in terms of possessing a unique
spatiotemporal trajectory wherein any two objects that satisfy the condition are
metaphysically individuated and are, therefore, metaphysical individuals. Or they use
spatial separation at a time as an individuator. There are accounts that include a
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spatiotemporal condition in conjunction with some other conditions. For example,
Reichenbach’s account defines what he calls ‘material genidentity’ in terms of objects
possessing a unique spatiotemporal trajectory in conjunction with a condition that it be
possible in principle to label the objects in some way (Reichenbach 1956).
However, such accounts are still open to the primary criticisms leveled at spatiotemporal
accounts. The accounts in terms of spatial separation are too permissive insofar as they
count things like clouds as individuals (at least most of the time). The accounts in terms of
unique trajectories presuppose the individuality of spacetime points in order to talk about
unique spatiotemporal trajectories and so are open to the criticism that Popper and
Legenhausen touted their proposals as avoiding.3 The arguments in the preceding chapter
imply that clouds aren’t individuals and seem to imply that spacetime points aren’t
individuals (at least in the absence of an explanation of how the condition of formal
immiscibility could possibly be applied to, and therefore satisfied by, spacetime points).
Consequently, most of my work for this section has already been completed insofar as the
account of ‘individuality’ provided in the previous chapter supports these two criticisms of
the two spatiotemporal accounts. Therefore, I will set these two criticisms aside. There is
one remaining criticism to consider.
That criticism contends that spatiotemporal accounts get things backwards. As Hausman
puts it, “[t]wo particulars are two and not one not just because they stand in certain spatial
and temporal relations which fulfill certain axioms, but simply because they are two. They
are not two because they are spatially diverse. They are spatially diverse because they are
two” (Hausman and Wilson 1967, pp. 42-43). Here Hausman is conflating the problem of
accounting for numerical diversity with the problem of identifying a principle of
3It may be the case that spatiotemporal accounts of individuality could be developed which allow for
individuation by unique spatiotemporal trajectory without presupposing the individuality of spacetime
points. It’s beyond the scope of this work to develop such an account, hence I’m restricting my attention to
existent accounts of spatiotemporal individuation.
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individuation: a conflation that leaves no room for the possibility of distinct
non-individuals. However, we can simply replace the talk of numerical diversity with talk
of individuation. In that case, the criticism is that objects need to be individuated in order
to stand in certain spatial and temporal relations.
Allaire makes the same point when he says, “[r]elations ... presuppose numerical
difference; they do not account for it. The thisness and the thatness of things is
presupposed in saying that the one is to the left of the other. Were it not, then in at least
some cases we would be forced to say what we all know to be false; namely, that the same
thing is to the left of itself’ (Allaire 1970, p. 254). Allaire is ultimately arguing for bare
particulars as individuators, however, he also makes the mistake of conflating numerical
difference with individuality. This conflation is particularly ironic given that he goes on to
say:
The mistaken belief that relations individuate derives from confusing
numerical difference—call it simply difference—with qualitative (relational
or nonrelational) difference—call it simply nonidentity. Difference is primary;
nonidentity is not. This may be shown by considering a representation ... built
in accord with the rule that there is but one sign for one entity. In such a
representation, the difference of two entities, say, a and b, shows itself in the
difference of ‘a’ and ‘b.’ The nonidentity of a and b shows itself in the
occurrence of at least two sentences, one true and the other false, which are
the same except for the one containing ‘a,’ and the other ‘b.’4
Allaire’s conflation isn’t important. And I suspect it to be true that some accounts of
relations as individuators are based on confusing numerical difference with qualitative
difference. However, I think it’s often the case that it is assumed that two things can be
4(Allaire 1970, pp. 254-255).
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related to one another even if they aren’t individuals. Quinton states the problem very
succinctly: ‘[p]osition individuates parasitically. To put the point in linguistic fashion, a
language can individuate only if it contains singular terms’ (Quinton 1973, p. 18).
This criticism is similar to the problem of the individuality of spacetime points faced by
the ‘unique trajectory’ accounts of individuation. Not only do spacetime points need to be
individuals in order for an object to be related to a unique set of them, but the object needs
to be an individual in order to be the other relatum. In other words, both relata need to be
individuals in order to be relata in the first place. So even if spacetime points are
individuals, they can’t serve to individuate objects. I don’t find this criticism convincing
since it’s not obvious why only individuals could enter into relations. The conflation
between numerical difference and individuality may be important here insofar as while the
argument can be changed to avoid the conflation, it doesn’t seem like a good argument
once reference to numerical difference is removed. Put another way, the idea that relations
precede numerical difference is potentially incoherent in a way in which the idea of
relations preceding individuality (or just relations between non-individuals) is not.
If spacetime points are not individuals, we can ask why a given object is associated with a
given spacetime trajectory and not another since the spacetime trajectories aren’t
individuated (in virtue of spacetime points not being individuated).5 If spacetime points
are not individuals, then we can’t talk about this trajectory or that trajectory at all.
Although, we can still talk about trajectories of objects as long as we realize that we aren’t
associating a unique set of spacetime points with that object. But if a given object isn’t an
individual, we can ask why a given spacetime trajectory is associated with one object and
5Note that the issue here is that of which spacetime trajectory token is which. Even if there isn’t a
distinction between two spacetime trajectory tokens of the same kind there is still a distinction between
types of spacetime trajectories. That may serve to individuate objects in different states of motion, but there
needs to be a distinction between tokens, not just types, if the proposal is to individuate two objects that are
both in the same state of motion (and so have the same type of spacetime trajectory).
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not another since the objects aren’t yet individuated. The objects need to be individuated
in some way before we can talk about which object is which. There are responses to this
criticism, and Reichenbach’s account already avoids it through his ‘possibility of labeling’
criterion. If we can, in principle, label the objects, then we can talk about which is which
and we can associate a given spacetime trajectory with this object rather than that
object.
I’m not convinced that this is a satisfying response. First of all, is having a unique
spatiotemporal trajectory doing any work in individuating objects if we have to be able to
label them first? And what is it that allows us to label the objects in the first place?
Reichenbach’s account doesn’t strike me as a spatiotemporal account insofar as the actual
metaphysical ground of individuation seems to be whatever feature of the objects allows
us to label them. I see no problem with the idea that there could be non-individuals which
could be labeled.6 But it’s unclear what role the possibility of labeling could play in an
account of individuation that would leave any room for further conditions. Unfortunately,
as (Reichenbach 1956) was published posthumously, there was no opportunity for the role
of labels to be further clarified. This issue seems that it would be a general feature of most
responses to the criticism: To say that we need to be able associate a spacetime trajectory
with this object rather than that object in order to individuate this object is to say that we
need to individuate the objects prior to associating them with spacetime trajectories.
Consequently, I don’t think that unique spacetime trajectories could serve as individuators
even if I did accept spacetime points as individuals.
There are, at least, two responses that could avoid attributing individuality to objects prior
to their entering into relations. One response is to say that spacetime relations don’t obtain
6This depends on one’s account of individuality. If labeling is associated with some form of identity
(self-identity, synchronic identity, or diachronic identity), then an account of individuality on which these
forms of identity play no role could be compatible with labeling of non-individuals.
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between spacetime and objects but between spacetime and properties. Although this
response just shifts the problem. The properties need to be individuated to associate this
property with a given spacetime trajectory rather than that property.
The other response is found in OSR. If OSR is correct that relations ontologically precede
relata, then it can’t be the case that objects must be individuated before entering into
relations. This is, according to OSR, to get things backward or, in other words, to make
the same kind of mistake I’m attributing to defenders of spatiotemporal trajectory
accounts of individuation.
One upshot of this discussion is that it leads to a more general problem for defenders of
non-individuality. If only individuals can enter into relations, and since any physical
object clearly enters into spatiotemporal relations, then there can’t be any physical
non-individuals. This is far too quick, and it would be problematic if my discussion had
this implication as then clouds, for example, would be individuals. For composite entities,
such as clouds, we can say that they are not individuals but that they can enter relations in
virtue of being composed of individuals. If only individuals can enter into relations, then
as long as everything is composed of individuals then we can say that composite objects,
even when they aren’t individuals, can ‘enter into relations’ insofar as their components
can enter into relations. But we obviously can’t say the same thing for non-composite
individuals. Consequently, if an object either needs to be an individual or needs to be
composed of individuals in order to enter into relations, then there can’t be non-composite
non-individuals. And so fundamental non-composite particles cannot be non-individuals,
as these particles do enter into relations.
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5.2 Are Objects Individuated by Monadic Properties?
According to the bundle theory of individuation, objects are individuated by their set of
monadic, or non-relational properties. Bundle theories of individuation are always paired
with bundle theories of objects which assert that objects just are bundles of properties. To
use a bundle theory of individuation without a bundle theory of objects would be to accept
the existence of bare particulars to which properties attach while denying that those
themselves serve as individuators. So the justification for the bundle theory of
individuation is that, after ruling out relational accounts of individuation, there is nothing
other than monadic properties to serve as individuators.
Existent bundle theories of individuality would not serve the defender of non-individuality
without modification. This is because these theories don’t specify any particular
properties as individuators. What individuates any given object is the complete set of
monadic properties that it has. On such a view, every object is an individual. It is easy to
see how a bundle theory of individuation could allow for the possibility of non-individuals
by considering one standard objection to the view. It is commonly objected that bundle
theories of individuation cannot account for multiple individuals possessing the same sets
of monadic properties. If what makes an object an individual is the specific set of monadic
properties it has then in the case of ‘two’ qualitatively identical objects it’s not clear
whether we have two individuals or one scattered individual. But an explanation as to
what individuates objects shouldn’t leave this sort of question unanswered. One way to
respond to this objection is to focus on particular sets of properties in conjunction with a
principle that ensures that no two objects have the same set of such properties. For
example, French and Krause point out that one response to the objection is to focus on
spatiotemporal properties and a principle of impenetrability (French and Krause 2006, p.
8). This particular response would also allow for the possibility of non-individuals if there
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are any objects that don’t satisfy the principle of impenetrability. So, quantum particles
could be non-individuals on the bundle view (as long as Bohmian mechanics isn’t the
correct interpretation of quantum mechanics).
It is well beyond the scope of this project to work out a specific bundle theory of
individuation that would allow for non-individuals. Additionally, focusing on
spatiotemporal monadic properties opens the view up to some of the objections that face
relational spatiotemporal accounts. Consequently, I will simply assume that it is possible
to construct a bundle theory of individuation on which quantum particles would count as
non-individuals. As a result of this assumption, my focus here will be on general
objections to bundle theories of individuation.
One final note before I begin looking at problems with bundle theories of individuation. A
bundle theorist can view properties as either universals or tropes and some of the
objections to bundle theories will depend on which view of properties is taken. I am not
going to get into the debate over whether properties are universals or tropes, but I will
differentiate between the two in what follows.
The first, and most common, objection is the one I already mentioned. That a bundle
theory of individuation can’t make sense of qualitatively identical yet numerically distinct
objects. This objection is raised in (Allaire 1963), (Hochberg 1969), and (Oaklander
1977). The objection is also raised in a slightly different, but equivalent, form in (Gracia
1988), and (Lowe 2005). The second form of the objection states that the bundle theory of
individuation makes the strongest form of PII an analytic truth. That is, the bundle theory
of individuation implies that it is not possible for numerically distinct objects to share all
of their monadic properties.
Allaire’s version of the objection is aimed specifically at bundle theories that take
properties to be universals. Two qualitatively identical objects will instantiate exactly the
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same set of universals. But then that set of universals can’t individuate those two objects.
The objection still holds if we focus on subsets of properties. However, the objection is
avoided if properties are tropes. Then two qualitatively identical objects have their own
distinct properties. Each has, say, their own redness: red1 and red2.
Moore’s version of the objection also only targets bundle theories that take properties to
be universals. I will follow Hochberg’s description of Moore’s argument (Hochberg 1969,
p. 157-165).
Consider four things: a white square, a white circle, a black square, a black
circle. Assume, for simplicity, they have no other non-relational properties.
Call them Peter, Paul, Mary, and Joan. To say that Peter is white, on the view
Moore wishes to refute, is to say that the predicate white is related by
predication to the predicate square, the latter being the point of difference
with the white circle, Paul. Moreover, Peter is identified with the predicate
square. But to say that Mary is black is to say that black is related to square,
by predication, and to identify Mary with the predicate square, since that is
the point of difference with the black circle, Joan. We thus identify Peter with
Mary. Moreover, they cannot be differentiated, even by introducing relations,
since it will always be the same universal square that is involved in any
relation to anything else.7
In other words, the problem with the bundle of universals view is that the only thing we
can attach predicates to is another predicate. What grounds the difference between Peter
and Paul such that the predicate “is white” has two distinct subjects? To say that Peter is
white is to treat “being square” as the subject to which the predicate “is white” attaches.
So, Peter is the name for the property of “being square.” To treat “is white” as the subject,
7(Hochberg 1969, pp. 158-159).
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given that Paul is also white, would result in Peter and Paul both being names for the
property of “being white”. This leads to a contradiction since Peter and Paul are
numerically identical yet qualitatively distinct. So, on pain of contradiction, we conclude
that Peter is the name for the property of “being square.” Now, to say that Mary is black is
to treat “being square” as the subject to which the predicate “is black” attaches. So, Mary
is the name for the property of “being square.” This leads to the contradiction that Peter is
numerically identical to Mary even though Peter and Mary are qualitatively distinct.
Without bare particulars the only thing to act as a subject for a predication of color is
being square or being round. But treating these as the subjects of predication leads to
identifying a white square with a black square or a white circle with a black circle.
Moore’s objection is more general in that it points to a problem that comes up when you
have multiple objects that share properties even if they don’t share all of their properties.
And note that the response I mentioned earlier isn’t applicable here. That response would
work for Allaire’s objection since it would rule out cases of numerically distinct objects
that share all monadic properties in which case there’s no need to explain how there could
be such objects. But Moore’s objection isn’t limited to objects that share all the same
properties. As I see it, the only way to avoid Moore’s objection is to reject the claim that
properties are universals. If properties are tropes than Peter is the name for “being
square1” whereas Mary is the name for “being square2”, so there is no contradiction.
Finally, the other form of the objection is also only limited to views according to which
properties are universals. If properties are tropes, then there can be numerically distinct
objects that share all of their monadic properties (in the sense in which two, say, red
objects share the property of being red in virtue of having the properties red1 and red2). In
other words, the strongest form of PII is only an analytic truth on a bundle theory of
individuation if properties are universals. Strictly speaking, the objection does still hold
for tropes since qualitatively identical objects will have distinct tropes. But this isn’t
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something a trope theorist would be concerned with and the puzzles that arise in the case
of universals don’t arise in the case of tropes. Or, in other words, the question of how it’s
possible for there to be numerically distinct but qualitatively identical objects has a
straightforward answer if properties are tropes. There are no such objects whose existence
must be explained, in the strictest sense, since “qualitatively identical” objects differ in the
specific tropes they possess.
A second problem facing the universals version of bundle theory was initially raised by
Gracia. This problem is that a bundle theory of individuation undermines the distinction
between individuals and universals. Gracia states the problem as “[t]hey have to worry
also about the obliteration of the very distinction between individual and universal that
their theory aims to support, for a bundle of universals is a complex universal and cannot
be regarded as an individual just in virtue of being complex” (Gracia 1988, p. 148). The
problem is that of explaining why certain complex universals count as individuals and
other complex universals, such as those that are never instantiated, are not individuals.
The worry is that if what makes something an individual is its bundle of universals and if
objects are nothing but bundles of universals, then any bundle of universals is an
individual. But then any bundle of universals is an individual including complex
universals that ‘have’ other universals as ‘parts’. For example, being a methane molecule
is a complex universal that involves the universals being a hydrogen atom, being a carbon
atom, and being a chemical bond. As long as one accepts the logical possibility of
uninstantiated complex universals, then the universals version of bundle theory seems to
imply that these would be individuals. It’s not clear to me that this would really undermine
the distinction between individuals and universals since simple universals wouldn’t be
individuals. It depends on whether the idea of an individual universal makes sense. Prima
facie the idea of an individual universal doesn’t make sense so, at minimum, Gracia’s
objection highlights an explanatory burden defenders of bundle theory need to discharge.
Either explain how it’s possible for objects to be nothing more than bundles of universals
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that are individuated without implying that uninstantiated complex universals are
individuals or explain how a universal could be an individual. While Gracia has, in places,
recognized a difference between particularity and individuality, it does appear that he’s
conflating them here. I’m not sure this is a problem insofar as I’ve seen no bundle theorists
respond to this objection by defending the idea that universals are individuals.
There are two ways bundle theorists attempt to respond to this objection. One response is
to characterize properties as tropes, view the tropes as individuals, and claim that objects
inherit their individuality from the individuality of the tropes that compose them. This
response implies that all objects are individuals, so this isn’t an option for defenders of
non-individuality. Additionally, this response only seems to shift the question from what
makes an object an individual to what makes a trope an individual.
The second response is to claim that there is a metaphysical relation that ties features
together into a bundle. This relation is sometimes referred to as a “tie,” “nexus,” or
“operator” (Gracia 1988, p. 148). This response does not allow for the existence of
complex non-individuals (neither complex in the sense of being aggregates with multiple
parts nor complex in the sense of possessing more than one property). Any object that
possesses more than one property will necessary possess the metaphysical relations that,
on this account, grounds individuality (i.e. the relation that ties the properties together).
Additionally, as Gracia points out, if the metaphysical relation is not unique then the
question is just being shifted from what makes an object an individual to what
individuates this metaphysical relation. If the metaphysical relation is unique to an
individual, then we’ve abandoned bundle theory and adopted a bare particular or haecceity
based account of individuation.
The trope version of bundle theory has a similar problem with explaining what
individuates tropes. This objection is discussed primarily by Rosenkrantz (Rosenkrantz
1993, p. 102) and Lowe (Lowe 2005, p. 83). The issue with the trope version of bundle
150
theory is that it seems to be circular. If, on the one hand, we say that tropes are partly
individuated by the objects to which they belong then it’s viciously circular to say that the
objects are also individuated by their tropes. To avoid the circularity, one could say that
tropes aren’t individuated, even partly, by the objects to which they belong. But then it’s
unclear why a particular trope must be associated with a particular object. A trope could
belong to different objects at different times or a trope could potentially overlap with
multiple objects at the same time (Lowe 2005, p. 83). In other words, if tropes aren’t
individuated by the objects to which they belong, then we need an explanation as to why
objects can’t exchange, or possibly share, tropes. If the circularity were avoided by
providing an account of individuation for tropes and claiming that objects inherit their
individuality from their tropes then, as stated above, all objects would be individuals, so
this response is of no use to defenders of non-individuality.
Finally, there are two major objections that are independent of whether one views
properties as universals or as tropes. The first of these is that bundle theory implies that all
of an object’s properties are essential properties. “If an individual is the same as the
bundle of features it has, then any true proposition that says that any such and such
individual has such and such a feature must be analytic and/or necessary and the features
that it specifies are essential to the individual in question” (Gracia 1988, p. 145). This
objection is entirely based on the intuition that at least some properties of objects are not
essential properties. It at least seems obvious that many macroscopic objects have
properties that are not essential properties. It’s not so clear in the case of particles.
However, any attempt to utilize a bundle theory of individuation for some objects and not
others will have to explain why it’s an appropriate account of the individuation of objects
for the former set of objects and not for the latter. A bundle theorist could claim that only
non-composite objects are individuals, but then they would need to explain away the many
paradigm cases of composite individuals.
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The second and, in my opinion, more problematic objection is that bundle theories of
individuation aren’t really concerned with individuation at all. Rather, bundle theories
conflate some of the issues that Gracia carefully pulls apart. In particular, “[b]undle
theorists suffer from two errors: the confusion of the problem of individuation with the
problem of discernibility and the confusion of individuality with distinction or difference.
It is for this reason that their view aims to account for difference, primarily epistemically,
and not for individuality understood metaphysically” (Gracia 1988, p. 150). According to
every version of bundle theory there are, strictly speaking, no numerically distinct yet
qualitatively identical objects. There is always something unique to each object whether
it’s the metaphysical tie that binds a bundle of universals together or that one object has
the trope red1 whereas its ‘qualitatively identical’ partner has the trope red2. Every object
has a uniquely identifying feature that an epistemically perfect being would have access to
even if we do not. In other words, the criteria for being an individual on bundle theories of
individuation is being discernible to an epistemically perfect being. As for the other
confusion; accounting for difference between two objects is not the same as accounting
for individuality. First of all, if particles are non-individuals then there are non-individuals
with different properties. Defenders of non-individuality could not accept accounting for
difference as sufficient for accounting for individuality because it undermines their
position. But there’s also the more general issue that while objects that are different must
be distinct individuals (assuming they are individuals) it is not the case that distinct
individuals must be different. There is nothing impossible about qualitatively identical yet
numerically distinct objects. Or, put another way, the strongest version of PII cannot be an
analytic truth and my primary opponents (e.g. French, Krause, and other defenders of the
‘Received View’) don’t view the strongest version of PII as even contingently true (French
1989).
From the preceding discussion it’s not clear that my initial assumption that a bundle
theory of individuation could allow for non-individuals is correct. But if bundle theory
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ultimately does not allow for the existence of non-individuals, then defenders of
non-individuality would be in agreement with me that the correct account of individuation
cannot be a bundle theory.
5.3 Bare Particulars and Non-Qualitative Properties
The remaining accounts of the metaphysical grounds of individuality all take those
grounds to be provided by entities that are often considered metaphysically problematic in
similar ways, particularly by empiricists. So I want to explain why we should take such
accounts seriously before moving on to the accounts themselves. What these accounts all
have in common is that the metaphysical grounds of individuality are taken to be
something non-qualitative. There are different accounts of the distinction between the
qualitative and the non-qualitative and it is beyond the scope of this work to wade into that
debate. For my purposes, it is sufficient that we have a general understanding of what sorts
of things count as qualitative or not. The simplest way to provide that is to work with a
simplified definition. A non-qualitative property is a property that concerns a particular
entity whereas a property is qualitative if and only if it is not non-qualitative. A haecceity
is a non-qualitative property because haecceities uniquely identify the possessing object.
The property of existing, understood in Gracia’s sense as an individuator, also counts as a
non-qualitative property. There are two classes of non-qualitative properties, intrinsic and
extrinsic, and only the former are considered metaphysically problematic. We will here be
concerned with the former. But to give a quick example of the latter, the relational
property of owning a particular piece of land is a non-qualitative property because it
makes reference to a specific piece of land. In addition to properties being qualitative or
non-qualitative, other things can be non-qualitative provided they, in some sense, concern
a particular entity. Any property, substance, or whatever else, whose sole purpose is to
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individuate the specific entity of which it is a component will count as
non-qualitative.
We already saw one example of using a non-qualitative feature as an individuator in
Dorato and Morganti’s account of primitive thisness in chapter two. I use the term
‘feature’ here as they don’t take primitive thisness to be an ontological component of an
object such as a property. However, even Dorato and Morganti’s primitive thisness is still
something that empiricists may view as problematic for the same sorts of reasons they
might view bare particulars or intrinsic non-qualitative properties as problematic. So I will
begin here with Dorato and Morganti’s defense of the idea that naturalism is compatible
with the existence of non-qualitative features. Their defense takes the form of a criticism
of the alleged inference from naturalism to Leibnizian reductionism.
Dorato and Morganti claim that there is a conflation “between two different ways of
determining what is supported by, or to be deemed meaningful on the basis of, science and
what is not” (Dorato and Morganti 2013, pp. 597-598). The conflation is between (i) the
idea that what is naturalistically acceptable for scientific and philosophical theorizing is
qualitative and (ii) the idea that what is naturalistically acceptable is whatever contributes
to the success of our best scientific theories. Dorato and Morganti favor the second way of
understanding what is naturalistically acceptable and go on to point out how it is
incompatible with restricting one’s focus to the qualitative. They offer three reasons to
explain this incompatibility. The first reason is that empirical differences can arise out of
non-qualitative facts. It matters empirically how many qualitatively identical particles are
present even if the only empirical difference in some circumstances is the mass. As long
as the objects in question have additive properties, like mass, it will always make an
empirical difference how many numerically distinct yet qualitatively identical objects are
present. If qualitative uniqueness is not necessary for empirical significance, why should
we view the non-qualitative as naturalistically unacceptable? The second reason is that
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“the possibility that facts of numerical distinctness might be as fundamental as, or even
more fundamental than, facts about qualities appear directly suggested by some scientific
theories” (Dorato and Morganti 2013, p. 598). As an example, they point out that in
NRQM we start with particle number in constructing a Hilbert space with the correct
number of dimensions for the task at hand. The point is that in NRQM particle number is
always a starting assumption for “the construction of the right kind of model for the
physical problem at hand” (Dorato and Morganti 2013, p. 598).
Interestingly, the idea that particles are not individuals arguably strengthens the claim that
non-qualitative facts about number are empirically significant. Putting these two reasons
together, we can say that if the number of qualitatively identical particles present is
empirically significant and if particles are not individuals, then there seems to be nothing
beyond the number of particles to point to in order to explain the empirical differences. If
particles are individuals, then there’s the possibility of explaining the empirical difference
in terms of whatever grounds that individuality (and construing facts about number as
non-primitive facts that depend on those grounds of individuality). I would, however,
make a claim even stronger than Dorato and Morganti and say that if number of
qualitatively identical particles makes an empirical difference then particles must have a
non-qualitative feature or property that explains that difference. But note that a
non-qualitative feature or property needn’t imply that the objects possessing that property
are individuals.8 So I agree with Dorato and Morganti that naturalism is compatible with
non-qualitative features or properties, I would go further and say that naturalism requires
that we accept non-qualitative features or properties. But, as I said, that doesn’t imply
anything about whether particles are individuals or not. That depends on what
non-qualitative features we take to be important.
8Presumably any object that possesses a feature or property that makes specific reference to that object
has some form of identity. However, since I’ve claimed that identity isn’t a sufficient, or even necessary,
condition for individuality I allow for the possibility of non-individuals that have non-qualitative properties.
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The third and final reason Dorato and Morganti offer for the compatibility of naturalism
with the non-qualitative is that we can take there to be brute non-qualitative metaphysical
facts that do not constitute additions to our ontology. We can get a handle on what this
means by distinguishing between two different aspects of ontology. On the one hand, we
can talk about components of our ontology in the sense of building blocks that make
things up. On the other hand we can talk about features of those building blocks. The
distinction is between being and ways of being or between what exists and what features
they have. Consider Bohmian mechanics where particles follow the guidance equation,
which gives rise to wavelike behavior. One possible ontology for Bohmian mechanics
includes both particles and physical waves that ‘guide’ the particles. Another possible
ontology doesn’t include physical waves at all and just says that the guidance equation just
describes how the particles happen to behave. The former makes guiding waves a
component of our ontology whereas the latter doesn’t add any components to our
ontology. But the latter is still making an ontological claim about the way in which
particles in Bohmian exist. This is how one can make ontological claims that don’t add
any additional components to our ontology.
While I agree that Dorato and Morganti are right about what most naturalists would
prefer, I don’t think it’s a preference that naturalists should have. Dorato and Morganti’s
first two reasons in favor of a compatibility between naturalism and non-qualitative facts
are not restricted to brute non-qualitative metaphysical facts. If those reasons are good
reasons to accept brute non-qualitative metaphysical facts, under the right conditions, then
they are just as good reasons for accepting non-qualitative properties (or other ontological
components) under the right conditions. Having said that, I am sympathetic to the idea
that there are some brute non-qualitative metaphysical facts, I just don’t think they should
be inherently preferable to things like haecceities or bare particulars.
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5.4 Are Objects Individuated by Bare Particulars?
A bare particular is a propertyless, in the sense of having no intrinsic properties, substance
that serves as a bearer of properties. Bare particulars do not differ from one another
qualitatively because they lack intrinsic qualitative properties. Bare particulars are
individuals, but this is a brute fact that is not grounded in any non-qualitative property that
bare particulars possess. I will use the term ‘feature’ here as I did with respect to Dorato
and Morganti’s primitive thisness. However, the metaphysical grounds for the
individuality of a bare particular is the bare particular itself. The individuality of a bare
particular is so tightly tied to what it means to be a bare particular that it would be
incorrect to view bare particulars as possessing a property that grants individuality (and
not merely because bare particulars, by definition, don’t have intrinsic properties). A bare
particular “is just that entity which is a constituent of one and only one ordinary thing.
Thus it accounts for the difference between any one ordinary thing and all others”
(Hausman and Wilson 1967, p. 42).9 In short, bare particulars are self-individuating.
The bare particular view is similar to bundle theory except that it adds one additional
ontological component to objects. Instead of objects being a bundle of properties with,
perhaps, some metaphysical tie that binds them together, objects are bundles of properties
bound, possibly by a metaphysical tie, to a bare particular. Still, the addition of the bare
particular allows this view to avoid some of the objections against bundle theories of
individuation. On the bare particular view, the difference between two qualitatively
identical objects “is accounted for by each containing a different individual; the sameness
by each containing literally the same characters” (Allaire 1963, p. 3). Thus one, alleged,
advantage of the view is that it grounds both the difference and sameness of qualitatively
9Here ‘ordinary thing’ means anything other than a bare particular. It’s just a, perhaps oddly phrased,
way of indicating that a bare particular doesn’t have other bare particulars as constituents.
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identical objects. So the universals version of the bare particulars view avoids the first
objection against the universals version of bundle theory; it can make sense of qualitatively
identical yet numerically distinct individuals. Moore’s version of the objection makes it
clear why that is the case. The problem was that the only thing predicates (or properties)
can attach to is other predicates on the bundle theory. But on the bare particular view
predicates attach to a bare particular, so we don’t get the contradictory identifications we
saw with the bundle theory (e.g. identifying a white square with a black square).
The universals version of the bare particulars view also avoids the need to explain why
certain complex universals count as individuals whereas others do not. All and only
complex universals that are instantiated (i.e. are associated with a bare particular) are
individuals. However, the bare particulars view faces a very similar problem. On the one
hand, we could say that all objects are individuals or, equivalently, that all instantiated
properties must be attached to a bare particular. On the other hand, we could allow for the
existence of non-individuals by allowing that some bundles of instantiated properties are
not attached to bare particulars. But then, we require an explanation of why some bundles
of instantiated properties are associated with bare particulars whereas others are not. Note
that the objections to bundle theory wouldn’t reoccur in this case because those objections
all stemmed from, in one way or another, the idea that bundles of properties are
themselves individuating. So these objections would not apply to the idea that there are
non-individuals that are merely bundles of properties. Defenders of non-individuality
would, of course, prefer the latter option. But then we get a new form of Gracia’s
objection: why do some properties attach to bare particulars whereas others do not? So the
bare particulars view avoids Gracia’s objection to bundle theory only by either insisting
that all objects are individuals or by creating a new, and similar, explanatory need.
The bare particulars view also avoids the remaining three objections to bundle theories as
well. It has no problem with, because it has no need to, explaining what individuates
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tropes and it doesn’t imply that all of an object’s properties are essential properties
because the particular properties an object has have nothing to do with why it’s an
individual. Finally, bare particular views do not confuse individuation with discernibility,
nor do they confuse individuality with distinction or difference. Bare particulars are not
discernible and do not render qualitatively identical objects discernible. And while bare
particulars can account for difference they need not be viewed as individuated as a result
of accounting for difference, and so needn’t conflate individuality with difference.10
I will now turn to a number of objections to the bare particulars view. The first objection is
an epistemic worry. If the bare particulars view were correct, then we would not know if
there were any cases for which it was needed to account (Meiland 1970, p. 261). Meiland
is understanding the bare particulars view as aimed at explaining numerical difference and
is claiming that the view makes it impossible to have a criterion for determining numerical
difference in the case of qualitatively identical objects. Note that Meiland isn’t conflating
the alleged metaphysical grounds of numerical difference with the epistemic issue of how
we would determine numerical difference. The problem is that we can’t, according to
Meiland, know whether the philosophical problem the bare particulars view is trying to
solve is actually a genuine problem because we never have any grounds for treating
qualitatively identical objects as numerically distinct. Even in the case of spatially
separated qualitatively identical objects we have no evidence that they are two objects
rather than one scattered object because what makes two objects two objects is that they
are numerically distinct bare particulars; spatial separation isn’t relevant. Note that
Meiland isn’t relying on any specific view of composition in making his criticism. The
problem is that those who want to explain numerical difference by way of bare particulars
aren’t in a position to reject the possibility of scattered objects. A scattered object, on their
10For some recent defenses of bare particulars see (Sider 2006), (Pickavance 2014), (Garcia 2014),
(Connolly 2015), and (Perović 2017).
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view, is a composite object with spatially separated parts unified by a single bare
particular. Without epistemic access to bare particulars there is no way to rule out the
existence of such objects. In short, on the view Meiland is criticizing, how many objects
are present is entirely a matter of how many bare particulars are present independently of
any principles of composition one might accept.
If we can’t determine whether numerically distinct yet qualitatively identical objects exist
in the first place, then we can’t determine whether the explanatory need the bare
particulars view is meant to satisfy even exists. So, the bare particulars view is, in a sense,
self-defeating in that its truth makes it impossible to know whether its explanatory target
(accounting for numerical difference of qualitatively identical objects) is actually
something that needs explaining in the first place.
While I agree with this criticism, it is important to note that it only targets bare particulars
views that, strictly speaking, don’t address the problem of individuation. As we saw in the
last chapter, the problem of accounting for numerical difference and the problem of
individuation are not the same. It is possible for a solution to the problem of individuation
to also account for numerical difference. However, there is no need for the problems to be
connected in that way. Adopting a bare particulars solution to the problem of
individuation while denying that bare particulars ground numerical difference allows one
to avoid Meiland’s objection. In fact, a defender of non-individuality who wanted to adopt
a bare particulars view to explain the metaphysical grounds of individuality would have to
deny that bare particulars grounds numerical difference. If they didn’t then there could be
no more than one of any given non-individual since non-individuals, on this view, are not
associated with bare particulars.
A second objection to bare particular views of individuation is that they are circular
(Rosenkrantz 1993, pp. 99-100). Rosenkrantz also talks about the bare particular view in
terms of diversity and provides the following criterion: “(P2) At time t, a particular x is
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diverse from a particular y =df. There exists a substratum S such that: (i) at t x is
supported by S, and (ii) at t y is not supported by S” (Rosenkrantz 1993, p. 84). Here ‘x is
supported by S’ means that S serves as the bearer of properties of x. Or, more succinctly,
that S is the bare particular for x. He goes on to point out that because a bare particular is
a particular, it must also be individuated by a substratum.
But such a state of affairs is incoherent. An ordinary particular is alleged to be
some sort of combination of a substratum and properties. However, since a
substratum is “bare”, it seems that there could not be a substratum which is
itself some sort of combination of a substratum and properties. Thus, there
could neither be a substratum which is supported by another substratum, nor
be a substratum which is supported by itself.11
I must admit I can’t see how the difference between ordinary and bare particulars is
supposed to imply the conclusion. Although I’m not sure that matters as there’s a problem
that prevents this line of reasoning from getting off the ground in the first place. The
problem is that Rosenkrantz has mischaracterized the bare particulars view. The
circularity arises because, according to Rosenkrantz, diverse bare particulars themselves
must be individuated by something else. According to (P2) what it means for particulars
to be diverse is for them to each have their own substratum. Consequently, diverse bare
particulars must each have their own substratum. But defenders of bare particulars reject
(P2) as a description of their view. Bare particulars are self-individuating. It is only
non-bare particulars (i.e. bundles of properties attached to a bare particular) that require a
substratum. One could perhaps criticize the idea that bare particulars are
self-individuating. But that’s not what Rosenkrantz is doing. He’s claiming, incorrectly,
that defenders of bare particulars accept that diverse bare particulars are individuated by
11(Rosenkrantz 1993, p. 99).
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their own substratum. Recognizing that bare particulars are self-individuating the
circularity objection can’t get off the ground.
A third objection is that the bare particular view “solves the problem of the individuation
of objects by fiat, but at the expense of generating impenetrable mysteries” (Lowe 2005, p.
86). This is a common objection, but the objection itself is somewhat mysterious in that
there is a lack of details about (i) why the bare particulars view only solves the problem by
fiat and (ii) why the alleged mysteries are mysteries at all. Lowe doesn’t go into any detail
regarding (i) but he, unlike most authors, does offer some insight into (ii). It is largely
taken as intuitively obvious that the bare particulars view amounts to nothing more than a
statement that the problem of individuation has an ontological solution and that the name
of the ontological component that solves the problem is ‘bare particular.’ The bare
particulars view differs from the previous views we’ve looked at insofar as it relies on
transcendental argument. The idea is that in order for the world to be the way it in fact is,
bare particulars are necessary. If we accept that there are individuals and that there must
be some metaphysical grounds of individuality, and if we accept that neither relations nor
qualitative monadic properties can individuate objects, we’re already committed to some
sort of non-qualitative metaphysical grounds of individuality. It certainly seems incorrect
to say that the bare particulars view solves the problem of individuation by fiat if we have
reasons to think that there is a non-qualitative metaphysical solution. That solution must
either be in terms of non-qualitative properties such as haecceities, of must be in terms of
something that’s both non-qualitative and not a property. Furthermore, as I already
explained, the bare particular view is essentially just bundle theory with an ontological
addition that addresses all of the major objections to bundle theory. So, one reason to
accept the bare particulars view is by accepting both the motivations for accepting bundle
theory and the objections to bundle theory. Whatever one thinks of the bare particulars
view it is has plenty of principled motivation.
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It is also not clear what the alleged mysteries are supposed to be, or why they are
supposed to be insoluble. We saw two ‘mysteries’ above that are both based on
misconceptions. The first based on conflating the problem of individuation with the
problem of accounting for numerical difference and the second based on misrepresenting
the view such that bare particulars need their own substrata for individuation. But beyond
that the literature contains brief unexplained claims about the mysteriousness of ‘bare
particulars’. I’m very unsympathetic to mere claims that a view is unacceptable merely
because it is unintuitive. Consequently, I’m very unsympathetic to mere claims (as
opposed to arguments) that bare particular views of individuation are unacceptable
because bare particulars are mysterious. Such objections should clearly state what
mystery needs to be explained and provide some reasons as to why an explanation is
required in the first place. Explanations have to stop somewhere so any calls for
explanations regarding bare particulars (such as asking for some further explanation of
what individuates bare particulars) should be paired with an argument for why such an
explanation is necessary. In the absence of such an explanation we are in no position to
determine whether the potential problem (i) is actually a problem and (ii) is a problem
with the bare particulars view or a problem with the intuitions of the objector.
Lowe claims that since bare particulars lack properties “it is something of a mystery how
they manage to ‘support’ the properties of the objects whose subtratra they are’ (Lowe
2005, p. 86). So this is a little better than merely saying that bare particulars are
unacceptable because they’re mysterious. It points to a specific explanatory need although
doesn’t provide any reasons as to why an explanation is required. There are two parts to
the objection. One of them is simply that the notion of ‘support’ needs to be clarified. The
other part is that there is something about a bare particulars lack of intrinsic properties that
creates a concern about the prospects for clarifying the notion of ‘support’. This second
part of the objection isn’t spelled out and it strikes me as strange to suggest that something
that is meant to serve as a property-bearer would require properties to serve that purpose.
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The request for an explanation of the notion of ‘support’ is reasonable and is a version of
what French and Krause call the problem of describability which I will discuss at the end
of the section.
A fourth objection, often referred to as the ‘classic objection,’ is that it’s nonsensical to
suppose that something without properties could exist. While some defenders of bare
particulars have claimed that bare particulars have no properties whatsoever, most
defenders of bare particulars do not accept that claim. While bare particulars lack intrinsic
properties, they have properties in virtue of instantiating properties. A bare particular has
no essential properties, but any actually existing bare particular has the properties it
instantiates. There are different proposals for explaining precisely in what sense bare
particulars are considered to have properties (see (Bailey 2012) for an overview), but
what’s important is that, with the exception of a few specific versions of the bare
particulars view, the classic objection is confused (see (Sider 2006) for more detailed
discussion of the confusion). Some people, such as Bailey, still object that the
explanations of the ways in which bare particulars are alleged to have properties only
avoid the mystery of positing a genuinely propertyless substance at the expense of
creating new mysteries (Bailey 2012, p. 35). However, Bailey notes that it’s not
satisfactory to object in this way and goes on to provide a more detailed objection.
Bailey’s updated version of the classic objection grants that bare particulars have
properties and asks whether or not they have the properties of ‘host substances.’ He
contends that bare particulars are untenable regardless of the answer. Consider a tomato.
Answering ‘no’ to Bailey’s question means that the bare particular associated with the
tomato doesn’t instantiate the properties of a tomato and, as a result, doesn’t exemplify
being a tomato (Bailey 2012, p. 36). This is a problem because bare particulars are
supposed to explain how objects have properties. An object is supposed to have properties
because one of its constituents is the bare particular that instantiates those properties. So
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answering ‘no’ to Bailey’s question, according to Bailey, leaves the bare particular view as
unmotivated. Unfortunately for Bailey, this simply isn’t true. Explaining why objects have
properties isn’t the only thing the bare particulars view is meant to do, one could adopt a
bare particulars view as a solution to another problem while maintaining that it doesn’t
explain why objects have properties. One could adopt bare particulars merely as a means
to solve the problem of individuation and could even hold that there is no need to explain
why objects have properties. It could be accepted as a (metaphysically grounded) brute
fact that objects have properties. So, one horn of Bailey’s dilemma only holds against
views that claim that the only role of bare particulars is to explain why objects have
properties.
On the other hand, answering ‘yes’ to Bailey’s question leads to a crowding problem.
Consider our tomato again. Our tomato has all the properties that make something a
tomato. But the bare particular associated with that tomato also has all the properties that
make something a tomato. So we actually have two tomatoes. The bare particular is a
tomato and the combination of the bare particular with the bundle of properties it
possesses is a second tomato. Bailey considers and responds to a few objections, but he
doesn’t consider what I take to be the most serious objection to his argument. His
argument relies on the idea that what it is to be an object of a certain kind is just to have a
certain set of properties. This is why he claims that, in addition to the regular bare
particular + properties tomato, we have a second tomato that is simply the bare particular.
Recall that properties are not constituents of bare particulars even though, with our ‘yes’
answer, the bare particular is considered to possess those properties. This is what allows
Bailey to take the bare particular by itself as counting as a tomato.
The problem I see with Bailey’s argument is that it seems to conflate the bare particulars
view with bundle theory. If I accept bare particulars, why would I accept that being a
tomato is only a matter of possessing the right set of properties? Instead, I would claim
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that being a tomato amounts to having the right set of properties bundled together via
instantiation by a bare particular. The whole point of positing bare particulars
over-and-above bundles of properties is to solve (alleged) problems that arise from
viewing objects merely as bundles of properties. But to take something to be an object of
a certain kind merely by possessing the right bundle of properties is to, at least partly,
defeat the purpose of proposing bare particulars in the first place. This is true even if we
agree with Bailey that the only motivation for bare particulars is to explain how objects
can have properties. Being a tomato isn’t just about having the right bundle of properties
because, according to the bare particular view, we can’t have a tomato, or any ordinary
object at all, if all we have is a bundle of properties. So while a defender of bare
particulars can, and probably should, accept that what makes an object the kind of object
it is depends on the set of properties it possesses, there is still more to it in virtue of the
fact that free-floating bundles of properties don’t exist. To put it another way, being a
tomato isn’t merely a matter of satisfying the kind conditions for the kind tomato, but also
satisfying conditions on being a concrete particular. It is satisfying the latter conditions,
given the ontology of bare particular theory, that requires that being a tomato amount to
more than merely having the right set of properties. If being a concrete particular is a
matter of being a bundle of properties instantiated by a bare particular, then we only have
one concrete particular. If a tomato is a concrete particular, then we only have one tomato.
So, my claim that being a tomato amounts to having the right sets of properties bundled
together via instantiation by a bare particular isn’t merely a way to avoid Bailey’s
objection. It’s what a defender of bare particulars already accepts in order for the bare
particulars to do the metaphysical work they are intended to do. Consequently, Bailey’s
argument is yet another based on confusion. Answering ‘no’ doesn’t remove all
motivation for positing bare particulars because explaining why objects have properties
isn’t the only metaphysical work bare particulars are meant to do. And answering ‘yes’
166
doesn’t lead to Bailey’s crowing problem because his argument depends on a claim that
that no defender of bare particulars would accept.12
But not that responding to Bailey’s argument in this way undermines the ability to view
non-individuals as bundles of properties lacking a bare particular. If a concrete particular,
like a cloud, is a non-individual lacking a bare particular, then being a concrete particular
can’t require the possession of a bare particular. So, we end up with a dilemma for
defenders of bare particulars views. Either Bailey’s argument fails for the reasons I
described and the existence of concrete, particular non-individuals is impossible or the
existence of concrete, particular, non-individuals is possible and Bailey’s argument
succeeds. Of course, one way to avoid the dilemma is to accept an alternative response to
Bailey’s argument.
Ultimately, despite the unpopularity of bare particular views, there’s a surprising lack of
definitive, or even on target, objections to such views. An inclination for metaphysical
parsimony may be largely responsible for this state of affairs. It may be viewed as the
burden of defenders of bare particulars to explain why bare particulars are a fruitful
addition to our ontology. Combining this with a widespread acceptance that the reasons
offered for accepting bare particulars fails to satisfy that burden, then we can make sense
of at least one possible reason for the lack of worked out objections in the literature. I
myself don’t favor the bare particular view. However, I see no issues with the
transcendental and bundle theory based motivations for positing bare particulars and so
see no reasonable way to personally deny that defenders of bare particulars haven’t
satisfied this burden. On top of that, the only worked out objections to bare particulars that
I can find in the literature are based on confusions. Those confusions aren’t always on the
part of objectors, but also resulting from defenders of bare particulars conflating the
12For another criticism of Bailey’s argument see (Pickavance 2014).
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problem of individuation with another problem. But, unlike with the metaphysical
grounds I’ve looked at previously, avoiding these conflations, as far as I can tell, answers
all existing objections to the bare particular view. That’s not to say that there are no
legitimate undiscovered objections, including ones that may be more devastating than
those we’ve seen regarding the other views. But in terms of existing objections the bare
particular view of individuation stands out as the clear frontrunner at this point regardless
of my own intuitions. If I could turn my intuitions into arguments against the view, then
perhaps it wouldn’t fare nearly as well. But I won’t treat my intuitions as arguments. The
world is the way it is regardless of what I think about it so mere intuitions, including my
own, do not constitute good reason to discount a view. To sum up “[t]he complaint about
“bare particulars” is mostly confusion; and in the rest, there is no solid argument against
the substratum theory” (Sider 2006, p. 395)
However, there are two major problems with bare particulars views. The first was
mentioned at the beginning of this section. On a bare particulars account of individuation
either all objects are individuals or we need to explain why only some objects are
associated with bare particulars and others (non-individuals) are not. Since I take things
such as clouds not to be individuals, and defenders of the ‘Received View’ think particles
are not individuals, we would both require an explanation as to why things such as clouds
or particles aren’t associated with bare particulars whereas objects such as people and
laptops are. In a sense, if both individuals and non-individuals exist then the bare
particulars view doesn’t actually solve the problem of individuation. A further distinction
between individuals and non-individuals is needed to explain why bare particulars are
associated with the former and not the latter, but if such a distinction can be provided then
what do we need the bare particulars for? The issue here is a metaphysical one and it
relates to the additional role as property bearers that bare particulars are meant to have.
Why is it that individuals need a property bearer and non-individuals do not? If it’s
possible for there to be non-individuals and if to be a non-individual is to lack a bare
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particular, then there are objects that are just bundles of properties not attached to a bare
particular. So then why posit an individuator that also serves as a property bearer as
opposed to an individuator that doesn’t serve as a property bearer (like a haecceity)? If
individuals and non-individuals both exist, then bare particulars have a redundant
metaphysical role on top of serving as individuators. The issue here is a matter of
simplicity. Even though one could say that bare particulars don’t need to serve as property
bearers, why accept this addition to our ontology when a property (like a haecceity) will
do?
There is at least one response open to the bare particular view. They could claim that all
and only non-composite objects are individuals possessing bare particulars. Then
composite objects could have their properties in virtue of the properties of their parts.13
But if allowing for the existence of non-individuals requires claiming that all composite
objects aren’t individuals, then that is a difficult position to defend. It requires explaining
away all paradigm examples of individuals. Perhaps proponents of the bare particulars
view could say that composite objects are individuals in virtue of being composed of
individuals. But that leads us right back to the objection because again every object is an
individual.
The second major problem is what French and Krause call the problem of describability
(French and Krause 2006, p. 12). If we accept an account of individuality that counts as a
transcendental account (see chapter two), then how are we to explain, in positive terms
rather than negative terms, the nature of the individuator? There are no positive
descriptions of bare particulars in the literature. They are described by pointing out what
they lack; namely, intrinsic, or essential, monadic properties. But that doesn’t actually tell
us what a bare particular is. I don’t think this, by itself, is a good enough reason to set
13Though it is worth noting that this position is incompatible with the existence of holistic properties
since the properties of the composite object supervene on the properties of its parts.
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aside the bare particular view. However, a non-qualitative account of individuality that
avoids the problem of describability would have an advantage over the bare particulars
view. However, I think the previous objection is sufficient to dispense with the bare
particulars view. As long as both individuals and non-individuals exist, there seems to be
little hope for a bare particulars account of individuation.
5.5 Are Objects Individuated by Haecceities?
A haecceity is “the property of being identical with a certain particular individual—not
the property that we all share, of being identical with some individual or other, but my
property of being identical with me” (Adams 1979, p. 6). A haecceity is a non-qualitative
property that is meant to serve as a metaphysical individuator without either postulating a
new type of entity, such as a bare particular, or adopting any particular view of objects,
such as bundle theory. In addition to a haecceity being different from the property of being
identical with something, or some individual, haecceities are distinct from the properties
of “(ii) being an x such that (∃y)(x = y), or (iii) being self-identical, or (iv) being an x such
that x is identical with x” (Rosenkrantz 1993, p. 3). None of these properties are
non-qualitative because none of them have to do with a specific particular. The haecceity
that an object has is the property of being identical with that specific object token.
Furthermore, none of these qualitative properties seem like good candidates for
individuators because all individuals, and perhaps non-individuals as well, have these
properties whereas a haecceity is a property that is unique to each individual.
Before moving on to look at the pros and cons of individuation by haecceities, I should
distinguish this view from the doctrine of haecceitism. “If two worlds differ in what they
represent de re concerning some individual, but do not differ qualitatively in any way, I
shall call this a haecceitistic difference. Haecceitism is the doctrine that there are at least
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some cases of haecceitistic difference between worlds. Anti-haecceitism is the doctrine
that there are not” (Lewis 1986, p. 221). My primary reason for distinguishing the
existence of haecceities from the doctrine of haecceitism is that there are reasons to think
that the latter is incompatible with quantum mechanics (Huggett 1999). But as Huggett,
and Lewis, point out,
[H]aecceitism is neither necessary nor sufficient for haecceities. For instance,
in two identical worlds of individuals that maximally violate the Identity of
Indiscernibles—so that all the individuals in both worlds are in identical
states—both worlds represent the same of any individual, and so haecceitism
fails. But there could still be nonqualitative properties differentiating the
individuals. On the other hand, differences in representation de re do not have
to be explained in terms of haecceities, for they could be brute metaphysical
facts.14
Consequently, arguments to the effect that haecceitism is incompatible with quantum
mechanics do not rule out the possibility that objects, including particles, are individuated
by haecceities. Haecceitism is, essentially, the doctrine that there are, or at least there
could be, modal differences that are not grounded in qualitative properties. But haecceities
serving as individuators need not imply that there could be any such modal differences.
The existence of haecceities is compatible with anti-hacceitism; modal differences may
always be grounded in differences in qualitative properties even if some non-qualitative
properties, such as haecceities, exist.
The motivations for proposing haecceities as individuators are the same as those behind
proposing bare particulars. We accept that being an individual or not is a metaphysical,
not merely linguistic, fact that must have some kind of ontological grounds. We then rule
14(Huggett 1999, pp. 7-8).
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out theories of individuation based on relations and qualitative monadic properties. This
forces us to consider non-qualitative ontological grounds for individuality. Haecceities
aren’t as metaphysically revisionary as bare particulars since there are simple and
observable non-qualitative relational properties. So haecceities aren’t a new class of
entities, at least not in the same way that bare particulars are. Even if one doesn’t view
non-qualitative relational properties as genuine parts of our ontology over-and-above the
qualitative properties that ground them, it’s less revisionary to claim that they are genuine
parts of our ontology than it is to postulate propertyless substances. The most revisionary
part of the haecceities proposal is that it postulates the existence of monadic
non-qualitative properties. Additionally, haecceity based views of individuality also avoid
the objections against bundle theory for the same reasons as the bare particular view. And,
similar to the bare particular view, supposing that there are both individuals possessing
haecceities and non-individuals lacking haecceities creates a need to explain why some
objects and not others possess hacceities.
None of the views we’ve looked at seem to work particularly well with the existence of
non-individuals save for spatiotemporal theories. With the bundle theory it’s not clear that
it’s coherent to take that as our theory of individuation and also accept the existence of
non-individuals. And the bare particulars and haecceities views both have an explanatory
burden created when we need to account for individuals. Still, I think the haecceity view
is the one defenders of non-individuality should favor. It avoids not only the objections to
accounts based on relations or qualitative monadic properties but, more importantly, it
actually addresses the problem of individuation. As we saw above, accounts based on
relations or qualitative monadic properties address problems that are related to the
problem of individuation, but don’t actually address the problem of individuation when the
problems are carefully distinguished. Additionally, the bare particulars view only seems to
address the problem of individuation if either there are no non-individuals or all composite
objects are non-individuals. I don’t think the explanatory burden belongs to defenders of
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the ‘Received View’ insofar as myself, and many others, also accept the existence of
non-individuals (e.g. clouds). So even if I think that particles are individuals, I still have to
explain how things such as clouds can be non-individuals and so need to explain either
why clouds lack haecceities or why clouds aren’t associated with a bare particular.
I think haecceity based views of individuation have two advantages over bare particulars
views. The first, which I already mentioned, is that it’s less revisionary. Aside from
illegitimate or confused calls for explanation from the bare particulars view, there is still a
need to explain what bare particulars are. However, while bare particulars are open to the
problem of describability, haecceities are not. A haecceity is a non-qualitative property
and a haecceity based account of individuation is a transcendental account. However, we
can explain what a haecceity is in positive terms. French and Krause treat the problem of
describability as a general problem for transcendental accounts, however, it’s really only a
problem for some transcendental accounts. They phrase the problem in terms of an
inability to provide a list of attributes and, as a result, the problem only comes up when
the proposed individuator lacks attributes to list. Hence why bare particulars fall prey to
the objection and haecceities do not.
The second reason to favor a haecceity based account of individuality over a bare
particulars account is that it should be much easier to explain why some objects lack
haecceities as opposed to explaining why some objects aren’t associated with bare
particulars. For one thing, bare particulars are supposed to be what properties attach to. In
addition to solving the problem of individuation they are meant to explain a metaphysical
distinction underlying the difference between subject and predicate. That explanatory
aspect of the bare particulars view is lost if there are subjects (i.e. non-individuals) that are
not bare particulars. This is a problem even for one who doesn’t think the
subject-predicate distinction corresponds to a metaphysical distinction of this sort insofar
as it removes some of the motivation for postulating bare particulars in the first place.
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Additionally, if the subject-predicate distinction doesn’t play any role in how we should
interpret our physical theories, then this motivation for positing bare particulars is also lost
in considering whether particles are individuated by bare particulars. But, more
importantly, there is nothing mysterious that needs explaining in terms of some objects
possessing and others lacking a property. There may be an epistemic issue about how we
determine what is and what isn’t an individual, but we don’t normally think that the fact
that objects with property X exist and that objects without property X exist calls for an
explanation as to why the former objects have X and the latter do not. In short, the
explanatory burden of explaining the difference between individuals and non-individuals
is a genuine burden for the bare particulars account but can only be seen as a genuine
burden for the haecceities account by confusing epistemology for metaphysics.
Furthermore, just because haecceities serve as individuators doesn’t preclude the
possibility of there being criteria for what is or isn’t an individual. I defended such criteria
in the previous chapter in the form of conditions that are logically necessary and jointly
sufficient for individuality. This actually provides a means for understanding Dorato and
Morganti’s primitive thisness as something other than a metaphysical claim lacking an
ontological truth maker. We could say that to possess a haecceity is just to possess the
properties of relative indivisibility, formal immiscibility, and ontological autonomy. I’m
not sure they’d want to go this route. While these latter properties would be qualitative it’s
not clear that they are sensibly understood as actual properties that objects could possess.
The first two would be formal modal properties regarding what could or couldn’t be done
to an object without changing its form (e.g. without changing the kind of object it is). So
going this route requires defending the existence of de re modal properties. It’s also not
clear that any of these properties could be understood as intrinsic properties. If they were
relational properties, then we’d get into the problems we saw with spatiotemporal
accounts of individuation. Consequently, if we’re going to take haecceities as
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individuators, I think it makes the most sense to treat them as properties rather than as
Dorato and Morganti’s primitive thisnesses.
The literature on haecceities is much sparser than that on bare particulars and most of the
recent literature on haecceities has nothing to do with the problem of individuation. For
example, Gary Rosenkrantz’s 1993 book Haecceity: An Ontological Essay has 65
citations, the vast majority of which have nothing to do with the problem of individuation.
Rosenkrantz’s positive argument for haecceities takes the form of criticism of alternative
views along with, where applicable, demonstrations of how using haecceities as
individuators avoids those criticisms. Additionally, similarly to the situation with bare
particulars, the few worked out objections to haecceities don’t stand up to scrutiny. The
few objections in the literature are all discussed by Rosenkrantz and there have been no
new objections, as far as I can tell, since then. Consequently, I will discuss the objections
in the same order as Rosenkrantz.
The first objection is that there is something problematically trivial about using haecceities
as individuators. As Rosenkrantz points out, there is some variation here that all occurs
with one particular premise. The general argument, which I will follow Rosenkrantz in
referring to as Argument C, is as follows:
(C1) The haecceity of a particular, a, is the property of being identical with a,
and to say that a has this property is to say that a is identical with a...
(C2) If a particular is individuated by its having a haecceity, then the diversity
of particulars at a time can be analyzed in terms of a particular’s bearing
the relation of identity to itself at a time...
(C3) The diversity of particulars at a time cannot be analyzed in this way,
since any attempt to do so suffers from (familial) triviality...
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(C4) A particular is not individuated by its having a haecceity.15
In addition to this version of the argument, there are four variations that involve changing
the first premise. The problem with this first version of the argument is that either (C1) is
false or else we have no reason to think that (C2) follows from (C1). (C1) is ambiguous
because we can mean different things when we say ‘a is identical with a.’ “This
expression refers to either a relational statement ... or an attributional statement
(Rosenkrantz 1993, p. 107). The former way of understanding the statement has us
ascribing to a the qualitative relation ‘ being identical with .’ Rosenkrantz views this
as a qualitative property being ascribed to a whereas I don’t view it as a metaphysical
statement at all (recall my discussion of self-identity in the previous chapter). However,
what’s important is that understanding (C1) in this way misrepresents haecceities.
Haecceities are non-qualitative properties, and the relation of self-identity, property or not,
is qualitative. Granted, (C1) understood in this way does seem to imply (C2), but it
doesn’t matter because (C1), on this understanding, is also false. If instead we understand
a is identical with a as indicating that a possesses the non-qualitative property of being
identical with a, then it’s not clear how (C2) is supposed to follow. How does an object
possessing a haecceity imply that diversity of particulars can be analyzed in terms of a
relation of self-identity?16 It’s not obvious that it follows on Rosenkrantz’s metaphysical
understanding of self-identity and less obvious if we view ‘a is identical with a’ as merely
a logical truth with no metaphysical import (as I view it).
I will now turn to the four variations of the argument. My purpose in looking at these
variations is to clarify what haecceities are not by rejecting a number of problematic
attempts to explicate the property of being identical with a. What is important for my
15(Rosenkrantz 1993, pp. 106-107).
16Because (C3) is the rejection of the idea that the diversity of particulars can be analyzed in this way, the
analysis referred to in (C2) must be one that is only available due to the presence of haecceities.
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purposes is just to note that the property of being identical with a is not to be understood in
any of the senses proposed below. However, I do include discussion of why the proposals
are incorrect rather than merely asserting that the property of being identical with a should
not be understood in any of these ways. The first variation replaces (C1) with:
“(C1a) The haecceity of a particular, a, is the property of being identical with a,
and this property is identical with the ordered pair of a and the identity
relation” (Rosenkrantz 1993, p. 108).
This variation avoids the problem of identifying a haecceity with something qualitative
since the ordered pair makes reference to a particular object. But it’s not clear how the
combination in an ordered pair of a qualitative identity relation could have the features of
a haecceity. Rosenkrantz notes that haecceities can be exemplified whereas an ordered
pair can’t be and that ordered pairs have elements whereas haecceities do not. Haecceities
and ordered pairs have different features and so can’t be identical.
In the next variation we have:
“(C1b) The haecceity of a particular, a, is the property of being identical with a,
and this property is identical with a collection (sum) of a and the identity
relation” (Rosenkrantz 1993, p. 109).
This proposal claims that haecceities include particulars as parts. The terminology is a bit
strange here since a mereological sum of one object is just that object. But setting the
terminological point aside, Rosenkrantz claims that the problem with this proposal is that
haecceities are abstract entities and, as such, cannot have particulars as parts (Rosenkrantz
1993, p. 109). I disagree with Rosenkrantz that haecceities are abstract entities and I think
a response to (C1b) needn’t rely on whether haecceities are abstract entities or not. It
already seems to be wrong to say that a particular object can be part of a property. More
specifically, it seems to be putting the cart before the horse to say that objects are parts of
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the properties they possess rather than that properties are parts of objects (assuming
parthood is the right way to think of the relation between objects and properties in the first
place). Defenders of the (C1b) version of Argument C need, at minimum, to explain both
how a particular object could be part of any of the properties it possesses.
The penultimate version is:
“(C1c) The haecceity of a particular, a, is the property of being identical with a,
and this property is identical with the property of being an x such that x
is identical with a” (Rosenkrantz 1993, p. 109).
Rosenkrantz’s objection to (C1c) is somewhat involved, and unnecessarily complicated
insofar as there’s a simpler objection which Rosenkrantz already raised against (C1).
(C1c) has left behind any reference to the identity relation that (C2) refers to.
Consequently, just as with (C1) understood in the attributional sense, it’s not clear how
(C2) is supposed to follow. How does identifying a haecceity with the property of being
an x such that x is identical with a lead to (C2)? If the proper connection can’t be
established with the identity relation, then (C2) doesn’t follow.
Rosenkrantz’s objection to (C1c) focuses on a specific argument in its defense. The
argument notes that the properties identified in (C1c) are necessarily coinstantiated and
claims that any two properties that are necessarily coinstantiated are the same property.
Rosenkrantz refers to this latter claim as committing one to a ‘coarse grained view of
property identity’ (Rosenkrantz 1993, p. 110) and goes on to explain why a fine-grained
view of property identity is preferable. But we can avoid that debate entirely by noting
that we have no reason to think that (C2) follows from (C1c).
The last version of the argument uses the premise:
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“(C1d) The haecceity of a particular, a, is the property of being identical with a,
and this property has a and the relation of Identity as logical
constituents” (Rosenkrantz 1993, p. 114).
Here we have a return of the identity relation which makes it less mysterious how (C2) is
supposed to follow. This proposal differs from (C1b) in that it does not suggest that
haecceities have particulars as actual parts. The proposal is that the properties of
being identical with a and being identical with a are the same property.
Rosenkrantz explains (C1d) as follows:
An advocate of (C1d) maintains that the idea behind this premise can be
understood from the Fregean perspectives of linguistic expression, sense, and
reference. From the perspective of linguistic expression, a name such as
‘being identical with a’ is created from the predicate ‘ is identical with ’
by “plugging in” two names ‘a’ and ‘b’ to produce the sentence ‘a is identical
with b’, “plucking out” ‘a’, and nominalizing the result. From the perspective
of sense, it is impossible to grasp the sense of ‘being identical with a’ without
grasping the senses of the identity predicate and the name ‘a’. From the
perspective of reference, the compound relational property of being identical
with a derives from a’s being “plugged” into the right hand variable position
in the relation, being identical with , resulting in the monadic attribute
being identical with a.17
These three perspectives provide three different approaches to defending (C1d).
The idea from the linguistic expression perspective is that we can read off the metaphysical
constituents of properties by looking at the structure of property-designating expressions.
17(Rosenkrantz 1993, p. 114).
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Rosenkrantz doesn’t mention any particular defenders of this line of reasoning; likely
because it’s too obviously flawed. Otherwise, to use Rosenkrantz’s example, the property
of being a believer in Santa Claus has Santa Claus as a constituent.
The idea from the sense perspective is that if I must grasp A and B in order to grasp C,
then A and B must be constituents of C. I’m not sure that’s right, but even if it is it seems
that we can grasp an objects haecceity without grasping the sense of the identity relation.
Rosenkrantz defends this possibility using his distinction between relational and
attributional understandings of a is a. One can have the attributional belief that a is a, and
so attribute a haecceity to a, without thinking that a stands in a relation of identity to itself.
Similarly, one can think that a stands in a relation of identity to itself without thinking that
it has a haecceity (Rosenkrantz 1993, p. 115). Many people think the latter, including
French and Krause, whereas anyone that thinks self-identity isn’t a metaphysical relation
but accepts the existence of haecceities will think the former. Whatever the relation
between the concept of a haecceity and the concept of self-identity, they can come apart.
Indeed, it’s not clear, as I’ve mentioned before, how they are supposed to be connected in
the first place.
Finally, it’s not clear what the idea behind the reference perspective is. I should note,
however, that the unclarity isn’t so much a feature of Rosenkrantz’s discussion as it is that
the notion of “plugging” he borrows from Edward Zalta isn’t sufficiently explicated.
“Plugging” is a technical term that refers to “a putative logical analog of the linguistic
operation of partially saturating a multi-place predicate with a name” (Rosenkrantz 1993,
p. 114). In order for this approach to differ from the approach from linguistic expression,
there has to be a genuine difference between the logical operation of partially saturating a
multi-place predicate with a constant and the linguistic operation of partially saturating a
multi-place predicate with a name. Not only that, but that difference must be
metaphysically salient if it’s going to lead to the conclusion that haecceities are to be
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identified with the identity relation with a constant plugged in. Rosenkrantz’s use of the
word ‘putative’ suggests he isn’t convinced that there’s a difference and I should note that
Rosenkrantz doesn’t endorse this argument. He presents it as an alternative way that
someone what might defend (C1d) before arguing that this sort of defense of (C1d) leads
to a contradiction regardless of how we understand “plugging”. However, Rosenkrantz’s
argument depends on viewing haecceities as abstract entities.
Since I don’t view haecceities as abstract entities this leaves me with no counterargument
to (C1d). There is the issue of what it means for a non-qualitative property to have the
object to which it refers as a logical constituent. I don’t think such a view is obviously
problematic like the view that haecceities have the object to which they refer as a part. But
there still seems to be something backwards about the proposal. At the very least it seems
potentially circular to claim that a is an individual because it has a haecceity and that this
individuating haecceity has a as a logical part. My arguments from chapter four, however,
do allow me to formulate an objection here. That objection is simply that haecceities can’t
serve to individuate if they are to be understood as (C1d) suggests because the identity
relation isn’t a sufficient condition for individuation.
These objections have all claimed that haecceities can’t serve to individuate (C4).
However, there is one more set of objections that claim that haecceities are impossible.
Some of these objections are very similar to those we’ve seen above and fail for similar
reasons. For example, one such objection relies on (C1b) in conjunction with the claim
that abstract objects can’t have concrete objects as parts. It might seem question begging
to use the same response to (C1b) here since that response was essentially this argument in
reverse. Abstract objects can’t have concrete objects as parts and so a haecceity can’t have
a concrete object as a part. But (C1b) misrepresents the view it is attempting to refute.
There’s no point postulating non-primitive haecceities to serve as individuators if the
qualitative properties that the objectors are proposing as the components of haecceities in
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(C1) and its variations could do the work haecceities are meant to do. If a haecceity is
non-primitive, it must be something over and above its constituents if it’s going to do any
metaphysical work that those constituents can’t do. Consequently, there’s something
peculiar about trying to take a reductionist approach to haecceities, or to treat defenders of
haecceities as viewing them in a reductionist way. They couldn’t just be what these
objectors are claiming them to be. A haecceity is the property of being identical with a or
b, etc., for objects a, b.... Rosenkrantz considers a revised form of this objection that
avoids this problem (Rosenkrantz 1993, p. 125).
Instead of claiming that haecceities include concrete particulars as parts, the revised claim
is just that haecceities, being non-qualitative, must be intimately related to concrete
particulars in a way that doesn’t make sense. After all a haecceity is always associated
with one specific concrete particular. Rosenkrantz notes that the sense in which the
haecceity and concrete particular are intimately related isn’t made clear. There is also no
explanation of why the alleged problematic relation is actually problematic. If there are
such things as sets of concrete objects then there are abstract entities with an intimate
relation to concrete objects insofar as they have those objects as elements (but not as parts
or constituents) (Rosenkrantz 1993, p. 125). And, I mentioned previously, there are
completely unmysterious non-qualitative relational properties (e.g. the property of owning
a particular piece of land). So, it can’t be the case that properties are problematic simply
in virtue of making reference to specific particulars. Ultimately, this objection amount to
the intuition that there is something strange about intrinsic non-qualitative properties (so
I’ve responded to it previously).
The other objections to the effect that haecceities are impossible are similarly question
begging. They rely on claims such as (i) “[n]ecessarily, if P is a property, then an
individual’s conceiving P does not entail his conceiving of a particular concretum”
(Rosenkrantz 1993, p. 126), (ii) “[n]ecessarily, if P is a property, then P is possibly
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exemplified by something, x, and P is possibly exemplified by something, y, which is not
identical with x” (Rosenkrantz 1993, p. 127), (iii) “[i]t is impossible that an abstract entity
has contingent existence” (Rosenkrantz 1993, p. 128), and (iv) “[n]ecessarily, a property is
possibly grasped” (Rosenkrantz 1993, p. 128). (i) and (ii) are simply statements that there
are no such things as non-qualitative properties. (iii) is the claim that a certain kind of
relation between abstract entities and concrete particulars isn’t acceptable (although one
needn’t accept that haecceities are contingent entities even if they are abstract since one
can accept the existence of uninstantiated abstract entities). Still, (iii) is question-begging
insofar as we’re given no reason to think abstract objects couldn’t exist contingently.
Finally, while one could defend the view that haecceities can all be “possibly grasped,”
(iv) seems to embody a kind of epistemic arrogance that sometimes lies behind the
dismissal of “metaphysically suspect” entities. While one could challenge the use of
haecceities as individuators using these four claims, they can’t be the starting point of
those arguments. Each of these claims would need its own independent defense.
5.6 Are Objects Individuated by Matter or Form?
The next two metaphysical grounds I want to look at rely on a distinction between matter
and form. The material theory of individuation states that objects are individuated by the
matter that they possess whereas the formal theory of individuation states that objects are
individuated by their substantial form. These views have received even less attention than
haecceities but, I think, for good reason.
The idea behind the material theory is that “[i]t is in the nature of matter to be unshareable
and, therefore, all material things are rendered individual by it” (Gracia 1988, p. 156).
Gracia notes a number of problems with this view but leaves aside what I think is the
biggest issue. According to the material theory of individuation all material objects are
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individuals. There’s no distinction between composite and non-composite objects as far as
individuality is concerned since being made of matter is what makes something an
individual. Clouds, for example, would count as individuals. Gracia doesn’t consider this
a problem and, as we’ll see in the next section, Gracia takes clouds to be individuals. But
my discussion in the previous chapter shows that clouds do no satisfy the logically
necessary and sufficient conditions for individuality.
Gracia’s main concern with the material theory is that it’s not clear how matter itself is to
be individuated ((Lowe 2005) raises this worry as well). If we have two marble statues it
can’t be that “marble” accounts for the individuality of each statue; it must be that this
marble accounts for the individuality of one and that marble accounts for the individuality
of the other (Gracia 1988, p. 156). To deal with this problem defenders of the material
theory have added additional features that play a role in individuating objects. This
additional feature has either been the actual dimensions of the object in question or merely
the fact that material objects always have particular dimensions. In the first case, what
individuates the two statues is the actual dimensions each statue has. There are two
obvious problems here. One is that the statues could have the same dimensions. The other,
which Gracia mentions, is that the actual dimensions an object has are accidental features
(this may not be true for elementary particles, but it seems true for any composite material
object–there are no perfectly rigid bonds between particles). It seems to defeat the
purpose of a theory of individuation to invoke accidental features as individuators. How
can an object be individuated by features that it needn’t possess? In the second case, what
individuates the statues is that a piece of marble must always have particular dimensions.
This isn’t an accidental feature, but this doesn’t seem to solve the problem it’s intended to
solve. The marble of both statues has the feature that it must have some physical
dimensions or other and so we are still left wondering what it is that individuates the
statues.
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The idea that objects are individuated by matter plus its actual dimensions demonstrates
another major problem with the material theory of individuation. It’s not actually a theory
of individuation at all but rather a theory of difference. It conflates the problem of
individuation with the problem of accounting for difference and tries to provide a solution
to the latter. It isn’t trying to explain why a given marble statue is an individual rather it is
trying to explain why any two marble statues are distinct. And it is reasonable, I think, to
explain difference in terms of accidental features. At least for qualitative difference.
Explaining numerical difference in terms of accidental features requires PII. The view still
fails as an account of difference if the accidental feature in question is the actual
dimensions of objects because different objects can have the same dimensions. But if no
two objects could have the same dimensions then perhaps one could explain why there are
two objects by appealing to their actual dimensions.
The formal theory of individuation locates the metaphysical grounds for individuation in
an objects substantial form. “A form is a structural principle, and a substantial form is the
structural principle that determines the fundamental (i.e., necessary and sufficient) features
of a substance” (Gracia 1988, p. 158). In other words, the formal theory of individuation
says that what individuates objects are the necessary and sufficient conditions for being
the kind of object that it is. The standard, and obvious, objection to this view is that “the
very notion of form, as opposed to matter, is the notion of what is shareable by and
common to many” (Gracia 1988, p. 158). If we have two identical spheres and we want to
know what makes sphere A an individual it can’t be its sphericity “for its sphericity cannot
be what makes the sphere the very sphere that it is” (Lowe 2005, p. 81). Gracia doesn’t
view this objection to the formal theory as conclusive because one could appeal to ordinal
forms such as “the first man born in space” (Gracia 1988, p. 159). But it strikes me as
question begging to, essentially, individuate people based on birth order. More
importantly, birth, or creation, order is an accidental feature as well, so this response fails
for the same reasons as using matter along with an object’s actual dimensions.
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The formal theory of individuation can be viewed as a more restricted version of bundle
theory that picks some particular subset of features as individuators rather than all of an
object’s features. But it still leads to the problem that all objects are individuals since
every object is an object of a given kind. Some of the objections against bundle theory
also apply here. But I still think the most problematic issue is that it tries to locate
conditions of individuality in kind criteria. It’s understandable in the sense that it’s
difficult to specify bundles of features to serve as individuators in a non-arbitrary way.
One at least can’t object that there’s something arbitrary about bundles of properties that
constitute the essential features of a given kind of object. But the focus on kind suggests
that the formal theory is concerned with discernibility rather than individuation, just as the
full-blown bundle theory is. What individuates two objects of the same kind if the relevant
properties are all and only the essential properties those objects all share?
5.7 Are Objects Individuated by Existence?
The final theory of the metaphysical grounds of individuality that I will look at is the
existential theory of individuation developed by Gracia. The theory states that “existence
is the principle of individuation for all individuals” (Gracia 1988, p. 170) and that
existence is not a property. The reason for the latter claim is that existence, understood as
a property, would be something possessed by every existing object leading to the question
of what individuates one object’s property of existence from another. If, instead, we
understand existence as something unique to each object, then, according to Gracia,
there’s no need to explain what individuates existence. “Existence” here refers to some
ontological component of objects that is unique to each object like a haecceity. However,
unlike a haecceity, it is not a property. It is also not a substance like a bare particular. The
idea that existence is not a property is uncontroversial, however, the idea that existence is
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an ontological feature of objects is controversial. Gracia’s view is very similar to the bare
particulars view with ‘bare particular’ being replaced by ‘existence’ and ‘substance’ being
replaced with some new unexplained ontological category. Arguably this is just a
modification of the bare particulars view such that it is confusing for Gracia to use the
term ‘existence’. The difference from the bare particulars view seems to be only that
‘existence’ doesn’t serve as a bearer of properties and doesn’t serve to explain the
subject-predicate distinction. So it may be best to understand Gracia’s proposal as simply
a variant of the bare particulars view in which two of the metaphysical roles assigned to
bare particulars have been removed leaving only the role of individuator.
As with the regular bare particulars view, Gracia’s view faces the problem of
describability. Other than saying that existence is not a property of objects, Gracia says
nothing else about what sort of thing it is. It is described entirely in negative terms and
that description is even more sparse than that given to bare particulars. Consequently,
there is nothing more I can say about the kind of thing existence is beyond it being an
ontological component of objects that is neither a property nor a substance. That the bare
particulars view and Gracia’s view both face the problem of describability may explain
why it’s difficult to distinguish between them aside from the difference in metaphysical
roles they are meant to play. At worst, the problem of describability might ensure that
there can be no substantive difference between Gracia’s view and the bare particular view.
Much of what Gracia says implies that he sees what he’s referring to by ‘existence’ as
closely related to the ordinary sense of the term as seen, for example, by his concern
(discussed below) with the objection that there are possible individuals that don’t actually
exist. For my purposes it may not matter whether we can get clear on precisely what
Gracia’s proposal is. If it is just a modification of the bare particulars view, then it is one
that doesn’t avoid the objections I raised against the view in the preceding section. If, on
the other hand, it is not merely a modification of the bare particulars view then it still faces
the problem of describability and the issue that my arguments in favor of existence of
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non-individuals in chapter four constitute counterarguments (i.e. my conditions on
individuality imply that there are non-individuals, such as clouds, and so imply that a view
that implies that clouds are individuals, or more generally that there cannot be
non-individuals, is incorrect).
The existential theory of individuation shares the same advantages that the non-qualitative
approaches have. It avoids the objections leveled at theories that attempt to ground
individuation in qualitative properties (either relational or monadic properties). It avoids
creating a demand for an explanation of the individuation of the proposed individuator
because existence, just like bare particulars and haecceities, isn’t shareable. A lot of the
objections to views based on qualitative properties arise because such properties are
shareable leading to difficulties in explaining the uniqueness that is a feature of
individuals. Similar to the bare particulars and haecceities views, the positive case for the
existential theory of individuation is that it avoids objections facing alternative views
while, allegedly, not facing any devastating objections itself. Although I agree with
French and Krause that the problem of describability is a significant problem and it is one
faced by both the bare particular and existence-based accounts.
There are three major objections to the existential theory of individuation. The first is that
non-existing entities can be individuals as well. The objection is a modal one regarding
the possible existence of individuals that don’t actually exist. It claims that the existential
theory of individuation is incompatible with the idea that it’s possible for there to exist
individuals that don’t actually exist. Gracia provides two answers to this objection. The
first is that the existential theory needn’t be compatible with possible individuals because
even if they would be individuals if they did exist, they are not individuals if they don’t
exist (Gracia 1988, pp. 172-173). His reasoning behind this is based on claiming that the
only candidates for possible individuals are “(1) composites of universal features that as
such are instantiable; or (2) mental images of individuals that have actually existed”
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(Gracia 1988, p. 172). In the case of (1) there seems to be no reason to think that a
collection of uninstantiated universals is an individual even if an individual could
instantiate that collection of universals. The same is true even if properties are tropes.
Why would a collection of uninstantiated but coinstantiable tropes count as an individual?
In the case of (2), existence can explain why the individual was an individual.
Gracia doesn’t provide any reasons for thinking that (1) and (2) exhaust everything we
might mean by ‘possible individual’ beyond claiming that his experience suggests that
actual references to possible individuals is always about such cases. Although Gracia
gives an example of the possible existence of a silver dollar that wasn’t actually minted, he
leaves aside such cases. In addition to (1) and (2) we have (3) individuals that could exist
but don’t exist. Gracia must be treating these as instances of (1) which is a bit strange
given that he rejects the bundle theory. But I think there is a more straightforward response
that works for cases (1) and (3), even if (3) is treated as distinct from (1). This response is
simply that there is no such thing as a possible individual. Since what we’re talking about
here is the metaphysical grounds of individuality a ‘possible individual’ in this context
must possess some actual ontological component that grounds its individuality.
To be a bit more precise, I think this objection conflates two different issues. It conflates
the issue of possessing the logically necessary and sufficient conditions for individuality
with possessing the metaphysical grounds for individuality. To object that an account of
the metaphysical grounds for individuality doesn’t allow for possible individuals is to
commit oneself to some form of modal realism. Even though the possible individual
doesn’t actually exist, the objector would have to take the ontological grounds for its
individuality to exist in order to object in this way. Any individuals that don’t exist on a
given account of the metaphysical grounds of individuality fail to exist because the
metaphysical grounds for their individuality fails to exist. To object that a given account
of the metaphysical grounds of individuality doesn’t allow for certain kinds of individuals
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is to claim that the metaphysical grounds for the individuality of those individuals does, or
at least could, exist. But what would could it mean to say that the metaphysical grounds
for the individuality of a given possible individual exist without adopting modal
realism?
I wonder if what’s going on is that the objector is expecting an explanation of the
metaphysical grounds of individuation to set the logically necessary and sufficient
conditions of individuality. Or, put another way, I wonder if the objector is conflating the
question of what the intension of ‘individual’ is with the question of what the metaphysical
grounds of individuation are. In that case proper target of the objection would be the
conditions discussed in preceding chapter rather than the metaphysical accounts being
discussed here. Recall on Gracia’s account that what it means to be an individual is to be
non-instantiable. Possible individuals are non-instantiable (on the assumption that
properties aren’t individuals as Gracia claims) and so Gracia’s position allows for possible
individuals. It’s just that those individuals don’t exist in the ordinary sense of the term and
also don’t possess existence in Gracia’s special sense of the term. To object that Gracia’s
proposed metaphysical ground of existence doesn’t allow for possible existence is to
confuse one of the roles given to the condition of non-instantiability for a role meant for
the metaphysical grounds of individuality. One could certainly object that Gracia’s
‘existence’ should play the role of determining the conditions of individuality. However,
that’s a different objection. The objection here isn’t that Gracia has misassigned roles but
that by his own lights his theory doesn’t allow for possible individuals. On Gracia’s view,
a merely possible individual is an individual that satisfies his definition of individuality as
non-instantiability but doesn’t exist (and so lacks the metaphysical grounds for
individuality).18 An actual individual exists in addition to satisfying the definition.
18But note that Gracia isn’t allowing for possible individuals in a modal realist sense.
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The additional answer Gracia gives, which I will only briefly mention for the sake of
completeness, is that we could distinguish between actual existence, possible existence,
and impossible existence and allow the first two both to serve as individuators (Gracia
1988, pp. 173-175). This response applies only to the modal realist version of the
objection and not the version that conflates the logically necessary and sufficient
conditions for individuation with the metaphysical grounds of individuation. While the
idea of possible existence is controversial and would need to be defended, it isn’t
something a modal realist should take issue with.
The second objection is that “the same individual may cease to exist at one time and begin
to exist later at another time and that in this case it would have two separate existences”
(Gracia 1988, p. 175). This objection simply begs the question. Existence is not a property
that is multiply instantiable such that the individual in question could have existence1 as a
property when it first exists and existence2 as a property when it comes back into
existence. Suppose this objection were raised against the haecceity view of individuation.
In order for the individual to be the same individual at both times it exists on the haecceity
view would be to have the very same haecceity both times. For it to be an individual both
times and possess a different haecceity both times would be for it to be two different
individuals at those times. For the objector to insist that the same individual would have
two different haecceities, on the assumption that the haecceity view of individuation were
correct, is to beg the question. The same is true with respect to existence. Why think that
the ontological component of an individual to which ‘existence’ refers would be different?
If you combine the idea that existence individuates with the idea that existence is a
property, then it makes sense why the individual in the example would have two separate
existences. There would either be two individual existence tropes, or two instances of an
existence universal being instantiated that are, somehow, individuated. But if existence is
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not a property, then it’s not clear why an individual that exists for some time, ceases to
exist, then begins to exist again would have two separate existences.19
The final objection is also based on a confusion. It states that “if existence is responsible
for making “man” this or that man, then it cannot be the principle that makes “man” this
man rather than that man” (Gracia 1988, p. 176). The objection is that if existence is what
makes an instantiation of “man” into this man rather than merely a man, then existence
can’t account for why this man is different than that man. But this is to conflate the
problem of individuation with the problem of accounting for difference (Gracia 1988, p.
176). Existence is what makes a given object an individual regardless of whatever else
exists including other instances of the same kind of object. A principle of individuation
isn’t meant to account for difference, even though some principles of individuation could
do so. Making “table” into this table is all that a principle of individuation needs to do in
order to address the problem of individuation. However, as stated before, a principle of
individuation will serve to account for difference, at least among individuals, in a universe
that contains more than just a single, simple individual.
5.8 PII Revisited
Before wrapping up this chapter I would like to return to PII and discuss the three
concerns I had mentioned in chapter three. The first of these concerns has to do with the
relationship between identity and individuality. We saw in chapter four that there doesn’t
seem to be any sensible metaphysical understanding of self-identity as a relation to ground
metaphysical claims of self-identity. There also doesn’t seem to be a sensible way of
19I’m assuming here that there is a way to understand Gracia’s position without existence collapsing into
some other account of individuation, such as a spatiotemporal account.
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understanding the denial of self-identity understood as a relation. One could claim that
self-identity serves as a logically necessary and sufficient condition for individuality, but I
didn’t discuss that option (despite such conditions being the focus of that chapter) because
that would imply that everything is an individual. One could say that self-identity refers to
a non-relational ontological feature of objects, but then we’re talking about bare
particulars, haecceities, or primitive thisness. We also saw that there is a difference
between a criterion of identity and a principle of individuation, and that the former isn’t
necessary for the latter.
How does this create a problem for PII? Recall that PII states that objects that are
qualitatively identical are numerically identical. Not only do we need a connection
between identity and individuality for the failure of PII to have implications for
individuality, we need the right kind of connection since, as I stated in chapter two, it is
possible to conceive of individuals that fail to satisfy PII. But it looks to me like there’s no
connection at all. Additionally, since the failure of PII implies a lack of numerical identity
it is numerical identity or lack thereof that must be relevant to individuality. So, it must be
the case that objects that possess numerical identity are individuals and objects that lack
numerical identity are not individuals. But the failure of PII doesn’t imply that there is any
single object that lacks numerical identity. That is, it doesn’t imply that our, say, ‘two’
qualitatively identical bosons ‘are’ really one boson that lacks numerical identity. It
implies that one boson is not numerically identical with a distinct boson that is
qualitatively identical. Don Howard puts the point this way, “even if one accepts the
conclusion that, owing to their indiscernibility, two bosons are not individuals, in spite of
their difference in spatial situation, this lack of individuality does not come in the form of
the bosons’ being numerically identical” (Howard 2011, p. 228). If bosons aren’t
individuals the reason for this can’t be a matter of numerical identity. Consequently, it’s
not clear that PII has any role at all in this debate.
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Looking at my second concern with PII may help clarify why PII is often invoked. The
second concern is that people often conflate the problem of individuation with the
problem of accounting for difference. We saw that in the metaphysics literature both with
some proposed solutions to the problem of individuation that were really addressing the
problem of accounting for difference and with some misguided criticisms of proposed
solutions that really do address the problem of individuation. I said before that the
problem of individuation still needs to be addressed in a one object world, or in a world in
which there are no qualitatively identical objects. That the problem of individuation still
arises in these situations makes it clear “both that the principle of the indiscernibility of
identicals and that the principle of the identity of indiscernibles are exactly what their
names indicate: principles about identity, and, hence, principles belonging to the problem
of differentiation. But they are not principles pertaining to the problem of individuation”
(Castañeda 1975, p. 133). If one conflates the problem of individuation with the problem
of accounting for difference, then it makes sense, given how often the conflation seems to
occur, why PII is often invoked in discussions about the former. But indistinguishability
does not imply a lack of individuality nor does distinguishability imply
individuality.
French and Krause, for example, state that distinguishability and individuality are two
different things but don’t seem to realize the implications for PII. Howard notes the
tension here when he says “French and Krause stress the importance of noting a
distinction between individuality and distinguishability, so what is assumed cannot be a
definition of individuality as distinguishability. Instead, what seems to be assumed is
something that one might dub the ‘Principle of the Non-Individuality of
Indistinguishables”’ (Howard 2011, pp. 228-229). It seems to me that assuming such a
principle would be question begging in two ways. First, it simply asserts that elementary
particles are non-individuals and second it merely assumes that there is a relation between
distinguishability and individuality that is such that indistinguishables are not individuals.
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Consequently, the conflation between distinguishability and individuality results in
misguided arguments from a failure of PII to a lack of individuality whose question
begging nature is obscured by the fact that defenses of the failure of PII for particles are
mistakenly viewed as defenses of the actually undefended Principle of the
Non-Individuality of Indistinguishables.
The final issue is that of the conflation of metaphysical and logical notions of identity.
Identity understood as a relation that obtains between an object and itself seems to be a
purely logical relation that does not correspond to any metaphysical fact. In other words,
identity statements of the form ‘x = x’ are true in virtue of their logical form not in virtue
of the existence of some metaphysical truth maker.20 The failure of PII, understood as
implying that some objects lack the metaphysical grounds for individuality, confuses
metaphysical identity with logical identity. In other words, the mistake here is to think that
an object’s lack of numerical identity (which, as I said, a failure of PII doesn’t actually
imply) is some sort of metaphysical fact. Note that this issue is distinct from the first issue
because the problem there was the lack of connection between numerical identity and
individuality. One could provide an argument for a connection between numerical identity
and individuality that doesn’t explain how to understand the falsity of statements of the
form ‘x = x.’
20If one thinks that ‘Pegasus=Pegasus’ is false because ‘Pegasus’ doesn’t refer, then part of what makes
identity statements true are that the objects they refer to exist. In this case, identity statements are not true
merely in virtue of their logical form. However, those who want to characterize non-individuals as objects
that lack self-identity won’t find any assistance here. They need to make sense of how statements of
self-identity can fail to apply to existing objects.
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5.9 Conclusion
The primary purpose of the previous chapters is to demonstrate that there are sensible
ways to understand the logically necessary and sufficient conditions for individuality such
that (i) there exist both individuals and non-individuals, and (ii) there are sensible
metaphysical grounds that are compatible with (i).
So how does my discussion fare with respect to these goals? Self-identity fails to satisfy
(i) since, understood as a logical condition it is incoherent to suppose that something
could lack self-identity. So, the only coherent account of individuality based on a criterion
of self-identity would imply that all objects are individuals. Synchronic and diachronic
identity fail to satisfy (i) insofar as they are unsatisfactory as criteria of individuality.
Distinctness also fails to satisfy (i) since two putative non-individuals would be
numerically distinct and so would actually be individuals. At best, using distinctness as a
criterion is compatible with the existence of one non-individual of any given kind if the
condition on distinctness is relativized to kind. Finally, the condition of non-instantiability
also fails to satisfy (i). Since any particular object is not instantiable every particular
object would be an individual.
The conditions of formal immiscibility and relative indivisibility satisfy (i); they imply
that things such as rabbits are individuals whereas things such as clouds and piles of rice
are not individuals. The condition of ontological autonomy also satisfies (i), even without
being paired with formal immiscibility and relative indivisibility, since some things are
ontologically autonomous whereas others aren’t. Although, without the other conditions
things that shouldn’t be counted as individuals, like clouds, are counted as individuals. So
although I concluded that these three conditions are the appropriate logically necessary
and sufficient conditions independently of criterion (i), they are the only conditions we’ve
looked at that seem to be compatible with the existence of both individuals and multiple
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non-individuals of the same kind. Defenders of non-individuality also require that (i) be
satisfied by their preferred account of individuality. They couldn’t deny that individuals
exist altogether because then the metaphysical import of the lack of individuality of
particles and its alleged role in explaining quantum statistics would be lost. Put another
way, if classical particles aren’t individuals then the lack of individuality of quantum
particles can’t explain the difference between classical and quantum statistics.
Consequently, for the sake of the ‘Received View’ (and its primary defense, the argument
from quantum statistics), classical particles had better be individuals. So defenders of the
‘Received View’ require (i) to be satisfied and that seems to require accepting some
combination of the conditions of formal immiscibility, relative indivisibility, and
ontological autonomy as the logically necessary and sufficient conditions for
individuality.
Spatiotemporal relations are, I think, unsuitable as individuators for the reasons I
mentioned previously, but at least spatiotemporal relations satisfy (ii). If spatiotemporal
relations individuate then there can be both individuals and non-individuals. And it may
even give the correct answers as to what is and what is not an individual. At the very least,
there seems to be room on a spatiotemporal account to explain why things like piles of
rice and clouds are not individuals due to the object as a whole not possessing a unique
spatiotemporal trajectory. Although there would be the worry about the possibility of a
pile of rice or cloud that does happen to possess a unique spatiotemporal trajectory. So
spatiotemporal relations may not satisfy (ii) in its intended sense if it would end up
implying that clouds sometimes are and sometimes aren’t individuals dependent on
whether they happen to mix with other clouds at some point during their existence.
We saw already that neither the bundle theory nor bare particulars allow for
non-individuals. Bundle theory appears to be incompatible with the existence of
non-individuals since there seems to be no way to explain what a non-individual would
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even be if objects are individuated by the complete set of properties they actually possess.
Bare particulars are incompatible insofar as the they wouldn’t solve the problem of
individuation if we need to further explain why some objects are associated with bare
particulars and some other objects aren’t. Or, in other words, if we have to explain why
some objects are individuals and other objects are non-individuals. All material objects
would be individuals on the matter theory of individuation and all objects that are of some
kind or other (i.e. all objects besides bare particulars) would be individuals on the formal
theory of individuation. Finally, if existence is our individuator then, again, there is no
room for non-individuals.
Consequently, if we require that there are both individuals and non-individuals then our
options for the metaphysical grounds of individuality seem to be reduced to either
spatiotemporal relations or haecceities. If we further require that things such as clouds
aren’t individuals and if the spatiotemporal account can’t avoid treating them as
individuals some of the time, then hacceities seem to be the only option.
While philosophers have considered, and endorsed, the possibility of non-individuals in
the past, the possible, or actual, existence of non-individuals has been largely absent from
contemporary debates over both the logically necessary and sufficient conditions for
individuation and the metaphysical grounds of individuation. Allowing for the existence
of non-individuals seems to clear away a lot of the views on these issues. This perhaps
explains why French and Krause developed a new account of individuation in terms of
self-identity. But combining the requirement that our theory allow for both individuals and
non-individuals with my criticisms of the coherence, or lack thereof, of self-identity as an
individuator, we seem to be left with criteria that seem to imply that particles are
individuals as well as a metaphysical ground that is applicable to particles.
As in chapter four it is likely unclear what my contributions are in this chapter.
Particularly since I spend significantly more time in this chapter merely describing what
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other philosophers have said. I see myself providing three major contributions in this
chapter. The first is determining which accounts of the possible metaphysical grounds of
individuality are compatible with Chauvier’s conditions. This dissertation is just as much
a work of analytic metaphysics as it is a work in philosophy of physics. Consequently,
while many philosophers of physics may not be concerned with whether there are
metaphysical grounds compatible with the conditions of individuality that I defend, it is
something metaphysicians would be very much concerned with.
The second major contribution is determining which existent accounts of the possible
metaphysical grounds of individuality are compatible with the existence of
non-individuals. Not merely because both myself and the defenders of non-individuality
would require such metaphysical grounds (assuming that we accept that individuality does
need metaphysical grounding), but because as long as there are sensible accounts of
non-individuals we should take care that our metaphysics doesn’t dismiss such accounts
out of hand.
The third, and final, major contribution is my attempt to defend metaphysical grounds that
are generally unpopular among philosophers of science. I do this partly by criticizing
Dorato and Morganti’s attempt to restrict their category of the naturalistically acceptable
non-qualitative to metaphysically minimal brute facts. I also do this partly by providing
responses to a number of objections to the bare particulars view and supplementing
Rosenkrantz’s discussion of objections to haecceities with a few responses of my own.
Part of the reason for this is simply so that I’m not relying entirely on my analysis of
individuality and my acceptance of the existence of non-individuals in evaluating these
accounts. Part of it is that I accept one of these unpopular views myself (i.e. the existence
of haecceities that serve as individuators). But part of it is that the motivation for this
entire work is that I think it both important and worthwhile to pay attention to the work of
metaphysicians on these issues. In this work I’ve provided not only a new argument in
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favor of particles being individuals (primarily discussed in the next chapter) but an
argument that seems to be different in kind from the arguments we saw in chapter two. An
argument that arose from paying attention to the sorts of issues pertaining to individuality
that metaphysicians focus on.
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Particles as Individuals
6.1 Individuality in Quantum Mechanics
Having looked at the arguments in the philosophy of physics literature for and against
particles being individuals; some challenges, again coming from the philosophy of physics
literature, against these views; what it means for something to be an individual and the
logically necessary and sufficient conditions for individuality from the metaphysics
literature; and the possible metaphysical grounds for individuality, I am now in a position
to bring everything together.
I want to begin with a small review of some of the things discussed in the previous
chapters. First, let us return to the arguments for particles as non-individuals. The first
argument was based on an alleged difference between the labeled tensor-product Hilbert
space formalism and the Fock space formalism. But, as we saw, the apparent lack of
labels in the Fock space formalism is just that; an “apparent” lack resulting from the fact
that the Fock space formalism is compatible with the occupation number representation.
It’s not that the Fock space formalism suggests that particles are not individuals it’s
merely that the Fock space formalism can, but needn’t, be represented in a way in which
particles are not explicitly treated as individuals.
The second argument was that the non-individuality of particles explains quantum
statistics. One may therefore think that my commitment to the view that particles are
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individuals comes with an obligation to provide an alternative explanation for quantum
statistics. I don’t think I have such a commitment nor do I have an alternative explanation.
However, I can provide an additional reason to think that the explanation must be
something other than non-individuality. In explaining why quantum statistics differs from
classical statistics what is being explained is why quantum particles display different
dynamical behavior than classical particles. But this immediately leads to the question:
“why would a particle’s being an individual or not have any implications for its dynamical
behavior?” Any proposed metaphysical underpinnings of the difference between classical
and quantum statistics must come along with an explanation of why those underpinnings
are something that would have implications for the dynamical behavior of particles. In the
case of individuality, it’s not clear why being an individual or not should have anything to
do with a particle’s dynamical behavior. This isn’t to say that there could be no such
explanation, only that such an explanation would need to be provided. If individuality
isn’t the sort of thing that influences dynamics, then the sort of explanation being offered
isn’t the right kind of explanation.
Consequently, it’s unclear whether an explanation in terms of non-individuality is even the
right kind of explanation for the difference between classical and quantum statistics let
alone whether it’s a successful explanation of that difference. So while I can’t provide an
alternative explanation of the difference between classical and quantum statistics, I can at
least say that we have reason to think that an explanation in terms of non-individuality is
the wrong sort of explanation (absent an explanation of the connection between
individuality and dynamics).
Additionally, recall that the permutability that non-individuality is invoked to explain may
not be a difference between classical and quantum particles. Saunders provided reason to
think that classical particles are permutable as well. And Belousek provided reason to
think that the permutability of quantum particles is not necessary to derive quantum
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statistics in which case it seems that the explanation for quantum statistics needn’t depend
on permutability nor the non-individuality invoked to explain it. Similarly, Morganti
argues that the only statistically relevant properties for many particle systems are inherent
properties that are insensitive to permutations. In short, we have a number of reasons to
question whether permutability is relevant to the difference between classical and quantum
statistics. Therefore, we have a number of reasons to question whether non-individuality,
whose role in the argument from quantum statistics is to explain permutability, is relevant
to the difference between classical and quantum statistics.
I provided some defense of the idea of weak discernibility as a transcendental argument
for the individuality of particles. If weak discernibility is something over and above mere
numerical distinctness and if the weakly discerning relations that apply to all fermions and
to all bosons are physically meaningful, then there must be something about the world in
virtue of which particles are weakly discernible rather than merely numerically distinct.
That something should be non-qualitative since weak discernibility isn’t grounded in
differences in qualitative properties.1 So weak discernibility suggests that particles are
individuals in virtue of possessing some non-qualitative something or other (a property, a
bare particular, etc...). However, there is a problem here. It’s the same problem with the
appeal to non-individuality to explain quantum statistics. Why would individuality or lack
thereof be the sort of thing that could ground a physically meaningful weakly discerning
relation? The problem doesn’t seem as pressing here since we have reason to think that
whatever explains weak discernibility would be non-qualitative and, I think, it’s
individuality being a non-qualitative matter that creates the explanatory issue. If
individuality were a qualitative matter, then we could look at how the relevant qualitative
properties function in our theory in order to look for a connection between individuality
1Granted the proposals for weakly discerning relations themselves are qualitative. But if we’re looking
for further explanation as to why such relations hold in the first place, there doesn’t seem to be anything else
qualitative that we could appeal to.
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and weak discernibility or between individuality and quantum statistics. If individuality is
non-qualitative then finding a connection is more difficult. But if what grounds weak
discernibility must be non-qualitative then, assuming weak discernibility is something that
needs to be grounded, then there must be a connection. Combining my discussion of weak
discernibility with my discussion of the possible non-qualitative grounds of individuality,
we can view the existence of physically meaningful weakly discerning relations, if there
are any that are in fact physically meaningful, as reason to accept hacceities.
6.2 Issues with Individuality in NRQM
In chapter three I looked at a number of issues with viewing particles as individuals or
non-individuals. These took the form of question that defenders of non-individuality need
to answer, and some proofs related to PII that may cause issues for defenders of
individuality.
The first issue for defenders of non-individuality was that they need to develop a notion of
cardinality that is appropriate for collections of non-individuals. Domenech and Holik’s
results may have already accomplished this. Recall that Jantzen’s criticism was that
Domenech and Holik’s definition of cardinality assumed self-identity. Consequently,
Domenech and Holik’s definition of cardinality would not be suitable for the dominant
particles-as-non-individuals view in which non-individuality is defined as lack of
self-identity. However, I don’t see this as a problem for defenders of non-individuality
since I don’t think they should be defining non-individuality as lack of self-identity (I
explained in chapter four why I think this is incoherent). So Domenech and Holik’s
definition of cardinality may be suitable for alternative particles-as-non-individuals views
although there are currently no such worked out alternatives.
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The second issue was that particle terms may be mass nouns and that mass nouns denote
individuals. I addressed this issue in chapter four. The conditions of formal immiscibility
and relative indivisibility ensure that mass nouns don’t denote individuals. Clouds, piles
of rice, bodies of water, collections of furniture, etc... may be made up of individuals, but
they themselves are not individuals. So, if particle terms are mass nouns, that does not
imply that particles are individuals nor does it imply that they are non-individuals. It
doesn’t even imply that collections of particles are not individuals because the conditions
of formal immiscibility and relative indivisibility don’t imply that any possible mass
nouns we could conceive of would describe non-individuals. Plenty of macroscopic
objects satisfy these conditions despite being composed of particles. This may be a reason
to think that particle terms are not mass nouns although whether particle terms are mass
nouns strikes me as an empirical matter.
The third issue was a collection of arguments to the effect that identity is fundamental and
therefore we should at least treat particles as individuals. But I have the same response
here as I did to the first issue. There is no problem for defenders of non-individuality here
because they shouldn’t be defining non-individuality as lack of self-identity. So even if
Bueno’s arguments from chapter three are correct, it’s only defenders of the view that
non-individuality is a lack of self-identity that need to be concerned.
So while I ultimately think examining what it means for something to be an individual and
looking at the possible metaphysical grounds of individuality favor a
particles-as-individuals view, that same examination removes all three of the challenges I
discussed in chapter three. Although, again, those challenges do cause problems for the
only developed particles-as-non-individuals view in which particles are non-individuals
because they lack self-identity.
Finally, the issue for defenders of individuality was not to defend accounts that were
incompatible with the various proofs regarding PII I discussed in chapter three. However,
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this isn’t really an issue because when it comes to individuality, PII is beside the point. PII
has to do with distinguishability and so the only accounts of individuality that run into
trouble here are those that either conflate individuality and distinguishability or connect
them in the right sort of way. Any of the views we looked at that didn’t make this
conflation didn’t connect individuality and distinguishability in any meaningful way (at
least not explicitly). And we saw in the preceding chapters why there shouldn’t be a
meaningful connection between the two. So the accounts of individuality that run into this
issue are not really accounts of individuality at all. Rather, they were accounts of
distinguishability. This is why I didn’t discuss this issue in chapters four and five. Its
targets are not accounts of individuality to begin with.
6.3 Particles as Individuals
Finally, I am in a position to address the issue of whether particles are individuals. On the
one hand is the question of whether particles satisfy the logically necessary and sufficient
conditions for individuality. On the other hand, is the question of what the provides the
metaphysical grounds of that individuality. I will look at each condition for individuality
in turn starting with relative indivisibility.
As I stated in chapter four, what is important here isn’t what it might mean to ‘divide’ or
‘mix’ particles since what matters isn’t whether the terms ‘divisibility’ or ‘miscibility’ are
appropriate. What matters for the case of relative indivisibility is whether there is a
physical process that takes one particle and turns it into two particles of the same kind.
Similarly, what matters for formal immiscibility is whether there is a physical process that
takes two particles and turns it into one particle of the same kind.
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Because elementary particles are not made of further more elementary parts, they cannot
violate the condition of relative indivisibility by being ‘broken’ into parts. So, leptons,
quarks, gauge bosons, and the Higgs boson appear to be relatively indivisible in virtue of
having no components to be broken into. One potential source of complication here would
be the fact that even elementary particles have decay pathways. Even if an elementary
particle decay into two particles of the same type were not, strictly speaking, a case of
relative divisibility, it would still be a problem. If a cloud breaks up into two clouds, we
can start asking questions like which cloud is identical with the original cloud. This is a
confused question, but it is so because clouds aren’t individuals. If an individual could
become two individuals of the same kind, whether through breakdown into components or
a particle decay process, then some of the confused questions we may ask about clouds
would demand answers. These are “which individual is which” sorts of questions which is
why they’re confused questions to ask about non-individuals.
Of course, there’s no genuine problem here because energy conservation prevents decay
processes in which one particle becomes two particles of the same type. It is, however,
possible for a two-step decay process to bring one from particle X to particles Y and Z
then back to particle X. For example, an up quark can decay into a down quark and a W+
boson after which the down quark could decay into an up quark and a W− boson, the W
bosons would then annihilate leaving only an up quark. However, that is not a violation of
relative indivisibility because the end result is only one particle of the original kind. Such
two-step decay processes may bring up the question of whether the resulting up quark is
the same individual as the original up quark or even whether the down quark is the same
individual as the original up quark. However, we would answer those questions by
looking at the metaphysical grounds of the particles’ individuality rather than the logically
necessary and sufficient conditions for individuality. The only way that conservation of
energy would allow a decay process that violates the condition of relative indivisibility
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would be if essential properties of particles were such that one particle could become two
particles of the same kind without violating energy conservation.
Conservation of energy ensures that relative indivisibility holds for composite particles as
well. No meson will decay into two mesons of the same type and no baryon will decay
into two baryons of the same type. Additionally, since mesons are composed of a quark
and an anti-quark, breaking them down into their constituents would yield one quark, one
anti-quark and no mesons. Similarly with the three quark baryons. Breaking a baryon
down into its constituents yields three quarks (since there are no two quark bound states
you wouldn’t end up with a two-quark particle) and no baryons.
So particles, whether elementary or composite, satisfy the condition of relative
indivisibility. They satisfy the condition in the ordinary sense of being indivisible into
further particles of the same kind unlike a pile of rice that can be divided into two more
piles of rice. They also satisfy a similar condition that takes into account particle decay
processes rather than mere breakdown into components.
Moving on to the condition of formal immiscibility we must consider whether two
particles can combine into a single particle of the same kind. Since such a process would
be the reverse of a process that violates relative divisibility, conservation of energy also
prevents violations of formal immiscibility. The only physical situation I’m aware of that
might be described as particles of a given kind combining into a single particle of that
same kind is in the case of a Bose-Einstein condensate (BEC). A BEC essentially behaves
as a single large boson. However, BECs only form under specific conditions. Combining a
bunch of bosons of the same type does not, by itself, result in the creation of BEC. To
form a BEC a dilute gas of bosons must be cooled to near absolute zero. Because of these
requirements, bosons are not formally miscible. The apparent miscibility of bosons in a
BEC is not something that follows merely from the kinds of things bosons are (i.e. it does
not follow from their form alone) but requires certain physical conditions in addition.
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Another way to put the point, physical miscibility is not sufficient for formal miscibility.
Being formally miscible is a matter of an object being miscible in virtue of the kind of
object that it is. Consequently, formally miscible objects should generally be able to ‘mix’
in the absence of physical conditions that prevent ‘mixing.’ They have ‘permission’ to
‘mix’ as long as nothing is preventing them from doing so, and so shouldn’t require very
specific physical conditions for ‘mixing.’ Consequently, any existing physical processes
that do result in two (or more) particles becoming one particle of the same or the reverse
would not be violations of formal immiscibility or relative indivisibility as long as those
processes require specific physical conditions to occur.2
However, there are still two additional issues. The first is whether the bosons forming the
BEC are combined in the right way to create an issue. A BEC is composed of a large
number of bosons whereas a cloud is not composed of a number of clouds. The behavior
of BECs suggests that they themselves are not individuals in the same way clouds are not.
In order for BECs to challenge the condition of formal immiscibility for bosons, they must
somehow blur the boundaries between the bosons that make them up. However, they do
not seem to do that as the aggregated bosons don’t ‘disappear into one another’ the way
mixing clouds do. Average particle number is conserved in a BEC and so saying that
bosons are not individuals because BECs don’t behave like individuals would be like
saying grains of rice aren’t individuals because piles of rice don’t behave like individuals.
Finally, the other issue is whether the BEC counts as a particle of the same kind as the
bosons that make it up. The answer seems to obviously be ‘no’ as a result of the BECs
composition and mass.
Some may find my discussion here unsatisfying insofar as the conditions of relative
divisibility and formal immiscibility are trivially fulfilled as a result of conservation of
2So if photon splitting experiments are accurately interpreted as involving splitting photons, then these
would still not be counterexamples to the condition of relative indivisibility.
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energy. But we need to keep in mind the distinction between the necessary and sufficient
conditions for individuality and the metaphysical grounds of individuality. I’m not saying
that conservation of energy grounds the individuality of particles, my claim here is an
epistemic one. We can tell that particles are individuals, that they satisfy the three
conditions of individuality, as a result of conservation of energy. I admit that grounding
the individuality of particles in conservation of energy involves a worry of triviality since,
arguably, the actual grounds of individuality in that case are just a matter of particles
having their mass as an essential, or defining, property (but see below).
The final condition is that of ontological autonomy (which was defined as an objects not
needing to be a proper part of another object in order to exist). Neither elementary
particles nor composite particles need to be a proper part of another object in order to
exist. Consequently, all particles are ontologically autonomous. The only apparent
challenges to the idea that particles are ontologically autonomous would, potentially, be (i)
the fact that quarks generally only exist in bound states outside of extreme conditions3 and
(ii) the existence of virtual particles. Whether virtual particles actually exist is a
controversial issue (see (Fox 2008) for an overview). In the case of quarks, what’s
important for the condition of ontological autonomy is that it be possible (in some sense
of possible) that the objects in question can exist without being parts of other objects.
Something that couldn’t possibly exist except as a part of another object doesn’t seem to
be a candidate for individuality. The condition of ontological autonomy is imposed to rule
out such cases as they are compatible with the other conditions of relative indivisibility
and formal immiscibility. Consequently, what is important is that quarks can exist outside
of bound states even if the conditions under which they do so do not generally
obtain.
3Quarks haven’t existed outside of bound states since the very early universe.
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The second challenge may not be much of one insofar as it is generally accepted that
virtual particles aren’t actual particles. However, let’s consider whether the existence of
virtual particles would challenge the condition of ontological autonomy. Whatever
explanation one may accept for the violation of mass/energy conservation involved in the
creation of virtual particles, it is agreed that the violation must be temporary. In other
words, whenever virtual particles are created, they must very quickly be annihilated. As a
result, one may think that there is a special relation of existential dependence between
virtual particles and the “real particles” from which they came; a relation that differs from,
say, the existential dependence relation between a person and their parents. However,
Chauvier’s move to distinguish ontological autonomy from the latter form of existential
dependence also distinguishes it from any form of existential dependence there might be
between virtual particles and the particles from which they come. Virtual particles are not
proper parts of other particles. So even if, say, an electron can sometimes exist as a virtual
particle it is still the case that electrons, both “real” and “virtual” satisfy the condition of
ontological autonomy.
The primary purpose of this dissertation was to defend the view that particles are
individuals and I have done so. Particles satisfy the logically necessary and sufficient
conditions for individuality and so are individuals whatever the metaphysical grounds for
that individuality may be. So, in a sense, I could stop here and leave aside the issue of the
metaphysical grounds of their individuality. Of course, I’ve already done all the work to
discuss the metaphysical grounds of particle individuality; all that’s left to do is to
consider whether there are any problems that arise with attributing haecceities to particles.
But it is important to note that criticisms of this part of my discussion will not challenge
my claim that particles are individuals (although an argument to the effect that there are no
suitable metaphysical grounds for individuality whatsoever would suggest that Chauvier’s
conditions for individuality are incorrect).
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As with the application of the conditions of individuality to particles, the application of
hacceities is straightforward. The hard part is defending the idea that there are such things
as haecceities that serve as individuators. With that done, the only difficulties in
suggesting that particles have haecceities would be (i) providing reasons to think that
particles are individuals and (ii) ruling out alternative metaphysical grounds of that
individuality. I’ve taken care of both of these in chapters four and five, respectively. This
may seem unsatisfying, but this is the nature of transcendental arguments. I claim that
particles are individuated by haecceities because particles are individuals and only
haecceities can serve as their individuators. I have no further positive argument for why
particles have haecceities.
However, noticing the connection between conservation and laws and the allowance or
disallowance of physical processes that violate relative indivisibility and formal
immiscibility gives us another option for grounds of individuality. Are there conservation
laws that prevent violation of these conditions in which the triviality concern with
conservation of energy doesn’t arise? Are there conservation laws that prevent violation of
these conditions in which either (i) there is no reliance on particles having the specific
values that they have for an additive property (such as mass) or (ii) having the specific
value that they have for the additive property in question is metaphysically
significant?
For leptons we could appeal to conservation of lepton number. A lepton has lepton
number 1 and a non-lepton has lepton number 0. A process that violates relative
indivisibility for leptons has lepton number 1 in the initial state and lepton number 2 (or
greater) in the final state. A process the violates formal immiscibility would be the
reverse. Conservation of lepton number rules out such violations. While lepton number
functions mathematically as an additive property, it doesn’t refer to an actual property that
leptons possess. It’s just using 1 and 0 to stand for ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers to the question “is
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this a lepton?” The conservation law simply tells us that leptons are not the kinds of things
that can violate relative indivisibility or formal immiscibility.
For quarks we have conservation of color charge. Color charge is the strong force, or color
force, equivalent of electric charge. However, it is interestingly different in that there is no
physical magnitude associated with color charge. Electric charge can be positive or
negative and has a physical magnitude attached. Color charge, on the other hand, can only
be ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ (i.e. red, green, blue, antired, antigreen, or antiblue). The color
charge of a state with one quark will be one of these six colors, whereas a state with n
quarks will involve a combination of n of these color charges. But no combination of
color charges is equivalent to a single color charge. A combination of a color with its
anticolor (e.g. red and antired) is considered to be colorless whereas the combinations
red-green-blue and antired-antigreen-antiblue are also considered to be colorless. So,
conservation of color charge gives us a way to ground the individuality of quarks without
appeal to specific values for additive properties.
In the case of the gauge bosons, the force mediating particles, there are both massive and
massless gauge bosons. The massless gauge bosons are photons (which mediate the
electromagnetic interaction) and gluons (which mediate the strong interaction). Because
massless particles don’t have decay pathways, the only kind of photon (or gluon)
‘splitting’ is that which occurs in photon ‘splitting’ experiments. But even if we view that
as a matter of actually dividing photons into multiple photons, it only occurs under very
specific experimental conditions and so is not a violation of relative indivisibility. The
same is true for the reverse process: it would not a violation of formal immiscibility. So,
like leptons, it seems to be the case that photons and gluons just are the kinds of things
that can’t violate the conditions of relative divisibility and formal immiscibility. The way
to understand this is the same as understanding the difference between an ontology for
Bohmian mechanics that either has or lacks a physical wave associated with the guidance
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equation. Not being open to processes that violate relative indivisibility and formal
immiscibility is a ‘way of being’ for leptons, photons, and gluons because there is no
actual conserved quantity (no property) involved in explaining why these particles can’t
violate the conditions of relative indivisibility and formal immiscibility.
The only elementary particles left are the W and Z bosons, which mediate the weak
interaction, and the Higgs boson. The only composite particles are mesons or baryons,
which are composed to two or three quarks, respectively. Baryon number conservation
functions in the same way as lepton number conservation. So it’s only the W, Z, Higgs,
and mesons left to account for. There do not appear to be any conservation laws I can
appeal to here that don’t involve conservation of specific values of additive properties. So
I could either say that the satisfaction of the conditions of relative indivisibility and formal
immiscibility for these particles isn’t grounded in a ‘way of being’ for these particles or I
could say that we just lack evidence for such grounds. But, of course, absence of evidence
is not evidence of absence. It is still the case that all particles satisfy the conditions of
relative indivisibility and formal immiscibility, it’s just that for some particles I can’t point
to a reason why their satisfaction of these conditions doesn’t involve a property.
So I can say that satisfaction of the conditions of relative divisibility and formal
immiscibility for the remaining particles are grounded in a ‘way of being’ wherein we
simply lack conservation laws in terms of W-boson number, Z-boson number, or Higgs
number. This lack could represent a genuine lack of such conservation laws, or it could
represent a lack of practical benefit of assigning such numbers to such small groupings of
particles. Especially in light of the fact that there is an approximate conservation law for
flavor (or kind) or particle that is only violated in weak interactions. Or I could say that
these particles have haecceities whereas, say, leptons do not. Or I could say that all
particles have haecceities. I prefer the first option.
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Lepton number is a flavor quantum number that is conserved in all interactions. There are
three more flavor quantum numbers that are also conserved in all interactions: these are
baryon number, electric charge and weak isospin. However, the latter two seem to be
importantly different in that they seem to represent actual properties that have physical
magnitudes connected to the strength with which a particle interacts via the
electromagnetic or weak forces.
For composite particles, there are only mesons (composed of two quarks) and baryons
(composed of three quarks). Baryon number conservation works for baryons as lepton
number works for leptons. So baryons seem to satisfy the conditions of relative
indivisibility and formal immiscibility due to a ‘way of being.’ But, for mesons, I can’t
point to any specific conservation law that doesn’t involve additive properties. So I can
either say we should accept that mesons satisfy the conditions of relative indivisibility and
formal immiscibility as a result of a ‘way of being’ based on the fact that this seems to be
how most particles satisfy these conditions. Or I could say that mesons have haecceities.
As before, I prefer the former option. I don’t think accepting something as a ‘way of
being’ rather than accepting an ontological component like a haecceity is inherently
preferable (as I mentioned before). But here we have reason to think the former option is
the right way to go with respect to leptons, photons, gluons, and baryons. So I don’t think
it’s a stretch to say that quarks, W-bosons, Z-bosons, the Higgs, and mesons have their
individuality in the same way (given that conservation laws do ensure that these latter
particles never violate the conditions of individuality).
Finally, with respect to the condition of ontological autonomy, I already said in chapter
four that it makes sense to view this condition as a metaphysical one. Ontological
autonomy is a matter of an object having its own being separate from other things. And if
we view the condition of being able to exist without being a proper part of something as a
consequence of ontological autonomy (a consequence that is particularly relevant for
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considerations of individuality), then we needn’t view the metaphysical counterpart of the
condition as a de re modal property.
Ultimately, particles are individuals because they satisfy the conditions of relative
indivisibility, formal immiscibility, and ontological autonomy. And they satisfy those
conditions in virtue of having their own being wherein it is simply a feature of the sort of
being that they have that they satisfy the conditions of relative indivisibility and formal
immiscibility.
The only thing left to do is to say something about whether anything changes when we
consider QFT. We saw in chapter one that QFT has the resources for viewing particles as
individuals with respect to states that are eigenstates of the particle number operator. As a
result, whether QFT has implications about whether particles are individuals or not hinges
on the significance of states that are not eigenstates of the particle number operator.
States that are not eigenstates of the particle number operator are often called ‘states of
indefinite particle number’. However, I think this terminology should be avoided as it
suggests a particular metaphysical interpretation of those states that we needn’t accept;
namely, that they are states in which there is no number which is the number of particles
in that state. Whether the existence of states that are not eigenstates of the particle number
operator has any implications about the individuality, or lack thereof, of particles depends
on (i) whether we should understand these states as states of indefinite particle number
and (ii) whether a state of indefinite particle number is incompatible with our conditions
of individuality.
We saw in chapter two that Huggett argues that the ability to represent states of indefinite
particle number is logically posterior to the issue of what metaphysical significance we
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should attach to labels. Huggett actually goes so far as to claim that quantum theory
introduces no new issues for individuality at all.4
Dorato and Morganti also briefly mention QFT after defending their primitive thisness
view stating that, “[t]hings, however, are likely to be different as one moves to quantum
field theory, where we can have superpositions of particle number and, consequently,
countability cannot be expected to play the same role as in the case of non-relativistic
quantum mechanics” (Dorato and Morganti 2013, p. 608). But they caution that “different
conclusions may be in order when it comes to even more fundamental physical theories
such as quantum gravity, string theory, etc” (Dorato and Morganti 2013, p. 608).
Do coherent states have an indefinite number of particles? I think that’s a complicated
question that isn’t answered merely by noting that it is very difficult to interpret them as
statistical mixtures rather than as pure states. The answer to this question may depend on
the interpretation of the theory more generally. Would a relativistic extension of Bohmian
mechanics treat coherent states as having an indefinite number of particles? I’m not sure
and I haven’t seen the question addressed. Discussions of relativistic extensions of
Bohmian mechanics seem to focus on ensuring the extension is Lorentz invariant and
worrying about dependence on a preferred foliation.
Aside from interpretation of quantum theory as a whole there are other interpretative
issues as well. Does an answer to the question of whether coherent states are states of
indefinite particle number depend on what it means for something to be a particle? I think
that it does. For example, if particles are emergent entities then there is a question of
whether there even are particles present in a coherent state. It could be the case that
coherent states are not eigenstates of the particle number operator because there are no
particles in that state rather than because there is an indefinite number of particles in that
4See (Gordon 2002) for discussion.
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state. If there are no particles present in a coherent state, then it’s not clear why coherent
states would have any implications for the question of whether particles are individuals or
not.
With Huggett’s objection that the issue of coherent states is logically posterior to the issue
of whether particles are individuals, Dorato and Morganti’s cautioning words that the way
we interpret QFT may change depending on the development of more fundamental
theories that are currently active areas of research, and the fact that the interpretation of
coherent states as states that have an indefinite number of particles seems to be a question
that is both open and complicated, it just isn’t clear enough whether there would be an
objection here when it’s all sorted out. Because even if we can agree that coherent states
are states in which there is an indefinite number of particles, that, by itself, doesn’t
necessarily create a problem for the view that particles are individuals. There is something
unintuitive about the idea of an indefinite number of individuals, but is that a problem with
my position or a problem with the intuition? Is this a case where the oddities of quantum
theory lead to the existence of some individuals whose features are in conflict with our
intuitions or is it a case where those intuitions point to a significant flaw in my position?
Coherent states are bound by conservation of energy just like any other states and so they
shouldn’t lead to an issue with my condition of relative indivisibility. The condition of
formal immiscibility is more complicated here but being a state of indefinite particle
number doesn’t seem to imply that a particle in that state could become two, or more,
particles of the same type. Consequently, even if coherent states are states of indefinite
particle number, I can say particles satisfy my independently motivated condition on
individuals (conditions that were not designed to have the peculiar result that states with
an indefinite number of individuals are possible).
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6.4 Conclusion
I have achieved three major goals in this dissertation. The first was to demonstrate
significant issues with the primary particles-as-non-individuals view in terms of lack of
self-identity. I have done so by (i) arguing that it is incoherent to suppose that there are
objects to which identity statements of the form ‘x=x’ do not apply and (ii) showing that
there are challenges to particles-as-non-individuals views that are particularly problematic
when non-individuality is understood as a lack of self-identity. As I mentioned before,
Domenech and Holik’s definition of cardinality for non-individuals may be perfectly fine
as long as non-individuality is not understood as a lack of self-identity.
The second goal was arguing that particles are individuals. I defended three conditions
that are each logically necessary and are jointly sufficient for individuality. And I
defended these conditions independently of any concerns regarding particles. These
conditions are, in my view, the logically necessary and sufficient condition for anything to
be an individual. Having defended these conditions there was little left to say about their
application to particles. Decay pathways, BECs, and virtual particles provided what could
serve as challenges to some possible accounts of individuality; but, properly understood,
there is no incompatibility between these features of quantum theory and Chauvier’s
conditions of individuality. As a result, the completion of this goal in this chapter required
only ensuring that the conditions of individuality were sufficiently clear.
Finally, the third goal was defending the idea that there is a sensible metaphysical ground
for the individuality of particles. However, I went beyond that as a result of the lack of
consideration for the possibility of non-individuals in existent accounts of individuality.
While I view particles as individuals, I also accept the existence of non-individuals and so
require that any suitable account of metaphysical grounds of individuality allow for the
existence of non-individuals. Ruling out possible metaphysical grounds of individuality
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due to (i) not allowing for the possibility of non-individuals and (ii) not being concerned
with individuality at all as a result of conflating individuality with another concept (such
as distinguishability) left only haecceities as the remaining candidate.
I’ve already explicitly mentioned most of my contributions in the preceding two chapters.
My major contribution from chapters three and four was to outline and respond to
challenges leveled against defenders of non-individuality. The criticisms raised by Jantzen
and Bueno are not general criticisms of particles as non-individuals as they were
presented. They were only challenges to specific particles as non-individuals views
(specifically that largely developed by French and Krause) in which being a
non-individual involves a lack of self-identity. Additionally, in chapter four was my
criticism of self-identity as a condition of individuality (self-identity being a relatively
new proposal for such a condition) as well as my focus on keeping the existence of
possible non-individuals in mind while considering the various possible conditions of
individuality. There has been an assumption in recent debates that essentially everything
was an individual save universals. It’s only recently that sophisticated ways of thinking
about non-individuals have emerged leading to serious proposals for non-individuals other
than universals including physical non-individuals. So chapter four (and chapter five as
well) largely focuses on rethinking traditional proposals with a new evaluative criterion in
mind.
In addition to evaluating the proposals in chapter five with respect to the possible existence
of physical non-individuals, I also evaluated them with respect to the position I had
defended in chapter four. But, more importantly, I defended metaphysical views that tend
to be controversial among philosophers of science. This is important because my primary
motivation for this dissertation as a philosopher of physics with a background in analytic
metaphysics was to demonstrate how the work of metaphysicians is not only important but
how it can be useful in addressing questions in the philosophy of physics.
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